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/wMt things-are-.-gboa; Pt;,right-}:,-woâ-t contemporary Brltiph 
phllpppphors.'do .sttbporlbp to the view timt the fmaammtal 
prohléias.of /*'SthiP#a.P ,h■■philospph.ipai alspiplinp arp: oon* 
-pèrnéd .#@ptiPh''Pf '.the. pprfPPt -defi-hitil».} pr- aaaljrpis,:’ 
Of ..fthi'ppl .torap}''ShPh, hP "right"' aat "gop#-} or, of one , 
'hmo.#st. 'ttîeffl, ' Thhp% Moore; virl-tes -.(I;)-, this-, laestloa.}
how-,-"gp.o4'". :io -.to .he defiaeû':} i8,,--the..mp.st yfundamohta'l 
tupotiph -Isa pli pthiPPw" Aad Ewlhg}- ,ih the. Prptaoo to - 
Tiffi, DlFlM'ÏTiON QE QÛ», argues .that th@. firpt a #  most . l 
-fuhdaaehtai; GUésS-loh of ©thio.ai •.enquiry.'4s. thp quostloa 
"What is the apflnitioh. of- gooâhesg". '
The p0ht|fove.rsy betWeoh mturaliam and abn-mturalism, 
which we are to ommlne in this thPsls» Is about an ethioal 
probieto in the sense in which the term "ethics" is uMer» 
stObd..'by; thes-c thinkers» It deais with the question whetitsr -: 
ethical terms, and., in particular, in the form in which we 
are to ezcamine it, the term "good", can .or cannot be 
analysed into, or defined by means of, terms signifying 
sensibly observable data* B'Wiag’ describe.s a haturallati'e 
■ view of ethics as, one which "amlyses ethical concepts 
solely in terms - of # e  concepts of a natural'science" (2)»
.4 noa-naturâ'list view of ethics, on the other hand, is one 
in which ethical-propostions are recognised to contain "at 
least on© concept which cannot b© thus analysed" (3),
Nevertheless', if there is a sense in which this discussion
/discttss-lph'..eaa-.be .desçrib# as #th%a%'x.it .seems, to .
-us. that Ayer has. hr ought a.weiG-pme aorrectloh of 
termlnologjj and am a #  to precision..-of.\thp#ght-;- with, 
his hçe of the. toim.,.*hâ©ta-éthio,al",- ,It w.o.%& probably., , 
bo diff-ioult- to .obtain agr©#Bioiit among: proseat#day, 
thialtor'f ,a.s ;#- the.-oorreot- naming of- tho;. phllosophloal.. 
dlsoiplfttO#. ot''d.lselpiîa@'s,. coiaprlss'd, tailor .''*me.ta-<*-, . 
oth-10's'**j-:--ana it.'do,8s -ao,t -seem dos-iroble-to attempt, to . 
r'OAOh- agr@Qm@n.t-,.oa thiC- question ,of oorfeot .deaomiaat-ioa 
at .this ■-p-oi|3.t*-., S #  we .hope to show-thht. the .issue between 
t-he.fOatura.-liat' -and the moa»mt#a.ll8t, while its, professed' 
ob-iéOt- is 'the.-astttre .of' ethi^ol çonoepto-£t'o.us-e listing’s 
- torminolo#)} or .of:,#at.,.'are-.éowid,ered'.-to .W ethieal 
ooixeepts:-:}- iS| in fwt,- a .dispute about the .extent'and 
o'Ompositibn of'.'the eonceptual..-order, D..oes', this ord.er 
,4hôiüdi;'''(ob'iee|-s£.whieh-haVe not been deriyed' from 
-sensible àsperieHOê, as the nOn*aaturaiigt- G.laims, or are 
all bur-éonoepts so-derived? This may sëem like a dispute 
about what is present in a given field (that signified by 
the terms oonaeptunl order) but, in fact, our fashion of 
vièy.iàg the conceptual order is itself affected by the 
view we take, regarding the fundamental chara'cter 1stIcs 
of' the .-cognit.-iVe. act as' 'such, ' Hence, Involved "'in this 
contrbVersy are problems concerning the nature of know* 
ledge, and we shall afgUe that the basic point of Issue 
betWOen the naturalists and the n0n*naturalists concerns
' 'x r. ‘ -.. ■ . y > -..Xix-■.. ; - :  ■.. i x;;,x
S i _ . • 1 . . - . ' • I » ■'! kV.iï'
■ -.v
/#àçëras #11 tW ’ :
■çf-intelligibility'**. Basing''théi» argiw0|its éa dif*. ■ 
féfent prtoêiplés' of i»teillgibll.it7s. '’iiiposoibl® 
f#:f$ith8r contestant to convince or éonyett thé.-éther»
...-.. facoavihçed by.-either sMé'.in this^ .-dlép##.*, t# Mv@ - 
, ;.th©réforé-thé«glÊ-.-it'-worthwhile :tQ ©xaralftQî.thé thaér-y of 
. ■ Ahrliiéièlf,. of ’ihféillgihiiity’*' as thàt ■iCrféUi.id'-ïa the
philosophy:..of -8t», T '.A'ghl0© # #d t.p Kèmpîéy .'this la 
'an-,.effort té'jîtëké, éïohr -■to.:.©hré©ivéi'--th®'-fhxa'àt'.'’gr'oimds . 
of-/oar disshti.sfahtloh-Swith;héth, side's„M:.thls éélshratôd: 
a-if|htê*.The,.:piahfof'fthlt thA&:^ %'#:£'théh*h folKows.;-*
'. ''îa.;.Ghhptày î---'^é.’:'|iia:|ll.Ô0tt|.l#©y-What‘-St'£:'fhom hy
" '''ola-lilhg that "holhg is 'thé first lhte.ll'iglhlf'-'.,. .Chaptèr 
' .'. ii, gïy#' 'h''''hfl'éf -'a.Qéouat';#.kooréls' 'o'oaoé#léh'of,..tho . ,
r. .of.the disàgréèmè'af-'b©tMèehxhli«sei-f 'MS. thé-.' ;. ' .-': '1; *" ' " -X "- ■ . ;■' '■."riatttraliits", and draws.-attéhtloa to 'certain opistem-» 
ûiogléa.l' -Implications,'of; his '#n p.osit:toa*''-,,,-,-Thl:é''.ls 
. ■: folié## by a é.lmp.ter-'.&%pt.ef; III) - oa- l'wihgis ' 'opisteia*
o.loglé'al theory, -whiçh.'-ls: roqulreà'as a . préi#iha-rÿ 'to - 
ohr':.d'ethi'i@â. ëxam.iaé'ti'om -of #h*m'tmaiiém as' this is
■'éohoélyéd ànô a'èfèhdès--hy iwihg, ou». .aàiÆxipafcl of
: réf.'ér'ëac© for this l a t W  hèing 'TBi #' GOOD*':
.-fahilshed la Ighy, this -Work.is; the aost '.yèe.eat com-* .. .
- .pr.ehéhéiyé and -explicit dèfénés of the hfh*nat.ufaiist 
ppéitioa* This .éxémiha'tioh 'is- -'#âërtàk#f:in Ghafteis IV 
çnd V., a #  a final ohaptér'; 'èhaptér VI',' pffefs .séfie
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çmPTER I. THE imEmmiBILITY OP BBIIG,
Introdnotion* The most oharaoteristic feature of the 
philosophy of St* Thomas Is its vigorously metapi^sical 
appjeoaah: it is towards the clarifloation and'-elucid*.
atiOh of-the notion of .being, towards the deepening of
* £ « * . V • « * ' *• *  ^ • if *  ^ i
their grasp of being .in all .its depth.an# amplitude that 
the energy of those ""wh'O.j.prbfess to .be. "T'homists'! is 
directed# And for these philosophers "explanation'* is, 
in the last resort and fundamentally, explanation in 
ter As. 'of. bein^, - or Of :tl# principles of. -being* "
The term "metaphysical" Ms, in modern times, fallen 
into suoh disrepute.that it is desirable to point out 
briefly certain of the features of St* Thomas's philo­
sophical putiook which will serve, at least provisionally, 
to allay the suspicion, so often entertained by modern 
thinkers, that the metaphysical system referred to under 
the name of "Thomism" is a highly sophisticated "play 
of concepts"# It is true that the mode of presentation 
in Certain of the older manuals of ThomistiC metaphysics 
does little to correct this impression# But a certain 
lack of historical perspective is shown when this charge 
is carried back to the philosopher who has given his name 
to this system* We must not forget that, if St. Thomas's 
work is marked by a firm confidence in the power of the 
humn mind to make intelligible to itself the nature of
. . ■
a — —
^ 8.'. . v; '
/o£ the real, tills confidence finds Its |>re*philosophtoal 
■, source, and. constant,;n6urtshraent,. in a fundamental 
, Christian, attitude in vhioh it is reoogntaed that, both 
knower and what is known are the effect of the creative 
. act Of a Personal God,, in whom truth and beSig are one#
% n  is. not, the creato? -of What he knowst -if;he can make 
the .real intelligible to,hltose.lf-this .is benhuse-the 
.. ".real la. intelligible * ■ - .In .the .Clirlstian setting of his 
thoij^ ht .St* .Thomas.*S, fundamental, realism expresses itself 
 ^ in .a. certain’docility before.being as it is-giVen to man,a C - >■'■'* * *  ^ ’ * » *•' •>' i .'i /' _a creature and not creator..’ ' There is' an '"bpéh&ness"
. ’before' the whole' fl#ld' .of. human experience., which is 
■ ’ • “’rbcbghls'ed' as.' the-’.expMicnoe’ of -dn 'erab’bd’i#d-”'intelleot>
', ■ '0 onSéquéhtly f ■ the - confidence in .mn’s ' power to • know ■ the 
real as'it really is is accbmpanied by the recognition 
that’ this grasp- of the real takes place according to the 
conditions of an embodied'intellect^ which can only realise 
the act of knowledge in eo*operatioa with'the senses» The 
»Iatelic0tualism"of St» Thoims is far from dogmatic 
’rationalism which seems too often to be considered as the 
outstanding mark (and condemnation)' of a "metaphysical 
approach" to philosophical problems*
These points will receive further elucidation in the 
course of this chapter as we attempt tb.'dëtermlne the 
exact significant© of the theory that "bCing is the first 
intelligible"* This examination falls into tliree sections*
. 9 *  •
/sections# in-'thé'first'section wé sMïl défend the ' 
Thoraist., position against. tW: oha'rgé. thàt,' 'M'ving first 
■ Méâs'ur'ed-'being...to the intelleot'we thon ,'extend'the '
, in'béiïeôt t'o nil''.'t!mt is '"'of'being"',.nnd-'tbab there*
.fore 'what is br'es'entéd 'as n "philosophy o'f ■^ing" 'is- '
'. no'- rae're ' tMh a ratlonhiis'tic- system - of 'aono opts '
'. originally,: è'ohs'tru&tea;.-by tts* TMs .defence, will-be ' .■'"
. reinf'of'ced- 'in the' 'sec'ohd' 'section 'in which'; we shall 
. attempt ' to f nswer. the question, ' -'"-What, In-fact*. - does 
..S'ti' Thorns s.. ïaëhn .by ’béing''?■"#' -This will* Ih turn, point 
to the need for an examination of the aot in which the 
Inteliéet grasps ' being , and this will be' dealt with in
; thé"third'seCtlonV
£  ■ ' : '. 1 0 *  £
.: ■ ' 'It, is- la t W  Dm- W l # #  (1) tmt the most
<: ' '-' frequently'quôtèd;text relative to'oUr'-Sttbleot is found.
;/■ ''.S'.éÇ^ aiso , (a);* ,';3t'» ■Thows''wrïtë8,''"fM't;,-horever, which
••■’ 'the'jiatëlléct-'éohÔ'èiVea first 'us best 'kaoWa*,,uhd 'in which 
- ■ it, reholveg - all 'CohCeptiOns - is • bSihg ' Cs m ) 'â's ' Avicenna ■
■ ' -',',sçya' ,ih ',the-,bçgiîm'2iig- of' his îliftPhYSica, boOJc Î, chapter
': iherefora,,■.all Other'eonéeptioas: of - the intelièCt' ,
' must be' arrived'at,by'an addition'to, being.*',, sut some- _
■ thih’g :ohnno.t';b© add# to'- being às an extrèhèous .mtuTe,
, in the -.imnner '-,ih which a difference is added to a genus 
'or,;hn accident,to a'^ s.UbSect, for every nature is essen- 
,.ti#lly being,,. and therefore the ' l%iloso,pher in. the. 3rd. 
boOk of the MEl'APiprs icS proves likewise that .-.being cannot 
be .a genus,*" (3) '
, ; . . -If we were to cons,ider this quotation In isolation
.from: certain fundumntal ideas of St. Thoiaas-’s thought 
' we. might -be .misled lato thWtlng that, for" him, the idea 
O'fx-being is a -"Clear and distinct" idea -and that he con- 
.side.rs th#, in its fully developed form, oUf knowledge 
, cohsistS in -the, linking.'of all other concepts to this 
'-id#., without - any .appeal to experience. There is., how^ 
éyér j in the first 'place,- no jUsttfioation fbr interpret­
ing the, phrase "q'uod primo IntCllectuS. .cOncipit quasi 
notissimum" as meaning tliat the intellect first knows
• ••'XX'ë. £'£
bf mp# q^ léaÿly
âldtliïotly# ü?he g^ ënteuGG of tlie oprpüs of
thlë #tlçlë refè% to the lioM In all Investigation 
of stâ#'lng f^om that whldh Is known In itWelf (nota
. ■ ; -J' • -.hR3^.;%q) y as opposed to that ijhloh la ImoWn tiirough 
_ something othep tlia%% Itsôlf» Following on. from this 
the p%aoe "quasi notlsslm*#" must W  tAkén to. refer 
to the relation 6f being to the ihtôliôdt % - a#\ not­
as a depcrlptlph of the type or form of knowledgo 
whloh the Intelleqt M's of beings Being la conbelved 
by the Intolleot as "beat"» or "most", known In the 
Sèhse that It l8 not Oonoelved or apprehended.through 
• anything-other .than Itself  ^and. -everything;else is 
eondelVed In relation to It, "For that which first 
falls under apprehension ls/,be|li%e^' the understanding 
of ivhloh Is Included in all things wMtsoeVer a man 
apprehends" (1)« The^ e^ le no justification, therefore^ 
for treating the "first ilntolllglbie" as a olear and 
distinct idea In the sense in ivhlch that Is understood 
la the Qarteslah Ideal of knowledge.. Moreover, in the 
second place ÿ we are not entitled, from either of .'the 
above quotations, to Infer anything with regard to the 
manner In which the understanding of being is "included 
In" all things whatsoever a man apprehends# In 
particular, we must recognise that the fact that the 
understanding of being Is "Included In" our appréhension
1 2 .
/apprehension of "ali^things" does not rule out the 
possibility that this • understanding may itself depend, 
in its development, on our "apprehension of all things", 
nor that sensible e3cpériènce is not involved in this 
latter#
If we oomsider the \root of the term "intelXegere" as 
"Intua legore", signifying. (D, we m y
say that, in claiiping 'that being is the first Intel-# 
llgible and; that the of. being is . included
in all pur apprehensions, what St. Thoms is saying is 
that both the original and ultimate field of the 
intellect ^ s activity-, is being; that/this field is, of . 
its nature, "open to" the "penetration" of the intellect; 
and that, no matter what may be the object of a particular 
act of "understanding", this object must be viewed within 
the intellect:*s,-grasp of being itself# Whatever the 
intellect thinks of^it thinks of as "of being", and only 
in so far os it does seek to measure itself to the being 
of that which it apprehends can it perform its function 
of understanding, or "reading from within" * Conversely, 
"everything is knowable in so far as it has being" (2);
I.e., the characteristic of being able to enter into a 
cognitive. relation with the intellect depends upon the 
being which an object possesses and upon nothing less, or 
more specific, as, for instance, on its possession of 
sensible qualities (as is claimed by empiricism), or on
13,
/on the possibility of its subsumption within an 
order of clear and distinct ideas, as this is envisaged 
in Cartesian idealism#:
It seems desirable; at this point to insist on the 
radical difference between "Thomist intellectuallsm" and 
what we have called "dogmatic rationalism"# By the 
latter we mean a theory of knowledge built upon the 
assUinption of the complété autonomy of reason to affirm 
and herself "found" her affirmationsby the mere contem­
plation of what she herself conceives* On this view 
reason can, by herself, reach truth without the aid of 
anything extraneous to her own activity* Intellectualism, 
on the other hand, is a theory concerning the power or 
capacity of the human intellect to grasp and make clear 
to itself the nature of the real, and by "make clear" we 
here mean to present to Itself the real as it really is# 
But what is important to note is that, thus understood, 
Intellectualism does not carry with it any prescription 
regarding the way in which this knowledge, this"making 
clear to itself the nature of the real", is to be real­
ised# The epistemological conditions of human knowledge 
remain to be determined* But already it seems clear that 
Intellectualism is incompatible with dogmatic rationalism* 
It seems to us that, when it Is logically developed, the 
latter ends in identifying the real with the mind * s
i¥. I
V,
/mind's conoepts> xvhépeas, as we imderstand it, Intel­
lect uaTlém Implies 1* a capacity which is distinct from
■ .•*realisation, and a* a capacity which is really capacity;
which Is hot simply, an "absence** to be "filled up" 
with the real as such, but a distinct positive power 
which will leave its imprint on what "fills it up", or 
on what it "receives"# Thus, St* Thoms writes (1), v;
"the received is in the receiver according to the mode of 
the receiver", and, elsewhere (2), "We must not base the 
diversity of natural things on the various logical not­
ions or intentions which follow from our manner of under­
standing; for reason can apprehend one and the mme 
thing in various ways"# From this, and similar statements :
in his works (3)$ it is clear that for 8t# Thomas our con- : 
oepts are not objects of knowledge, but media through 
which we know a reality which is distinct from them, and 
must so remain*
The purpose of this short section has been to clear 
away certain misconceptions which might arise with regard : 
to the quotation from the DB VBRITATE, in which being is 
described as the "first intelligible"# We have, however, 
had occasion to notice certain positive aspects of this
and these must now be clarified# In the 
first place, we drew attention to the fact that the :
•*knowableness" of an object is dependent on its being, and £
/aM on notjatttg legs»; Clfarljr, tà© glgn.l#mmoe of 
tills canaot be ' appÿeoMtod without an aceoynt ,of what 
St* Thoms ■ fflaans--by beAag» ïhis^  will be dealt with 
ih the following éecttbn* in th@ seooad plaeoi. %}Q 
bavé: geen',tiia.t,. àcop3?a|ng tp' #t# -fhomas-.j'- wp oaimPt ■. ■
assUffls a oao^one conregppadenpe betxieén. puw ponoepts 
and the jjèpl, trpating.:: the former ,a@' simple' ml3?3?pns of 
thp; lattpy,* ' in, this ppmioptlon" it: is ,nepeâsài;y. to 
pphsidez' thp 'Pntqup - ppgitlpn of the/not ion pp.idea, of 
beingj as thnt^ . in and tiwpugh whtchs evènythlnè is - 
ap|)pphenaed. or imderttPpd,' and this will be emmilnpd ■ 
la the ..thind, %eotlpn;: in whleh we. hope to show that,
In the judgmpnt of existenee, the intellect is conscious 
of being confronted with an absolute measure of its 
own aetivity»
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4.4. ' •■ S hw àhs ih té llé .c t' Is '. f it te d '- to  k h # , ' hamely . '• # tw e 'é % is #
S/S' . I® coi’pOffhX matte®"., aftd .we mhst hoté'Sthât ;thè:' terras
. ',.(i#t#o4exis^  é%#.eSS' .e#l'tcttl/' the 'tWo4**0 ç®ct@"'' '
.ct AoW# which' WeS'have.''ho®m^  d#q#hihg4lh''tkl^^
.4 : ' .sftction/ 8.0'. ##:,' the%. w0 .Cam say thh.tS.he®@'#4'asylhd'eed'
45 ''%i#ysAlISoi$ thesis,:#.. corre.çt,4thé ''f#dam®ht# . 
çoÿidtlté. efiott of thé - iptélléct dà: t'o4c'ôhfo®m ttséif
/to being and to nothing less# is the
import7bf the final phrase, "in pbrporeal matter"?
Can w  .expialh' this in' such a'-way/'thÿt the principle 
of ihteiilgibillty remains unquaiified? 8t# (Thomas* s 
:4b%planutibn,'i'8 that, thb'ihuman ''intellect is "united to a 
'‘b'bdy"7v - It'-'i'à'-îthis fact Which determines the type of • 
object which it is fitted to know% The union bet#en 
; the-;‘intellect I and the'bbdy ds" of/' s uch .-a ' k'ihd tWt! the 
senses CÏO not simply provide the bccasibn for an 
entirely autonomous activity bn the part of the 
''inteilbct,' ' but affect ''its verÿ way or mode,-'of 'exérols- ' 
ing its function of boiifbrmihg to thè real, dr to that 
ïWhibhï&s bbing#-, 4I/ ',(t#''hum'n-ihteilêçt): no
iimate ideas in the contemplation of which it sees the 
real as it really is5 on the odhtfary, it "has to 
/gàtWr : 'Imbwledj '^ ';%omIndivid m l  rthings way. bf the 
sensbsi" (1) Hence thb type of being which it is 
fitted to knoxii is that whose presencWcan' bo madd JBanl-* 
■fest'by the séhses / •IvO®.cbrpbreâl being» ' It does- not 
followV howbyer^ that human knowledge is limited to 
wkjbt thë 'senses can revéal, which would, in striotnbes, 
be no more tWh the here and now presence of individual 
sensible qualitiesw
This is the point at which we can see most clearly 
the fundamental difference between the Thomist viexi? of
/of the natucçe of knowledge ani tiiat which is 
involved, In th#, ^ umlan olalm that ''®eason is the 
handmaid of the senses;*". The Iraplleàtion of the 
.;.latt®V.-is. that-'the. senses are,, in themselvesj â 
: güffielent .Source of a complete act of knowledge*
This is. precisely what St, Thomas refuses to accept,
; and it seems to us that it is here tWt his dis­
agreement. with empiricism (in the modern Humian sense)
: ■■lies* ,"it .is,: true. that; Stv Thomas's whole analysis of 
the nature of knowledge is based on a certain pre- 
.philosophical conception of what knowledge is. But it 
is hard to imagine in What other manner hc> or indeed 
anyone » could proceed in this matter. In St* Thoans's 
eyes khowledge is characterised by self-consCiousness* 
in the sense that, to know is ,to say tb oneself what a 
4thing 'it, or tt present to .oûeself .the',real as it 
really isj or to make manifest to oneself what is the 
case* These are; so many phrases which, we suggest, 
are frequently employed at a pre*philospphleal level 
in answer, to the question, "In what does knowing 
consist''? And it is this presence of the self to the 
self as a subject before whom or to whom things are 
made manifest which we mean to.signify by the term 
"self*"Consoiousness",
It may be noticed that all of the phrases we have 
chosen as descriptions of Imowlng emphasise the activity
{A
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a #  tw sehses,; except, in-'
so far as they are "taken up by" or informed'by the 
intellect* For example, the impression of a certain 
shapeMàna colour which Jie in ; fact» the ' sen® ibl© 
effect produced in my sense of vision by the presence 
of a red-headed man is hot in itself knowledge of a 
redeheaded' man. $0% be able to hay,- "1 see.aÂCd- 
headed man" Is already to présuppose an activity 
(reflexive), and to employ categories which cannot be
found in or provided by the senses themselves*, Thn®»
for St> Thomas, the intellect is involved in'hll
knowledge. Perception or sensible knowledge is itself
informed by intellect which renders .intelligible the '.
material or data delivered by the senses, It is not
our purpose to giVe a complete account of all ttot is
involved■in, this''activity.of,'rendering intelligible,the
material of knowledge which the senses provide. To do \
SO w  should have to devote considerable time to the 
Thom#t docW^o/ ot hbs#..aotioh\ahd this m
beyond the limits x^ iich We have set ours elves in this 
chapterè But we may note here that this whole doctrine 
is . ah att#Rt to determine ' the ÿuïes. which. must be 
observed IS human thought is tb be faithful to the 
real (1) and that as such it presupposes a certain viex^
of t W  relation xfhiOh exists between human .thought .and the
reaif or between the logical and the ontological order,
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' r/31,.
/éonsMeriiiE -bhlyr.a" certain' a o p e ç t ^ . b f - ''î^- '
l't' x#ÿ.e sb.:.limltêd:''.it oouldrh0Y<^i^ .â^ alb8 \thG ' / '- ' ''
givèn It by tW"' -aWseë^  %#.': the .lèvol/of " revealing tW \7'
%*eâl . It t dnly toi the iGvel'/.of reveal^ , . /
laglt# ts t't. "brjÿ ' as. It\.ap*;&0arç;/-t _\'- -
aa' ÎÉitellèât ;whloh .lë, . la its horizon*
-''%b evbrytb^S/tlmt is 'is- a M  -.sp.-fai? as
the. /Intellect is limitM bÿ npthlag less than being ^ - , - ; ' '
and t this Is. not incloed a limitation of its activity but
th%:;V#y. i%: being--'aS; à 'q'ognltite; p o w e r .. - ,
it/^is-,.. capable/with the'00-"Operation’.of the, sens es of ,.. . 
realising the cognitive act in Which that which is : is 
revealed as M  Z##!##*, '^ é^4' W #4 P]:'0Vld# b^ .the ' 
senses can become revealing 6f the real only because 
the intellect is able through its grasp of being to 
bestow on them an ontological value® Thus/ for instance, 
to talk about the souses r,ev®allng sensible dualities Is 
already to raise the sensible impressions received by 
the-' senses to a status .yithln .beins. namely, the status . 7
of qualities of a thing, i*e» of something.which liqa
JSaStlUg*
And it is because the intelieot Is capable of grasp- 
ing, imprecisely no doubt in the first instance, but 
nevertheless adequately, (in the sense that all further 
pr.ebisions .take nlace from within the original .-;a
AI
auà|ifiôd, as,: fçr4 eMàpîëÿ ''®édVhéaâëd*; that, ïticaà-. 
;-re#é®''’'t|ié data significant ». in4;:#Ç':p%se:..o
thèïi®#/» ' .:' 'A/;'-',... , ;.■;■ "ï'7A-' 4..-A'•'....■
tr#' that'4%®. type- af .b®ing7whi#'44tli®"^  
infémed' by, tW.- iïM=eilëéÂMà:®éy®âdl§d ç.o®#®ead %lhg »
dutrthe4'.#timàtÇ''®e$,#pdA .àah :be /-
;rèVéàibà71i®'â:.'ln4:i#'’ 'rdytha;ta®7sort ;of being
;tb®¥'dt;4is7 .The int%##%t'''t%p .stili' m#®.#®#.. ty '
- by mthing % # #  ^ : ,1 '.’; /(A -, ' . '
tEeliipifett' : i ^  a#®d af %r4A##%;L%#gi:
, 4 .7:13.’ ■ 7 . 4 .4--V /
4 :■• ■ Tto.-.dtta-aaa^ t. .of. pxist'once./ . 7
\ In opataot/wl^ ^^
- W0d\ . 9^7them,:'7%', % Asehoq.*. \4oh~. »
- commltal ; Cso -'far.' a$ theÿ Wre. deliberately' chosen to
tWchnlqal TMse
v4re *^ gràsp pf being"/ and "notlhn of being"*. The
thé#., phrases - tends ^ to/ahggeet/sbm#hlngA%iose 
to ■ immediate: experience / x^ hereàs tÜ0: Second points -. 
-^owar#: :cqn#ptm 14-thom#tw. -But; in• eSqh; of them there :' 
is a counterbalancing element® Thus, "experience" for 
liu^h beingâ : ; implies paÿélvi ty ÿether than act ivity , and . 
we Use the term "grasp" to counterbalance this * On the 
other hand^ honceptuni thhiight tùggestë autonomous 
activity* and we chose the less activist term of "notion" 
to counterbalance this# iVhat we: are trying to capture 
14 these phrases is the peculiar nature of the "eaçternal 
Oyesqure" under which being becomes present to thé mindy 
.and the peculiar nature of thé ^ t^sponfexieity*? in and 
through which the mind recognises being* (By "spontaneity"
: we mean to draw attention to thé element of autonomy or 
freedom which the mind is conscious of enjoying in so far 
AOSit transcends, in. its. conceptual activity/, the immediate 
data given to it "here and now" by the senses.) These two 
..ï^ hrases, ;;"e4t#^iApress'ure" and- "sp#taneity" suggest a;:V 
respectively what are often described as the empirical and
/^ nd ratipmllstic aspects, of. the cognitive .,
How, midéi? .the'false dilemma (as we consider It to 
,bé)': Of. either ernPlrloism# or rationalism %;e tend to 
equate "exterml. press arc" .'with ; byute fact loi tv and 
, to .-consider that thé mind comprehendsor;.- under stands 
in proportion- as/, it escapes ■ from : this ^e^ternal 
pressure"# Empiricism and ratipiiallsm represent, the
%wo e%tr#e limité/'.of, this - ......
/limiting;it to the ordering of the sensible data by ■ 
##ely ' :fpr.#l-. systems y ■ rationalism attributing to 
thought a power to \sæââM ( or "discover") the omte# 
of its object® Both really agree, so it;would seem, 
in'believing tliat an object Is'ihtelliglblé'■just In so 
far as thou^ zht imposes totalllgibilitv on it. Héitliër 
of 'thcmÀSêèms. ■to; entertain thev'possibility that 
intelligibility may be given: may, that is to say,
impose itself upon the mind.# -; But this is precisely 
4hat xm claim when we shy that being is "the first intel­
ligible"® For, hero we have, as it were, external 
pressure at its greatest (since everything is * of being^  
and nothing escapes being), and yet this does not equal 
"brute facticity"Î for, on the cpntrafy, in its "grasp 
of being" the spontaneity of the mind is realised to 
fhe..highest degree, for it is xjthin the "light of being" 
that the mind can exercise its conceptual activity.
/activity* Being is»- we raay say, the. 'fnatur®!: habitat 
of the mind"» or, it.'s "natuVal light''* . - 4%
',7. These, reflections 7s«ggast that otir difficalty in :•
finding the correct terminology fori describing the 
mlhd 's ooataqt with .being- ;stôàs from-whàt -may be .bailed' ' ' : ‘ ' i. ' , -7 . ' ' ■ -. -ii/ ’ - " .77
the diatlhotlve nature of the bëiiavlùür of hein^  ^'vis h
o mlW * a behaviour
. ' 'It - is ' this ■' dOÛbX© ' phënoméhëh’ whlSh 'W mhst ' 'hot" ’. '7|
è)càmihe, and to do so we introduce the two terms "Imimnent" 
and' "tfahsdëMehta'i"* ':'By ■saying' tMt being' is #olly .'■/ 
Immanont in a concrete being #  mean to say that there is 
ho element, /aspect'/'or part' of-tW%' being which is' not 
"of being"/ By saying tMt being Is also trahscendehtal, . . 7 
we mean tWt. whliLe It immanent in the cohcrete being 
so that nothing in or of the being falls outside the com- 
prehension Of the notion of being, nevertheless this 
concrete being is not oo^extehslve with the notion of being. 7 
There are other concrete being# to which the hotlOh of 
being eqtxally applies, and# furthermore, there Is precisely 7 
nothirte to which this notion does not , In some my/apply.
What must bç underlined here is the Immanênoè of being in ji 
each and every concrete being* If this is hot sufficiently 
emphasised it is difficult: to see thé;'fundamental'difference:'/ 
in the way in which we must view the relation between the
$6.
/the hétloh of befng m à  a oohorète befngj an# the 
way in, which we must view the relation between the 
notion of an attribute or quality ana the concrete 
being which;, posaeases- it. If we say that in both 
cases what we do is to view the concrete being under 
a notion or idea or concept,
other aoplicàtiena, we must note that the grounds for 
so being able to view a given concrete being differ 
in the two cases* for example, if we can view a 
given partioular object (e*g. "This rose") under the 
concept red, this is because this rose is character­
ised by the qtmlity qf redness, and it is ttv virtue 
^  its,possessing this.'quality that it can be viewed 
under the general notioii* MoreoVer, we pan signifl? 
oantly say that it is by virtue of it's redness, and 
byjvirtue of its scent, or texture, etc,, that it 
can be so viewed, We must, therefore, be able to 
separate out ih our mind, or abstract this quality of 
the rose from the other qualities which determine it, 
and this same condition will govern the appiieabllity 
of the concept rod to other particular objects. We 
can say that in each case a given Object can be 
brought under the concept by being considered exclus-, 
iyely In one or a number (for we can have complex 
concepts) of its detormimtions* When, however, we 
vview "This rose" under the general notion of being our
':74 ./AA'''
/qu®7'vléWing'.'ctq#s not beàr :0n ■a'.'dqterminatlèiîlos -a," ‘ .
number of ■ aatèriîdrn'iti'ônsvof the object,, but. on tlrXs . .
robe 'in its -..oohcfst.e..’..entirety for Wc necessarily ; view '. 
;it'ifcsJâ#Èàil#â#â* A,'#7'cUn;,: -if’■'we iilte.fIgayAbat 
It ig by virtue ;.of''its>heing .tMt 'this rose 'haa- .be ' ■ -, 
brought.., imdep 'the,:.general notion .of. .being,.' '.but 'We muat 
ao.tq.;4'i>iiat In thib cas#. thë.' 'piWùb:7'.;by'Virtu#' of^ .^ carries' 
US' Immecliutoly. back - to' the givoh object Ip its ■ concrete 
■.Mt^a|y,f ‘aaa..';hpt,,: as- ih ' the case, of rod,:.'.to: the given 
.objéçt côhvSÎd'eÉed ..simply.in chi/ôf; a/'number^ qf .its 
dètéï'îBinationa,# ' Thiigÿ ' d i f f e r j  moté fail under .’the 
general ';of 'being.'-not. by ylrtue of posses**/,
oo#ià%'7
but, they :do ,''so. '
There 1# 4 .;singdlàÿ;bl'^pblari%/contained In'the / 
very^notion being ’whereby at ^ oaW-Vehd'the'^ ^
this notion points back to cover any given qbjéot In its - 
oonqret'e ' entirety .and' point's forward to the ; unlimited ’ •
' possibility .its r#%i#atl%, inr-otW beings # - -
■ it seems to us that there is only one apt of the . 
mind in. whio'h'-’such bi-^ pplarity can be contained and 
.expfpssed and this la the ant of judgment/K The act of'".. 
judgment Is a reflective act in which the mind is 
conscious, of bringing '..together or uniting two terms #
"A'
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/ôondltlbng mû^ Trvhioh the mijaê-. oam: be said-to form 
thlb not:lonr--«-
(IX , The notion of an Identity %vhlbh oontalhb ■
.we. m y ' say»: oomeroed'. vl'thidlf#
ferèhce, or realised', through dlffèrèiioe #' is- the notion
of. a; -mltjr of..orderthis suggests-ttet the-.notion
qf being; as tKat 1$: delivered to hs In the judgment, 
of - e%lstenoe$ Is an analoalëal notion#. , ‘ 4m\ .analogical 
term is one Whloh' does not retain exactly the same 
sense In its-different applications |< but which'is- itself 
affected by the objects to which It is applied# It Is 
nevertheless not a purely equivocal symbol because the 
way It is thus: affected can be reduced to a g&g: an
order can be established between its different usages*
In the case of the term being this analogy is an analogy 
of proportionality, and It seems to us'., that a useful • 
approach to this Thomlst theory can be made through the 
analysis we liave made of the judgment bf existence# For^  
when we attribute being or existence to two different 
concrète beings we are asserting a resemblance between 
them so far as they are both *'of being", but this resem­
blance cannot be accounted for by saying that they share 
a '^common characteristic", but differ in other cimracter- 
Istios# Bach of them is to^ 3^.1v and entirely "of being". 
We cannot, therefore,, say that each of these' beings is
/is an instance of a "universal" which is realised 
in the same wav in each of them» ïho poiht is that 
each concrète boiag .rmiiaea .Wmk',lh''its:: -own viavy 
in beihg the particular concrete'being that it is.
2*or'ésifeinplei lohn rehiishs' being-'in his own why, and 
Peter realises • beihg in his own my, and ih'doing so 
each my' be said to be reallsihc'his own ,'bëina; Hence, 
the reeemblcnçë tetWeèm' JbWi''âacI%-#etereq ïàÿ aë they 
are of being"* qan only bo described aë a resemblance 
■ of aronortionalitv ih so 'far as John is to his' being
aa Peter is to his being, and so: on».. , ïhus the
unity between Joîm and Peter under the general notiOh 
of bOihg is a imlty of order , th|' order of proportion­
ality just described, and we can say that the type of 
unity which the notion of being confers'on'the subjects 
of which it is predicated is a unity of order.
(2) It would seem that in the case of the jiaigment of
existence we have given to us the fundamental conditions 
of judgment as such. We cannot ask, "What are the con­
ditions. of such a judgment?"* or* "What preliminary 
conditions must be fulfilled in order that such a judg­
ment should be made?". îhere are, qq preliminary con- 
ditiOns. ®he notion of existence is the formal deter­
minant of the act of judgment as such. For* if we may 
say, on the one hand, that all judgment involves the
'C.#
/the bringing together of oan be ylmved ëepgirntely
and; that ;ln particular judgments attributing qualities 
to a 'given object this possibility of f^ vlewlng separately" 
is catered for by a prior act of abstraction, ym must 
admit' thatI on thé -other, hand, so far as every judgment 
consists in taking up a position before being, the bring*- 
ing together 6f what the mind has separated can ultimately 
be justified only because W^ng 'presents to the mind in 
its. original grasp of it (and this "grasp" is in the 
judgment "This exists") a real unity which makes place 
for-i; or realises itself through difference. The signifi-- 
cance- of these remarks may be overlooked unless it Is 
recognised that while the psyghologjpal process, involved 
in.abstraction may be said to b@gln_f%OB the sensible 
data-,, the concept $ once formed, is- used as a medium in 
the act of knowledge, and this knowledge is, as alœys, 
knowledge M J W M *  is Imo^ rm thrqu^ih. the_conc^nt
is not a payt of the being which is being viewed as the 
subject of the judgment, but the only
is one and the
same being which and, is red* It*s "being red" can­
not be viewed as something apart from its "being", but 
must be viewed as its #T.y.-,of mbé.W^ # Consequently, if 
abstract concepts derived from sensible data can fulfil 
their function of giving us (as predicates in judgments)
- ■ 4;,;:- < ■ 5. .'X-   r.‘ -^tn. ;-^ :? ; {:;A' V .- —  .
; : 43.
■/jWâgâêhts) l^Swliage 0f existeiit %hi#gs this is,' 
la ■■th.ë -last ï?ë,’ëo3?%,- cUie- to /elaat., f!md®rae.àtal jiiàgiaeilt. i> 
••'$iils ësslâtfi*'- -•■ Im ' l'&lôh it- :t@ ÿ'èoogalsed 'iîiât the ' 
iû'éïititÿ- asëéi?teâ "betWeà ’'®î1s'* aad ‘‘èisîatè” feaves" 
tiiace,'^ ltMn it fo^ aiffegeace. ■ ' ■ ' '• '•' ■■■
(3) ,-In the idea oï being, and* more partieùlarly, in 
the act OÎ judgment ih '-whtoh this' idea or notion 
néo’éssariiy expi’oss.es itaelf , %e m;ind la oonseiotto of 
feeing oonfponted hy un ahsoiut© meaaure of it# pvn. 
aétlvlty*. In  asfeefting of anything that "it 'exists" 
the mind is ooasclous Of inserting this thing in an 
afesoiut© order i'Xosi wMeh 'aOthlag, escapes (sinoe every- 
thing is "of being" ) and whi'oh 'nothing can contradict 
(for nothing is opposed'to- feeing, èxdépt, prefeisely,- , - 
"aothln#").é And".the mind is thfeg conscious of feeing 
ruled fey wlmt Is absolute and unooadltional. Being 
presents itself to the mind without condition* It 
fulfils, we m y  say* the conditions of Kant's "cate­
gorical impefmtive", enjoying, in relation to tte 
'ihtelligoho©, the qualities of independent a M  uncon- 
ditionality, which make of it an absolute standard, an 
unconditional norm or vplue.
8.110 B.'#
CqoQlaal&a,
$he çlm of this chapter lias been to provide, 
from a study of the Thomist principle of the 
"in'telligifeility of being"* certain points of refer- - 
ence which we can use in examliiiag the problem of 
naturalism versus non-naturalism. • The value of this 
account scorns to us to llo' in tlie fact ■ that within 
this theory, .of the intellisibili'ty .of being certain 
important questions relatiye to epistemology are 
opened up* Wq have not looked fof specific'"fhomist".' 
answers to specific egistemological,problemsbut we 
have, provided ourselves with a number of guiding 
principles wltliln tihich: to place particular eplstem- 
olOgical problems as these arise in'the- - examinétion 
we are to undertake, fhe following points seem to us 
important:-
(1); She ïhomist theory of knowledge seems to us to 
steer a middle way between rationalism and empiricism* 
or* more correctly* it sapy be said to transcend this 
dichotomy by resolutely refusing to identify one com­
ponent of* Or element in. the cognitive act with that 
act in its complex imlty.
(2) The theory that being* an absolute and trans­
cendental value* is the "first intelligible" suggests
the need for a clarification of the notion of "experience"
ifÿ.-
/"escperieîic'e"' itself. 411 human experience is a 
meeting of intelligence and boi|ig--, and tnls'àast 
alao be trn# .of '^eënéible experience**. It tlière* 
fore ëéeme highly guapeotvto '##at sensible 
'exp.ertenca'p . intei?pVeted as tW 'passive ï*egiét#tio%% 
of ,sê:^s0 data, as an original starting-point In' tW 
development of a realist epistemolOgy# Me might say 
that the .temptation to do so arises from the mistaken 
idea that, to preserve.the 'Realism" of knowledge in 
the.fâçe of the constructive activity of thought, it 
is necessary,to'establish,a contact 'with'/.the i#al 
Mhieh is ; l*he Thomist answer
to this is that original oontadt with the real is 
established in.the judgment of existence, in Which the 
predicate is an idea - or conoep't (though, if m  call 
the notion of being a concept, we must realise that it 
is unlike other'concepts. In that, it does not provide 
us With a merely partial, abstract, view of the real) «* 
tîn?bugh which the subject is grasped in its 
beih^* The idea of being has a dviyuaic quality whore-^  
by the mind is carried directly to concrete being,- and 
thus directly to the ontc^ORiaal order# But it is still 
bv iteans ^of an idea that cognitive contact with the real 
is established, and in this the: activity of thought is 
not cut out, but is measured by an absolute standard#
(3 ) ■ The Thomist theory #  thé! intelligibility
of toeing provides the grounds ‘for a metaphysical 
theory of the hot of judgment itself y Tlils-. suggests 
to Us the need to go further back twi the ieVel of 
concept S'- and their composition and division, .for'-•tills 
level.itself requires to be gromided.In being# Oon* 
seqUently,, we may question the fCrce.of arguments . 
concerning the nature of the real which treat the con* 
Cep.ts: as ^'glvW entities* Wo may question whetlier 
such arguments can;ever"get beyond the logical or 
intentional level# We Imqw tliat,: far from treating 
the latter as\a mere replica or mirror of the real order, 
which it simply reflects faithfully, adequately and 
passively, St* Thomas insists that we oanhpt pass 
directly from one order to the other# ' lot all distino* 
tions jjn the logical order reflect distinctions in the 
•'rea^- order^ and, consequently, hot all relations in the 
logical order reflect real relations# ‘Hie-must not ■ 
base the diversity of natural things on the various 
notions or intentions which follow from our mmier of 
understandihg"(l)# Plato- erred because, "He thought 
that the form of the thihg must of necessity be In the: 
jmoWer in the same manner as in the thing known"(2)*
(4 ) We must note that the mind is measured by being, 
and by nothlna less: that is to say, It IS hot measured
47#
Âleasured by boii%0 of one or spççlfio
but simply by being, we can oiAy appreciate the 
significance _ of this theory if W  .bear in mind that . 
"being" for the Thomist represents a value of great 
richness'and depth, which requires a highly complex 
metaphysics for its -élaboration,: It is extremely
important to bear; this. ihv<mind because, if . It Is true 
that the formal of th® oognltlv^ act is
belng .as such, It m y  neyos^ theless be the .case that 
the. iiiiztd does not recognise, this, and. that, In the 
plaq,e- .of the notion of-- trani^ qendental. 1% forms
the notion of thus , in
the eplstemologlcal order It will rule Its cognitions 
not by the principle of the intelligibility of being 
us suph, but by a principle of Intelligibility based 
on being of a certain kind# We can understand how 
this my-cope about when we realise that wimt the humn 
mind is aware.of Is always being of a certain kind, and 
that what l8 presented to it is being In Gimce/Time# 
Now, according to the Thomist theory all human eognit^ 
ion involves Intellectual activity, whose formal object 
is the transcendental value of being: this Is first
discovered in the judgment of existence# • It is nover-^  
theless possible for the human mindy in its effort 
towards Intelligibility to turn amy from this strictly
/strictly
knowledgé q M  to ôonoentrate Its. IntoreSt On the 
qualities of what it knows* li% this way it will 
be led to erect a principle of intelligibility 
based not on being as suoh^ ' but on being of a 
specIf10 kind^ as# for example,'aonsible being# PO? 
the'Thomlstii on the oontmry, an object is ilntelliglble 
by reason M'. its . and it oan boooW liitêlllgible
to US' in the measure In Which we oàn plaoe It within 
the absolute order of being: and final ihteiligiblllty
là provided, by metapliyélaal explanation ahd bv Mthlim
($) In oonoiuslon, it is mtoreetlhg to note that 
the principle of the Intelligibility of being, understood 
in its iWtàphysldâl ëehëb^ explàlhb how it Is possible 
for the human intellect to formulate, in the epistem- 
ologi#! order, a prlnoiple of intelligibility which 
stops short at being of a certain kind* InÈëlllgibillty 
Isi for the Thomist, a tfansoeMontal "property"- of 
being) every being, in so far as it Is Intelligible, 
But boihg, for the Thomist, Is an aiialoglcal notion, 
this same analogical character will conséquehtly mark its 
transeendoiital property, intelligibility: this too will
à an analogical notlo%%* We can say, therefore, t!mt
/that;.mtelllglfelli,#' :'Wl# ,b©.'Æ,éali'S,afel#' A'a
Wag;»*.'j%st a» the t3»aas.<*enâ'èats$' pfVfeeiag.rfs!
lîi •'diff.eji’eat ■Ways,*,-' , It :%*.(&&-.see#*, therefbge*.' 
oDweét to 8@y. that; theae ./fill :fe@ \a : .t#fe. #f ' %%©),*.;. ■
wMah g#W3p,Q%40 taithert#.# o:f' .W#g.. %hi,oh 
l8 a'ôp3Me.;beiag; 6Bâ .that, tîiig iatélligifeilttg'.Will 
afet-.fef, .the .imtelltglMltty *%#. ■ ’. ' -■
ehëiÿàftes^ isesj for .example; sijathematlfal'thought '.aM : 
it8%..o$j.eht-* low* - ’for 'the .fhomtst* all these. 
ligji'fe.ilitièg'î fînâ .their '.altlmate; g'j?,opti»g. 16 the 'meta* 
'pligs'lhal- ’'laws' of •.bfiag".* àM.St*.fh©œ0'saÿè»;,’'ï.h9 
é'owl'<4pës ïiot jMge . of :al3,-thihgs aceorâMg to ahsr. kihd . 
o'f 'tr.a'th* feht ,aooordâîi| ;'tô th®. .first trath* 'iûapameh as 
it ’''lA.;r0fi@ùteâ Sm  the' ‘.'èottl.: as ■ tp ^a.' .mirror*- hÿ- reas.oa of ■ 
th© .first priaoigl# of the mae$8##ih#4 (1) «. M *. 
hew#©!'#'.this is .aôt reêûghiseâf(lf » ws » / 'say* ,Wë âo ^ I - ■ / " W:  ^  ^ ' ÿ
aot',8'h. far. eaoagh baeis ii% - war - .f ©fleetive- amlysis qf 
Wo'wle.êg# .aad of its object) .thea, aaêer the yery dynaa- 
iSBî wMfeh. litf.s;s belag .with iàtslligibiltty,. t p  hiaæitt 
miad ,w,|ll tepa to efeôt on® or .Other of these."iatel*^ . . 
ligibilitlea." .lato aa absolute pflaeiple,.of■ iatellig*- ' 
ibilitÿ as BUoh» '. &&&.,. armed with.this priho'lpie, It .will 
pècesfartly seek to doijrlmte WM whole . expaasè of the. . 
rèal'j." .fofeiag the aiyersity of the .latter latq.the 
straight-ja.oket of a. typo of. îatelligîbill,ty WMeh.is
/is 'not, in fact, transçèndontaX and absolute,
Thcce fiwl remarks m y  Wve ooâëlderable 
importance in comieotion witli the problem of the • 
nature and definition of goodness# If goodness 
isy as # 0  Thomlet holds^ a transcendental "property" 
of being; then its intelligibility is à metaôhvsleal 
ilntelllglbillty and it will require metàpbyaicâl 
cat0go3?les for its eluoldâtioh*
li« f«renews;, omPEBR X.
(I) Stii Ihemas. Afjùlijàs,, Quaëâtioneg Dlsjpttlatae, Vol.I.: 1949* Qil, a.i.;
, ëMùëptionës; ,i,n#lle©tw'' - plaAti# ;,éx additiônë ad©ns* ? Sèd énti don potëst addi allquid q[Uâ3i ëartranèa
éssentiâiitér '#t ènë; '/.ünde etïam probat Phiibsophus
' ' S b i l i s g f tens* in qmhtW: ëxprîmWt Ipslus mddlûa, qui nbinlne ipsiua; ©niiâ uo6. expritnittîf .• ■ V . , , ' 4 ' , , If- / ' * * ' , : '> ' V • ' ,
'CIX'S:llh.; î-ïï.. q.9^ ., a*a.
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(1) Sèé S.Tli. 11-11. 9,8, a.i., and De Verltate, Q.l, a.l
(2) S.ïh.l» 9.16, a.3.
f e »
(1) S.Th. I. 9.8*, a.l.(2) SiSh. I. 9*76, a.3» ad k.C3) E.g., Centra Gentiles, I, Ob,. 93*
SassUâ.
(1) See Aristotle's Metaphysics, III (B), 998 b 15-30.
PasêJâ.
(1) Met. IV (T), 1003 a 20.(2) Jk dé Finance, Etre et Agir dans la Philosophie de Saint Thomas, Paris, 19*t?, p» 79.(3) Posterior Analytics II, 92 b 10.(4) See Met. IV (T), 1003b 10-20, and 1005 à 30-35*
c. *
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■ieefeg,;, 6.29,; - ', ..^  ;
(1+) &,à. murer, On Bsing and Rsseiic© by St. Thomas:''•-■'i|.;^ü|J6as5 p*:2&'*;':fobtn&%;,(T
d%çitw,qm»]L-/:e8s©,^ , :%
'# M#;: \
(1 ) S 't . ïh . I .  q .86 , a .7.
;'';v \v ' ■§'■'
(i) fÀ’ïëJWMÎpie;*, ,th# ' artie'l®; by fit'oi*geS' .Vàa.'-îî'ist-,
Vv.gi-ÿiïilMilbsbp»^ %9$2*f espW- '" f i ï 3 9 3 . ^ '   ' #
Q /l6 * : aA6.. ad i *  :
cm'PWR li,:' ■•:■-' mCT; à»m'LUÈ;;
; ;;fepm, pur general aocpmit of ;#i@ .'fhomist theory of 
being, as. ,^'the. first, int'eiii'gibi'é’"' it isWlreajy.'blear 
that'.-in thp.t ghllbsbphy ''value" must, in'gome;.#y be 
"carried ,in--.being:":.. ' For the 'Thomigt:'a .."b'hilo.sbphy of 
Valùe":rCaiinbt. be. b'ohçeiv'e'd-, ,,in sé.p'ara.tio.n. from a "phlld- 
go.phy. oz . beaiig".-. ' :.:ifiiatever .my be .the exact nhture of 
the ' rolatlon ' Wtweon the', concept: of go .and:.the
trahghbhd.ehtài'ho'tioh of;'being,-it: is clear " that '.the' . 
former: can only be obhceiyod ià^rbiation to the latter. 
Without .eiubidatih'g'.-'further-'this'; philosophical concept- 
ion,, we. can say that it is in marked contrast to at 
iea'st.' one' contempbrary theory in- ' ethical -.speOulatio'h'. ' 
.This is the theory Which holds that there is an irre­
ducible opposition between "fact" and ''talue"! this 
theory, though not new, was explicitly defended in the 
mimiPIA ÉTHIO&-of-G.E* Moore, Originally publiahed 
in 1903, and it has been reaffirmed more recently In 
TllS:--DEfIhIT10I Of :'QOO0-, 'published In l9W by'Dr. â.G. 
Ewing* as well as in the ethical writings of ClD. Broad 
(e*.g, Fl% fyœs- :9F ETHlGftL. ïïœ.QBï), Jf. laird (A ST®Y 
IN; MOHAL TiffiimX) and W.D. Ross (TIE RIGHT 4TO THE GOODî 
TÏE3 FOOMDAilON OF ETHICS).
In giving this list (which we do not claim to be 
exhaustive) of British philosophers who subscribe to the
/tkè w% âo âa%: moaa tù liaply
tbât.'-th'iè vietiT %s peoùllsir to Bri'felshvphllosophloal 
thpüght* Tli© ;no'tloii Qf ■ value aa "norm", as "what 
ought; to ogppseâ ajoji UlvoroeA frùm "faot", from 
"wha)t is",» ±8 found (not to go further baok in .
history) in the work of-Eormim Lpt^o In thoTèOeond 
balfvpf the hlneteenth oehtury» and it lies hehihd : 
the axiologloal theories: of value of sudh Gerinah and 
Austrian philosophers as H# HartWin* Brentano* and 
-%X';8çhelor* ' ' /There \isV however, auffioient that Is 
'•distinctive of.’the'British philosophera'* treatment of 
this theory to justify a separate examination of their 
position» and it is to;this. that we- shall ';il^  ^ our 
enquiry* It m y  be added » moreover» that» so far as ' 
\m have been able to ascertain» there has been no 
diféet influence of'thésé coxitinental thinkers on the 
main defenders of this theory in this oountfy» namely 
G#Bi Moore» and 4*0# Ex^ ingf (Professor Moore refers 
in his Brentano*s "The Qrigln of
the Knowledge of Bight and Wrong" » which he read after 
ho had written his own work*) We do not» however» 
deny that a common origin m y  be found» in part at 
leastp in ppst-ICautian "positivism"» and in the effort 
to preserve "value" from final dissolution in a world 
whose ultimate significance or "intelligibility" is» 
so it is claimed» contained in the propositions of
55.
/of seleme*
If* however, we were to approach oar subject from 
a atvày of this ot^ eaaa origin an adequate treatment 
woiûd nocesaarily involve us in a detailed historloal 
and cœaparâtlve study of theories claiming the title 
"positivism", together with a study of the various 
efforts made to "save" value in the fhce of sudi a 
philosophy. Such a study would expand unnecessarily 
the limits of this thesis, and would not, in any ease, 
release us from the task of c®asidering in detail the 
distinctive features of British ethical speculation.
We therefore consider it advisable, in the absence 
of such a detailed study, to approach our subject more 
directly and to avoid as far as possible the prejudice 
which may result from an int«i5K>rato tendency to con­
sider and to classify the views of our authors in the 
light of "historical origins".
âeallm J.' £&a..ifeJaur.s, ..gl »
It is to Professor Q.F.. more and Dr. A.G. Ewing 
that we owe the detailed treatment of the theory in 
question, and the geneareil description which follows 
is largely drawn from their work, and, in particular, 
from the PRIîCIPIA ETHIC4 and TIE DKFINITIOIf OP OOC©. 
This oonjunetiwi of the work of Professta? Moore and 
Dr. Ewing may be objected to on the grounds that there
/there are important cliffèrences in thé conciusiona 
p #  forward la the works^referr# :to and that, 
fact; part of Dr# Bwing»s main argument (vi^ # that 
good .directed/against the position
whioh Profesaor Moore takes up on this question In 
P B I N G I P I & - ' While' this is,.trim and important . 
this difference of conclusion only serves to throw 
into relief the common conception within which both 
review their subject mattor#
From this conception two elements may be singled 
out for attention# It is the Intimate, relation of 
these two elements within the conception shared by 
MOore and Ewing which gives to their work -its.-distinct 
tive character.
1# In the first' place We find in both Mbpre and 
Ewing an insistence on the necessity» at the outset 
of any ethical enquiry» of distinguishing clearly 
between two questions» via* a. "What Is the mture of 
goodness»" and b* "IVhat things are good." The former 
question» oohcerhlng the nature of goodness» thiÿ both 
agree» is "the most fundamental question In all ethics". 
(1) 4nd it must be clearly understood and its:irué 
answer recognised before any attempt is made to 
systématise our ethical expérience» or to determine 
"the place value is to occupy in our conception
W v :  ■
6f' (1). 'V ' ' ' '' '
2é- ' ; la tW-; second - tMy qliaro tho vloW::
# 0 âWdSüWz Ethics rcqUiroè that there ghpuid ho 
at 'least ' p# ' simple» ladéf Imhîe» ummalysable objëot 
of' thought,' by réfêronoè'to WhlQh Ethics' may/he .'-' 
defined# (2)/ For Moore- simple». iadeflbahle,. 
L^hâlÿsàblç^^b^ ' "good^ "' 'for 'Ewi).ig
it is "fitting" which» tqgôthor/#th qortaih psychO'# 
%o'giçal'-el#eht8#/fhrms; tW\6o#ièx "gpod#" \(ÔP'6d'' ^
$eahs Hfittihg object of a pro#ttitude#") But ivhether 
Wè! takë ':"@#â"'' or'''"fitt W^iO'ultimate':. ^ of .
ethical thôhght» What is important to note is that in 
'doMri'blhg''their'%opectlvp ooWept'o a'S'-'lhdefihàble" 
and hmmiÿëable Both Mbore and Ewing are inlying tlîat 
èthicê is distinguished grom anbtl^ er çclmoe w  bi#ly 
in' that it .considers things from a certain ammct or 
m W U ) W A @ % '  ï)hÿsiéJ,a^  /sM 6hf. Mol'oMlst may
study the same reality f^dm different .points of view) 
but 1% that» 1%% the fireÿ place ^ It coneldeys a certain 
unique "objéot#" We may say tl:*at» for Moore», "good" 
proÿldea ât once the term of référence by %#lch Ethics 
id defiiiedy and .the fiiml terminus of ethical analysis# 
If,» on the one hand, we may say that ethics studies, 
things üzk so far as they are good». %# must, oh the other 
hahd /say that , the outcome of this study is that the
■ ■58h
ytlië ÿeasoïî,:'ihay afe gOod/iâ that they are good.
,(.With' ËWiàg tde position ;to rathai) more oomplle- • 
ated. timS; £02? Mà;*''goôd*' la deflmble, blit id . 
the -ead 'dt âôësis-tliat here too'•■!;}© aaist shy the 
readda-why -gomethidg is - the fltÿlag db jeot df "a pro*» \ 
attitude ig: t)aat "It :ls' flttiüg that it ia -the object 
of-a-'iJfo-attitad©.-) -' ' - • ■ ■ '■ ■'
-'- - -Wd;oaa doM -see the' sigaifioa-àce of the. d’igt.iae- 
tioh b'é'tvàèh the'two'ciuéationè' -df thé-;.hati»fe of good- 
fteas and of what ' things, are good* ' For., 'If,- in the 
■last'rëaortf no read on 'can W' given ittiy s.omethlag Is ' 
good, but aimpiy tha't it, is good and' is seen to M  
go'od'^. it 'is: clear that '60'âtàdy .of tlie nattè?è of that 
which is, good can contribute t©' our Impwled'ge of the 
Mture of goddn©3's* Oonëéquently iihen we a#k "What 
. things' are .goéd" w# shp'uld he perfectly clear that the 
.answer' is la mb way an a.iiswe^' to the first question*
But #  sh^ all only be oléai' about this If we have as 
Moofo sayS) fully understood thé first question» a M  
aleariy reaognlsed its tvW amm^w
, ■ '4a objection Diay,. however» ho rnà^ e at .this point
may aëk why it should be neOOssary to attention 
to the ciistinction between the two questions: for do we, 
e#g*: havé any tenéênoy tn eonfhse eiig» vednoss 
reel things» or» "huimnity" with Peter and Paul? . Are we
”1yt')©' mot ' tüerofor© ihsigtlAg oa -tho oMloiis? ' This
Pbjcotioamdlps asy-tb brlùg. out;>f!Mi;îî0rç, theypeeul-
laritÿ ©t mtlilds àë' a eolGâoà« '"'Fèf while 'It':is .true
that WG do-, aot ’ téâd. to .eoafusacth© afetraot ■ ouality:■ '■ '■ ' ‘ , . . ; ■ - tredaesa" with, tliè,-things,'whidh'-'it gmiifiég,- -It is •
aléô 'truq .tWt W  hot .Gônsldër that the rêaméés '
of thixigë ééhstitùtW thé forWl ôbjeét of a: Wôlèhôé -
thé; ' Séienoé pf. thïiigs# " Qh the cither hand • we ..do
ÔQ#ldGr 'aTHablphde^  'of.:èthlô$;:tp' bé poseihlp;-*,- .
a pf #lv#sal .p p^ppsitiôhe » opnoemiâg "things: '
tl#t a:^ e good"* FWthêrmoÿe» q the Aoodad
êi^mplo » while - we do oohslder hWanlt^ a $ the '.formal
'ob#et 'qf-a- $blêx%#ÿ W  dd. tfllât oohoept 'of-;
"hitqaalty" Is aaaiÿëat)le and we jgg .thlnlc' that studying 
Pètëryâmd Paul will help hs tô#rds êiaoidàt^ 
that ëuoh élûoldàtïon xvlll be In tei*ms of iml% 
prdpdqltidw# 4hdg In; t#n» ;bhe latter wlliitdli iW 
something .about ^ P.eter and' Paul oto* - - _ "
. jWe inay . say that %t'hlps" là like" à scléheëD or là 
a âdlonoe» in so far as part of It :1s concerned with 
universal propdeltlone and thoï# syatdmtimUtloh, but, 
it is -onXike. other sciences In tliat those universal pro- 
posltldns àré npt elUOl#tidnë of its; formal; objects , 
they concern Its field of manifestation*, The other part
* i . - . . - ,  - 1 _ « ,f , . .,
of :Gthlçç #  and the most important part isy ConcW
/concerned not with the presence of eharaoteristios 
in things, bfit with the analysis and description of 
these eharaotoristios "in themselves#" It would seem 
to be in virtue of this part of the subject that ethics 
is.considered a philosophical discipline,' since-par^ t 
at least of the philosopher’s task (and some would say 
the whole of it) lë the analysis- of concepts employed 
by the "scientist*"
;noweVer, in ààying "these characteristics: in them* 
selves" wo draw attention to the abstract conceptual 
nature of the object of "philosophical" ethics$■ for 
neither Moore nor Ewing consider themselves "plato* 
nists"; neither would say that "goodness" as sueht or . 
fittingness as such exists: what exists are particular
■thihgs characterised by "gooaness"^ %  ■particular things, 
oliaractérised as "fitting objects of a pro-attltude"* (1)
; The ïifst- and most important part;of éthiès there* 
fore would seém to be concerned with concepts: with
the ■• question ' of the relation ■ of the Var ious ethical 
concepts among themselves, (e;#g#,which of them is, or 
are, simple) and with the question of the status of 
these concepts vis à vis sensible experience (e#g#, 
are ■ they n,.;.nriori- or empirical?;);# 4ndj . flmily, since 
these concepts, function in judgments it is clear that 
the formal nature (as opposed to the real content), of
\ ' ' m »  :
/of these judgments wili be of direct'■ interest to 
plilldsophical ethics,■■'in' throwing/light, on the nature 
''''''-pf' théèë-'étJaioâl V- '■ " ' /
•' If tMe position Is consistently maintained it "
'r/_Wqûid::Ëéëm'. that in'-the' last;_fesort ' ethlos/ias a philo* 
sophiôal dlsôlplihe,’is cut off entirely from the real 
and is r#uoed t6= à hranoh of epistemology# ■"
These-'remrks'■ are sufficient here' to illustrate 
pur remark; in the intrpduetion, vis* that at least one 
:;y-g!roUp'.pf:^ OPht'o#pra^  -
. name' of %thids" questions which, to ' use ..Ayer’s ' plifase,
% 'are.' more correctlydescribed ' as; mèta*èthloàlg ' these 
■ ;thihkerâ: seem to déhsïdèr ; that their task is'-.thé exam*
; ih a tlo n  and anhlyhis of pthloal nrpposi t lp n p  ^ w ith  a 
view to rpv^ thé epistem*
' ploglcal status pf their ’ethical" elomohts*' ' '
It is this cpncoption of the nature and purpose of 
éthiçal enquiry -Which We hold to be otiaràdtprIstio of '
' the British type; of faot.Avaluo theory; ' and it is this 
. '.y.jcoho'eptipn whioh;;determihPS:'' the. type of arguments employ^  
ed to establish that theory*
/ '/.ijExpbh^ të "pf.''#hé\;'thèpry
employed.;a.;terminology totHeaoribë their position
Ë$lii04;.Ih'Moorç.’o';déteotioh 6f What hé ôaîls HThe. -
' i^t-;isy:imfortuhatë .that la Moore’s ‘tféatmehtvpf -,
"naturalism"; in^Bthics ,hê: teems,:to consider -tha|t;ail 
ethical mtWaliê oombïit thé fallacy concerned;, and 
arp:yhaturallste/b because;they have not recog*
(2,) ihis'/ie-the imgretsi%: we' 
get and yet , if this - were true ,i/ it would surely follow 
;t#t;%eiaiàBhte';#tweén:'nà
was a purely logical one to be cleared up by the mere 
exposure;;# a , iMioal fallacy# --...However»:- if , oh{;the 
other hand', the dispute is not .based on a logical '- ]
fallacy, then the non-naturalist clearly requires other, 
argWents:;!w-brd tc 'éstabliehybis positioh and to 
réfuté that of his opponent* Other arguments are not 
teckl3ag;-in Moore.Ædt ' it ;.re#ih.$ ' the- çase.:- that once we ' 
have ' realised' that the Identification of the "naturalist 
fallacy";is not a; refutation of haturallsm, then this, 
together with the failure of Moore to provide a satis­
factory description of what he means by "naturalistic 
character"» doés;#éducé considerably the impression of -. - #
V ; -' .  ^Pà
/ôf':c6gé6éy, ià'Mp&6ë’'s,;p6'sitilfen. far.wore, .'detailed '■;
exppaitlod of arguments in favour of non-naturalism »,
in ethics ia given by Dr* AiC. EwiiJg if^  the DFPiNITIOH 
op TàÈ: GO# (1) and, pur:, œin.;concern, will, be with these ■ -%
argumontp*  ^ . . , , , .
..■ A word,.however» mast first be said about thé 
,''n?4tttralistiç;-;fallacy''.‘'.: Briefly*.,the . fallacy. :èp.a.sists . ■ M
in, mis talking, an Invariable accompaniment ,of the. quality 
gooinGss': .for :. that., quality its.elf:. - ■ For example j we should
be,.;bommittlng..'.the/naturnli,@'tl if believing,. - - .,/%
that pleasure alone was good we asëuméd-that, pleasure was 
IdëntiGai with .goodness, and that, '"good’ Simply m'ehnt.: ' ' #
pleasure,. Moore describes the fallacy (2) as a confusion 
of/good with Something "othéï*" tliaa .good» The use of the 
term "fàllabyH howéver Wuggêetè t^t thé "eohfusioh" is . 
of a .speoiaX sort; timt we have here, some fallacious 
thWght process# And.,what .Moore' seems- to be saying is 
th# .th%-fallacy.,q^  in: arguing, f #  éi^mple» -
the "premia# "pleasure aipne is good" to thd "conclusion" «• / 
"Good.is identical with pleasure". Els'-point, is that some 
' people want to hold - at on© and the ■ -same that the.'
statement "Pleasure alone is good" is a signifleant state* /; 
meht giving us positive ; information about the value of  ^
pleasure and» b) that pleasure Is identical with good# / 
Olearly this cannot be done; we must either accept (b)
' thprèby/r©jectlng po'aitlve i # p #  : pf (a) •
(£or it npw becomQg plpagurè àlpne is pleasure) or 
.1^0; must,:',r#je#'X'b)r#^ ^^  r8oogni;go;tW$''' thi3';s.ta#m@#^  » 
about What sort Of-thine -is,,. goM, ooniaj'ibutos, nothing: '
,tbith© il^elligiblo/eontôîït. : of#ho notion of '.gooaneasv 
Thé naturalistiO,fallaejr ,is,,abOording to Mooré a cage 
of. oonfUsing the two questions/'What,is the. nature of.
' Soodnçs,;?» n *  - , ,. , v,. ; ■ .
. .... MdorO has .admitted- (2) 't%t in the , mxhCIPl4 ETHIC&..- ■. 
he:-'off#èd\aqi.8ati#aotpgy%adù^^^ -by
■ to things,;or -Glmracterlstlq,s#: When»
use w^oh^Moqre laakes /pf 'thé':. - 'Y:' 
term "#turallstlo fallacy" we%realise tliat. la the first'.*Æ, . -r/ . ./.. . " 'stag©, of \his "argmm'à't the fail#© to say clearly what he 
meanS; by "i^turalH pis of ao vl#! importàwe* For in Jhls 
treatment.of "Metaphysical Ethics" (3) he tells us that 
it: ^  based on the »natura%8tlo fallacy even although»
as. he also tells us». metaphysics deals with objects which 
are xiatuml objects* (4) %  are forced to Conclude
. therefore that thé "fallacy" is' one ..-thing.»' the - ."naturalism" 
another,• It is not because "naturalism" identifies: good 
with ^  ?^turai object or charâçteristio ti|mt it is fal* 
laoiouss it Is fallacious because it identifies good with 
gomethihg 'lotjhey. tten'l ..good. It is not héonuge-. !lm!tlU!ali'sm'' 
rsdupes.ethicg to an empirieal or positiye,sclenco that it
is fallaoioUs"; it is go beoaugé in substituting for the
-V ... . ' ,
■ J . y' - ,■ ' : '6g:#' ' ; . . ■, . . . -
: . - . r - ... ' - . . f v-^ -^. //the: .pbjeQ:t o.f tho.aght; **gp.od"-ânothei* pt)jeQ:t, of. . '
' .tj'iO.ugh.t,. #. (lédtyqyg.;tîm ''aatoapmy'*'' of- Pthicsi; ' S'hts 
us "back- to, ào'pT&.^ü ■ à#gump.tïoà; .t.V«1|. .
. tW.;,automo*iiy, .of ;\,.ethJ.,o,s ;ï»e(îuî.3?es not. 8.1m%)ly /bkat .a» : : 
aspcpt o f the real be lg.olat.ea .aW voons.idoreC.-. "apar.t'' ■ 
■ih-;th0tt'ghtv: bi.it\tMt:,the real 'Ætself @h$#,a o.ohtaln.ag
the'mlM ooiislderd1'-': .'VC/':; - " 7^  ' '
/ T #  reason #iy the WlbW^ of 01m  thing with 
another in ethloa deservea a Special'mme is" twofolcls ’ 
i# Mobile thWi:9 ÿ a ooimbn mistake to opnfhse ,
"gbo'&f* with a hatiiral objéot br bliaraotwistio and" in 
fact ënôh a boni-hsioh lieh at the basis of eertaiÜJi hisîr 
.torl^l ..ethioai\the#iQ8\-% ,o*gÿ . those qf.3cn%ham hnd ' "
Mill»/, '2'« it, is a particularI7 'serious confusion bboq.use 
value preiloates (or at least certain of .these vi^. those 
 ^Of Intrinsic value) are .ho’ unlike; all .other■ predicates .
,. tliat 'to confuse them with amrthin,g other than themselves 
is to incur the’^dahger; of radically'falsifying our vlëW ■ 
of the mlyerso# (1)
'.However:# it,.Is clear; that this second point which is, 
in fact5 central to Hporeks conceptiora of the autfnomy of 
': ethics carries us further thau the "assumption that for 
' the autonomy of every science w# require an /*pbject** dls^ 
tihct in. thought from other objects, and not to be con- 
fused with other *^0bjeots\* * It carries "Us further then
/then thé truism which he quotes bn his title page * 
**ÈVèry thing is what Is is and hot another thing!** 
for this is a truism Involved In the very employment 
of thought and -mérely ' states '■ that;' the exerelse = of; 
thought about an object" requires tliat thought should 
be able to Identify the. object' It/la thinking about#
It does not, however# enable thought directly to pro­
nounce on the ontological statue of its objeot# Even 
if /*good" imré analysable in naturalistib terms it 
would ren^in true that "good" was analysable in those 
terms and hot in::b#ers':&' tMt: it ; was ^ wi#t ;it and l;- 
not another thing (or other things).
/■. It" is'therefore' clear that‘;heÿe we/'hre dealing with - 
an "unlikeness" between value predicates and other pre­
dicates which is hot merely the "unlikehess" of "dif*# 
feronce" implied by the statement "everything is what 
.it-:, la and not another thing v"
But if so we are entitled to ask for the evidence 
on which this position is based, And it seems that in 
the last resort We are forced to concluhe that for Moofe 
value predicates cafry, on their face a Uniqueness where­
by : whatever - is - "qualified" by/-'thorn is constituted in a - 
distinct and separate realm from everything which is hot 
sp qualified# Alongside., the reblm of facts, there is the 
realm of values, (1)
When we pay that Value predicates !*carry pn :. 
their: h 'wiqb<s^ he#$- do rnet. mean .ÿhat ah# -
uniqueness Is necessarily evident to the unreflect- 
ing mind# But what, w.è mean is that in the laet 
resort thé uniqueness 6f value predicates pennpt be 
dpmohstrated# hut only *f sho%m forth!*, Tp do this we 
m y  empléy logical devipes, re#uiing fof e%àmplë the 
fallacies in Bentham and Mill# hut all the time What we 
are ■really Workington is : the "nhtion of good" w%ieh# so 
it would seem# will reveal its uniqueness to us if only 
.Wf;are;patient and behave ih a Ipgieally correct manner & 
Under these conditions we will feach an intuitive 
insight into the nature of goodness as simple and non-
natural#. ^ ' ' . - ,,
But here we return to our previous'difficulty? what 
new information havè we on the " uhiqueness " of value pré-?
dicates'?! good is not the only simple predicate* But to
# y  it is the only #ontnaturaW\predlcate is merely to 
shy it is different from every other predicate# unless 
W#igive eeftain positive informétIon about all ;#tural■ 
predicatesi And it is precisely at this point that Moofe 
confesses himself still oneleaf as to what exactly is the 
.difference, between a **imtufal"''property.%nd a non-natural 
property# (1) But while Moore is unclear as to how the 
difference'' is to be described h# is cohvlncèd'that- there, 
is a difference and an ultimate difference between "fact"
; ./t . -.A
. ■'
/"f&çt"' and yalui©. a #  . that an- adequate aoopmt of the 
miiRt, Gontalh hoth stat^ mèn.tâ, af faet. an.a : 
atatem##, of .mlaa. -and tMt .tl# jla##, oaji - la ap :way 
b'@. Inferred .feom^  . 03? . reduced toj . the . forWQri, • .fJo- statew 
m,©hi , ©bout ''©ae#"»'. Gÿ: ig taking' hlaee;.. ©;? ■still.
bd: the ease or . takè;‘î?lau#5 , .'Uo statoaeht about what -must, 
oOour aoeorditig: to , id usai la%fë.\Oau eVOr.' @%)&r ©a a . ' or. gr'ouud 
a: âtat.ôHtont', of latrlïislô raltto. ' \
‘ it ' • (. • -t ir t . . , ' ' ■ ■'
-, $hig -is the position which' Moore - .takes up against 
thë;:'"hatth:*àll# " In-1#  last/resbrt-lms'M' up#
inspection of the "notion of good", and on thé ' ihtultlvë.
pre%oa# ' ' '
wenkne'é'sés'' of JMoore-^ b position against  ^consistent 
naturalist liave been shown by Rrior in LOGIC AIB 
W  mg# OP deal With : them :
here, except to. point but tliat it seems to us that from 
Mbbrois .point of viéW' the central 'point of .dispute must .. 
be the question# "Do I or: do I not have a clear, distinct 
idea 'of. h' imique property signified' by "g'Obd"? , ,i'f the': 
naturalist replies..#at he; does not, then, it seems.that., 
there. Is nothing, that MOore. càn do* .Mooro*s arguments 
against-■ the 'naturalists, .presUp#se.;"that..'%ood**' ;iS' the 
name of a characteristic and that when employed in a 
certain Sénsê . (via*: as m#ning intrihslc value) always ■ 
signifies the same characteriatio* The naturalist : can
"xW rnKy#' fpr-:inétanùé give. 
aqdoU# of %e word which
reveaip a flexibility suffIcleat to account-for; our’ 
diasatlSfnction "with; any ..We pértléalaf .'proposed ' ' '
nat'Ur^ llgtlC'. déflhltlbhV'/Ür a^ ^^
'bé 'raided, as to.#ethef ' good is. the name oA-a, oharao-. / 
'.'téristic’'àt‘ alXV. And It must be noted tliat ' Moore has 
hiniselA- rëééhtlÿ considered this #estl# and expresses’ •' 
hjWsel#'dbubt^ oprroot^aasw## '(.1) v '-To. raise. .
•this' issue : at, this ■point ’however,, would bè to obscure 
.'the nàtumlist-noayhàtwallst: dispute-#' ae this ''ïàttëa^;." ' 
:.is;:-#ÿl8agéd'.Lby/M0pr W:#greM' 't^ t/the'théory':
' t.M,#.or.oalled ■ ethlaël propositions are not propositions 
at all, is an effort to !*turh^  thé flank" of the natur- 
a'list'4-hoh*%6turhll9t^  dispute^ (2)7 ’For-"'lf'' é&oh terms as'/ 
.'"good^t. Or "right"' are not in,/bheir 'otMchl:"function- the 
names of charaoterlstlos at all, then there Is ho place 
for the dispute which-Moore has dealt with ïindër the 
term *%bn'^ natural^ * ahd **natural". ■ ' '
q#qlusloh*
Limiting ourselves to the. di#pute as it 1$ envisaged by 
,Moore -We may draw attention to certain metaphysical and ,.
ppistemological implications which follow from Moorè*o 
account* -
/  '  "  ■ S ' s
i)/à'#Drd$#g to'Moore is th# #me of, ,s :rm.l
QbaraoteplstlO; 9ay;,?g6#. th^  ^ .
"'^ alue-rfaoto" ,fo3?m :pai't of. the mivorse. Tiio.oon-  
oep$ 6f. gogâ biOweVeÿ« ;%#e$lnàble,;aaâ imlgae «
And' bÿ; "imiqao'l: la b,G3?0 '%ea# abt , sl):aply;tI#,t'''bW ' " '. 
eonoept ..of good'too ;a qoiite# which .Is rldon.til’lable
aad 'distiric'tf fipom .tli© ooatonb ,o# aay ottei^ .’- - - -
' don#]0t, but tMt It là: It self so all?#lier -
côïièçpts which; wo. employ, in, describing. the.^  universe • 
t#:t'-#t ,^ only 4s?lt''-not'â M É ^ &  tovtorms-Of .Other 
concept0 4 but there is, as it wér©-* nq ground -
bétwçem It and those other_ .concepts* •. If,, however# the , . 
mind : pan discover no wtdbf' intelligible umlty/within 
which to bring; together;-thlu©'.oohaepta and thé other . '
concepts through which it grasps and renders intellig^ 
iblé to Itself the universe of its experience # it 
follows that it muet either, (a) question thé power of ' 
its, own activity to reach the reallv ^ real.,'. it must
rest in an agnosticism based on,-|âéalistic premisses - 
• thia'is-clearly incompatible with, Moore *3 realism, or
a radical dichotomy 
beWeen value situations situations* But#
UÉ ÉWing says# : Wnlésn^^M is çonyincëd that/metaphysics 
is Impossible# a philosopher should aspire to some view 
that at least indicates, ; some systematic connection ,'. .
/ o b # # ' # W b 0##h'Vaïhéand^'# \
dïffiqûlt to #p@pô0 that the îultiBïaté. splutl# is
beÇtwd different/'k# 
of fâ b t s fact's of ezlatmme aW. facts of value 'side 
bÿ-'éidé'#d't# ap eÿplâaatién'Or nziy'thiag ..
mpfp to be said about it'% (1)' ' • '
2)v.Aopprdi% to Moore #  that good
is unique and that'it,lë- not definable "'Amount to
t&t' 'pré#ëi'ti6n#.- à g#a .ggafo an- pf^  '
them, synthetic and none 6f them analytic" '(2)# If 
' th# tkerp;' âre # ' Mooré'- hpldé^-a nimbêr" ' ôf ' ihtrineio ' - 
goods, it foilowa that the propbsltioha which "list" 
th#e IntriWio goods must each one of them be "syn­
thetic a orlorl"* Thus Moore*s treatment of the con­
cept' 'of-, .good; teihSB .-tp/thp forefront-the , question-of 
the "synthetic a priori"* which has claimed so much 
attention from certain contemporary philosophers*:
3) iMopre shares the nep^ealist view .that'-the., philo- ' ■ 
sppher*s task is not to justify our knowledge by a 
c.rltfo,na': bf- ■the . #owihg power : : the philosopher ' s .-con­
cern is to make clear to Us what it is that we already 
:khpw. - And this ,4s dpne by the ~ aquiysip of - fefms and. - 
of the structure of the propositions in whtàÉ;/wo 
express our knowledge* Now#, if by "epistemology" we
mn-
Li -'
,/# meah the: 'elaÿifioatiçn xÆ .M'eas'^üonQëÿts à #
. p ïo p o s itio n a  then' w  must say t î ia t 'Moose's wh'tile 
ap'pÿoa6ü' àaà ' tÿ e a tw a t •Êttodafflëntaï-qüeë'titoS' '
Di'- E tïd G a l ; en<îüli>y ' is  e p ig te m o lo g îe a i, ïn" th is  ' ' 
s | is è -h f  ; #  th a t ; ' la . '':
thfe hàg# 'o f Moora,, "mQtàrrëthiag'.' s ig n ifie s ;; p r iia a s lly  ' 
eplstom ôlogy,'. '. Thef'é isf/H ûw evëj?,' a,ubthQr',''aoa3a in  
i&lQh-:,-##' la t to ï !  ,t# m  ia;:émploy@a,. ',m m 8lyÿy^ 
ï ilfy ia g -.th ô  s th d y  o f 'th o  GoacUtlons goveraing the.. 
.s# je 0 tl;@ ':e b g h ït.ive '.a G t'iv itÿ  w ith , à: yièw  ;t.D ■iaetèfaiinr 
ïng  th s  jo a t upe and, p o ss ib le ' é j^ é a t ,of hi'imah ' knowledge * 
ih .  'th is  '.gëns'é'.'of - th'è 'té m  .we. m # t ' shÿ tW tl'iM o o #  \s -. 
'wo'fk.- is  ' s t ï 'iô t ly  ■noifeep'istérablbgioal j .'siaoe., 'as '.We ■ , 
lis te '.sa id V  âa :h i3 t ie tfj th®. ta sk  o f the  .ph ilosophex’. Is  
a p t , te  . . te ll as ''What'- knowledge -law ca? how o.op 'khpwledge 
roay be ju s t if ie d , j  b u t to  . .e la f ify  fo r  hs ' w # t  i t  Is  t l ia t  
.'W#“. laiowf .fa  th is  narrower, .:sea#e o f jie p is tw o io g y " ,
. h o w e .v o rth e re  is  one im p llc a tib a  o f'M o o re ’ s tre a tih e n t 
Whioh wb liiiaat note  s t h is , is  the .'question o f thè na tu re  
o f  the  aequaihtaaoe whieh,we have w ith  n o n -n a tu ra l 
è lià ra c te r ls t ie s , l ik e  good. These c lia ra e te r ls tic s  are 
.not open, to  se n s ib le  .inspe.otion# msr  thon,, .the. hmnan 
mind a non-seha lb le  type  o f pefoeption? 4 g a in , th is  
■palBâ' g u è s tié h 'h r is #  in  eonneotion w ith  our knowledge . 
o f s y n th e tie  a ;o r io r i p ro p o s itio n s^  In  these propos-
/propopitioaa atod Is not loS,, in its ■wry 
eonooptiort of tho sab^oat to thl# tho prodioatei 
it, wo#à sééa,|; thtr#foroi - that ■ tfto oeaaoétio» Wtwoon 
thoa must W  aà^ by an. not whibh is sepamt©. frora. 
the mots ia.- wiïlolî the subjoot ai# 'prodl#te or© 
oonoetvofU ''îïOw are m  to desoribo this mot'»’ Wnat is., 
.its- oogniti# status^ . Mooro is xWrofml to atoid giv- 
1%  OS'the--appearanc© of ' mnswori# suoh qusgtloas* 
ThtiSf-.-he iasists tl#t whon ho ©a-lls thè propositions 
■cottoeraMg what'is-'latrîàsioallÿ''good "iatmitions", 
he më'àaa *'ia©3f©|y to .assert tixot thoy at© inoapable of 
proof Î Ï -imply ' nothing whatever, as to the 'w#er of . 
■our ,ôôghiti-oh of thorn" (1), [##rthel©ss it séeiïis to 
us tixat we aaimot atoid awoh quê.étiohs., .and-, as we 
glmll 'See, the problem of hoa-^ senglbl© perception, or 
"intuition"' oceupies'm'important piao©- in Ewing’s 
episte-mologtcal thoory»'
In attèisptlng, la the brief-spaeé of a short 
clmp.tor, to. give an aoeo#t of Moore’s .conception of 
the'mturalist^non^Aturalist controversy,. -we>'r;©a.ll8© 
that there -ar© maiiy points -:oa wlxich a more aetailed 
st#y- of Moore’s thought would .ttrrow light* wo have, 
'however, chosen to o,©ntr.© our ©mtaination of this con­
troversy oh the work Of 4*0* Bwihfi, and -'fî/e therefore 
VJisli. it to be understood tMt we .include this cliaptor
./chapter 'only ':by -ï*0sgt>â';“èf 'tHe,'h'istor'lcal..'ifflpertahoe 
of/Moore's presentation of-the hâttîralist*-n.on-aa'tür- 
a'list dlgputé, ‘We .&haI'l':Wt,ithereforeV'.attempt'-.to' 
apply here the results of our examination of the . 
Thomlst theory ‘of: tWe 'Ihtélllgih'fiïty ' of.'Seing., beyond - 
noting that .'in. the.' firgt,"hnd: thira.‘-of ithe'.iniplissa-tiOns . 
-of Moore 's position ;we can Seteet vleWs vjliich afe in 
fundamental 'a'lsagreemeht':with /two .<of, the.^ ha'sio -fhomts't 
theoriesi namely, (1) that there is a "first prinoiple" 
governing. all '■Jsnowleige, 'through Wh'iOh . evervthihg ' that ;. 
'is real must ho viewed, .and (2) that all human knowledge 
involves a conoeotual element*
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•• • T W  ylmportanoe of considering the' opistemologlcal 
; be by noting
brlefl^ r the form 1% Wiioh he bïmëlf vlèwà his position 
In rëiàtlon to the.mtwaliats^ : In ims pBPiNlïIONiôF 
GOOD ''-(I) lie desdribbO.'%eyethl6a l ' : ' : hÿ":$np#
. ports as *;the view that, besides any elements whloh 
 ^' could 7:be: awlysed ■ In ^péyghologloâl terms or other terms 
appertaining to a natural solenbe, ethical; propositions 
Include at least one concept which cannot;be thus 
/' aha%#d:#/*:/. This-view ::he;; describes : as. tht/'altérî^ tlVe' to, ;;% 
. the naturalist View, from which wé can conclude that 
Ewing, regards the difference between his oim theory and 
\that' Of i the ^ ndt#allst;* s as concerning - the -^ Intèlllglble 
content of the statements under consideration and not 
their formal pharaotef as a . wholb* Thus;Ewlng■ is pre-<
: supposing that his opponents agréé with him on the
general nature of ethical statements as being in the 
' s tr ic t; ;seh3 e propb s it Ions # capable of truth and falsity# 
The terms of these propositions.function as descriptive 
of àn objective state of affairs and if they have any 
othor'vfuiictlon,'- è*'g#’ #i#tlve, this function is irrele- 
vaht to the meahing of the Dronbsltlon as ethical^
It la clear deiiMtatloh of
the. flold of rofçrënoe, Ewing .e^ celudes from -his 
dirGbt a4^ tadk against any theory which
insists.oh:^ emotive .or expressive . . _
f iihotiona of .thei^ ^^  Ihtriaaio .tb the sigaif* ' ;
lo'ahbo of othioal stat0mO*%ts aa ethical.. In the 
,préÿioù$3 y-eWpter -Wë poihtéd ;o#7;that. to 'lntr#uoe .ih^  ''/
to .the nati^allst^^ disputa, as that is
enyi$hgod-^ ,by Mboro!,' ;the/\q.h08tiph. Of \e60tive pr ' '0%pres~ - 
SiVe -theories would be jmisleadihg, sihoe Moor© ohvis- 
ages this dlOphte; a0 oOhêérned with the 'correct-anal'^  ' r"
ysis of qbileotlve Malities (1). However, while Ewing 
does# as i# hayO #ihted:.oùtÿ represe own posit-
ion in similar terms to those employed by MoOre, it 
wlll/heço##: oleay,_.tl#t''h é oatiihpii;; Ih fact:,;.,/limit the A/I 
.field, of his opponents to those who are '^naturaliste", 
in Moore,^  a sense qf the .term,. ,ind the reàèoh for this ; 
is that while Moore resolutely refrains fromttho direct 
'raisiiig. of ' epistemologieal (in thè [mrrower
sense of the term),. Ewing ^ s whole approach is epistem-^  
piqgioal* .Thi8 differenoe is of fundamental importance^ 
forj;'as; wellxope-to;show^  /considered from the: epistem- 
ological point of view, there is a oonno.otion between 
"naturalism" and theories of the Expressive type (2) such . 
that a satisfactory refutation of the former cannot be
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âÊàtlgnJi* à qnd t^ a '^O#$loal"
■ a u # # *
According to tW theory of hon^ hatLcpàllsm all 
ethical.propositions,reveal, over and above those 
elements, which display -a- sensible .-origin, the presence 
of an "object of thought" or concept which lacké all 
trace of such derivation# Viewed in this light, the 
theory bears,directly,çh the question of the.function 
of thought in human cognition. Is thought, "the hand#» 
maid of the senses"., limited in its power to ordering 
according to its own.formal laws the material-delivered 
to it by. the senses, or Ms it a positive role to play 
in our knowledge and its development? Gan It reveal to ; 
us objecta and truths which transcend the data of the 
senses?. In, defending non-naturalism and in claiming 
that we do know certain ethical truths Ewing clearly 
rejects the empiricist alternative. Our. task is to 
determine what form of noh^empiricism Ewing accepts and 
to examine the arguments whereby he establishes his 
position#
At the outset of this enquiry we arc, however, faced
by a problem# Does Ewing really consider that any ^ roof 
is required of the positive function of thought in the 
acquisition of knowledge? For it 8eei%s clea:^  that the 
existence of a priori knowledge is in itself sufficient
êvidèhoe for # 0  positive funqtlph of
thought, in cognition# If it is a fact that we can 
sometimes Wow that on© proposition entails.another 
or one characteristic necessarily involves another (1) 
this in Itself reveals that we are not limited in our 
‘knowledge to the mere "recording" of sense data.
Unless therefore it Is considered neeeo$ary to 
PXPVQ that we cah have %..^,prl,qr,i knowledge, it would seem 
that the simple observation of the fact that this khqw#* 
ledge exists is itself sufficient evidence for the 
positive function of thought in cognition# Ho proof 
of this latter is required; the function of thought is 
self'?eVident$ We MVe but to observé certain phenonema# 
n*#eiy, casés of a, nrloyi knowledge*
, How, there are certain indications in Bwing^s work 
which strongly suggest this point of view* In the first 
place,, if m  consider his remarks in IDEALISM (2) on a 
nriori concepts and on the possibility of Impwing the 
truth of a nriori propositions we are struck by the 
strictly empirical method of treatment ; he lists "some 
indubitable ezmmples " of a nriori concepts and ho is 
content to establish the possibility of a nriori truths 
by the negative argument that we can find no "general 
a priori objection" to this possibility* His view seems 
to be that no a orioyi limits can be set on our a priori
ÿa, -kadwledgs; a«â w@ mttst jusÿ Walt aftft4,366;! aatjh oa3(& mug.t te taken on its own evidence,»,
, iheve le no snçh ttlng as a geaenal esslanàtion and 
jüst.lflcatlon .0f the nosslhlllty of; a net. knowledge», 
la t #  second Rlacé^ ,we have In his pape# en the 
;Mngn|stie #eory m  Fnopositions ,(:l;) the
.e%liê# aa,ee#tiGn.{ ' "I bave,no ■ explanation.of'i...;E 
knowledge to offe#*., non d.o I thinii: It #eg,ni#ee onO:» any 
more tiiaa empl##al', knowledge.» î merely accept it ne 
a fnct that- we can .aometimes ‘knOW that one proposition 
entails a.nother .pr "one characteristic necessarily In* 
voiycs another,* ifhy-shonld we not have the, power of 
seeing this, as we "seem to have? Thus, limiting our*» 
selves to this quotation it Wo hid seem that, according 
to Ewing, the theory which opposes empiricism and which 
asserts that "we Mve ItnoiilOdge of some universal 
èharacteristios or relations which Cannot he disoovered 
hy mere analysis of what Is observed or he reduced to 
Oharaoterlsties or relations thus discoverable", (2) is 
established by simply "looking at the facts"5 by point. 
Ing to examples of a priori knowledge from different 
spheres. (3)
However, if Ewing insists that he has no "explan­
ation" of a priori knowledge to offer, and that none is 
needed, he does, nevertheless, spend raUoh time in
.r-'7
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/itt defending the 'View-- that a .nriôrt 'khwled.#" Is 
what it "Sfeffis to he", against certain theories which 
contain what is, in.his view,.a .false interpretation 
of thla knowledge,, or of the .propositions which are 
employed to express^  it. The two important contexts 
in which this question is .dts.cussed are, (1) .his 
arguments against Kantian Idealism, .and, (2) his 
arguments against the Linguistic Theory of & Priori 
Propositions* . yrom.these we can gather Bwing's own 
view On what a.nriOri knowledge "seems to be", and, in 
fact, .aocordi^ s,. to him, là* While '’agreeihg Vith .Kant 
that all knowledge 'requires the. co-operation of thought 
and sense (1) Ewing:oritioises him fof tracing.hack 
the.sohroe of the a oriori to the thinking subject♦ . 
âccordlng to Eiving, the distinction which Kant makes . 
betwe.en the a. .priori elements and the empirical elements 
in oUr thpught about the.real is unjustified; both these 
elements find their aouroe in the real5 and it is 
correct to say that both.are Vgiven" or disoovered. In 
this Connection Ewing is prepared to admit a non-sensible 
form of direct cognitive ooataot wlth the real which he 
calls "non*pepceptual intuition" (2). He also refers 
to the oorreatness of widening the notion of "experience" 
in order to admit into the "given" those elements of the 
real which are not open to sensible inspection (3)»
y|
' :y
TM3'0'7%ém##' # é . to lW î*à te  that $'%i'.
Ewihgfa view kaowle^ge ie khb^ledge a
realty which: a^e#L$h8^i^ by the epghitive
ÿelàtËéA we MVe W  He may thiis be eai^ teyhëfèh& 
a ''Irealiat^ ' j^ terpvetatioii e:^! imqwleagë ^? and y In gaütic^ " 
ular:y-wha.t my'be- êâïied'. a *^ !%*ealieh of the a. hrioApif'^
with negai^ d to the Linguiatio The%y ôf a nr loi?! 
pa^ epoaitione WMt he may be eald to be defending le the 
view that ie kiiowledfte ol^: the real.
WMbh/iby indeed y what ity and &g[i. ImôWÏ'edge^  '*Weeme to 
bé":i> Aé6igvd%g; to the Lihghiètio Theory -thè: neeeeaity' 
whioh: eharaoteiiiaee the propoeitlone expreaelng "hA..nrig;pi\ 
knowiëdge"ie not grounded in the "intelligible oonteht" 
of the/Aterme of eûèh hroboeitibhe»; but is dhë$ Cl) to ah 
initial arbitrary dëGibion regarding the uaage of oertain 
worde those which appear ae terms in the neqwaary
propo^itibn), and (2) to the purely formal requirement of 
oonsisteney by wliibh we "must" observe oor original define 
ition under pain of talking ncaisense (1). it fqllows that»
. "afor this theory, the heoessity of suoh propositions can In <!' ' - ■ . ■: "'A
no way be viewed a$ refleoting a oharaoteristio of the real g 
orders indeed, such propositions give us^  and oan give us  ^
no information about the real world, and, conversely, they - : 
remain unâffooted by what is present or is not present in ' %: 
world4 A
- V . ,
'■ /PerMpÈ Ewing * $ most serious objection to this ' 
theory is his argument that# in fact, êmpiôylhg àm
a'^ pribr'i proposition as à premiss it is aomotim# pos­
sible to bhtaih hew "information" about something which is 
given in sensible experience, without having to wait 
oh^ experience'.'to' reveal this hew'aspect,of the rëal to 
Us-* In this cOnheOtibn Ewing- talks about " synthetic 
cônnëçtfoh" -in the real# ' and of the mlhd^s power to "see" 
this' Ç'oimëçtloh* ■ '^Thls 'sÿnthotic ëémaotion' cannot be ' 
either explained Or explained away but must be accepted 
ûs. â"'fUci''fbr" it i's' itËèlf- the iaUndatibh.of all ' inferènce 
and so bf all explanation-il) # ’ According’ to Ewln'g the'.'.'.', 
synthetic oonnedtibh'which lies at the bash of inferericc 
leading to new knowledge of thé real is,, in each specific 
casé#-seen to hold between "objective ehafaoteristios" as 
such# and we arè thUs able to form "synthetic a Pyiori 
propositions" which, in conjunction with a minor premiss 
stating that what is given in experlohoo "instantiates'^ ' 
the "objective characteristic" referred to in the first 
t'.erm of the major premiss; -enables us to conclude that 
this same experienced object possesses the "objective 
characteristic" referred to in the second term of the 
synthetic a bfiori proposition*
Against the holders of the Linguistic Theory Ewing 
thus argues that their interpretation fails to explain
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/explain the,fact of inferénoè leading to new 
. knowledge of the' real, and that this fact oan 
only be apcpphted fps?; if we interpret the terms 
. of propositions as qonoepts with Intel-
■-llglblq7..,qqnteht'- such that, the mind can."find .its - 
way" from one ooncept to the other# Biifing has.
■ other more direct qritiqisms of this theory, but.we 
may -^ipite, here that, this present general objection 
. does ahoiv us In what sense it is true that Ewing
kiiowledge, and does not, in fact, 
qhestibh that It, is. "what it s'eems- to be"-*. Thus in , 
this objection he is aspuming that the "truths!'we 
reach by means of logical Inference do, in fact#
. f urnish ua with new .knowledge which, while i;b is 
; knowledge of the same reality as that, which is reveal- 
ed in sensible experience# is., nevertheless# .independ­
ent of this experience for its validity* But since 
this is precisely what.is denied by the holders of the 
Linguistic Theory it seems to us that the objection 
begs the issue* Those whom ho is criticising might 
quite %mll say that "a nriori knowledge" does "seem to 
be" what Ewing says it and they might agree that we 
"seem to see", logical connections between the material 
provided by the senses, but they would say that we are 
not justified in assuming that things are as they seem 
to be, and that thought has g as it seems to have, a
/a positive to play.iii oontributing to and
advancing our knowledge of.the real* Indeed# we might 
say.that they agree with Kaht in admitting, that there 
is a , "critical nrbblem" (though they would disagree 
With his ; solution)# and that we cannot dogmatically 
assert. that, or#,
.%Mbt . is - true ,9LM§.Jêâàl* ■ Ihis la the
grave sin of rationalism*
This brings us to a point of fundamental importance 
in the correct understanding of Ewing*s eplsteraology* It 
seems to us that, in his attack on empiricism# Ewing never 
rises above the dogmatic level in the above sense of the 
term# :Moreover# it is important to note that this dog­
matism is not limited to the thought aspect of knowledge, 
but extends to the sense aspect* Indeed, we get the 
impression that the movement of Ewing *s thought is by 
anàlpgy from the "reality-valué" of what Is given in 
sensible experience to the "reality-value" of what is 
"discovered" by Intellectual perception or intuition*
There is^  as it were, no more need to question the valid­
ity of what we seem to see intellectually than there is 
to question the validity of what we seem to see percept­
ually; if "reality-value" is allowed to the latter it 
ought hit to be withheld from the former* Ewing does, in 
fact, employ an ad hominem argument of this sort against
/against his empiricist adyersarles in THE DBPINÏTIOW 
OP" GOOD (1) . We-shaXi hà'TQ, occasion to qaestioa, the 
force of this type of argument in the foXXbwlng chapteri 
whit We miiist note here is that BWing ' s "dogmatic"', ap­
proach seems to bring with it the threat of à division 
of7thonghf and a#se: into , two separate and independent 
prihciplés; of knowledge, each in itself capable of found­
ing'a complete cognitive act*
Section 2, Thought and Sense.
In/Section:, a' of Gliapter 'I; we'attempted' tc7 explain in what 
Sense St,7 Thomas. Considered that the oo-operation of 
thought and sense 7was neceSsary fOr humn knowledge, to* 
cofding;,to him 'We have hO/'dip'Oot contact with the real, 
which is not sensible contaot* But this sensible contact 
ts7'hbt' itÿëif khOwiedge%,we requife. thought (of intellect) 
in order that this sensible contact should become signif- 
. ioant as Witnessing to ##'7 pf es Once of the real-;be:fore 
us. For Sti Thomas> therefore, all knowledge involves the 
activity of thought in the sehSe that only by this activ­
ity Can the "data," of the Senses be raised to the status 
of revealing to us a value of the real: and we know that 
ih-this ahtiVity,thought,.is measured by the absplute 
measure of the transcendental notion of being. Thought 
aiid .sense,/ theni • for Gt. Thomas, are tWo aspects of com*
' $9»
/çômppuêntG of tWÂôogàltlVe aqt ) and neither, con-
• éidërcd..separately and '• in'.• isolation ' from. the, other^ .
" ean'- W  ^ tÿ#.t edj a a--; e.uffiblaat gr auad, of .an. got «of 
neithéi^ ÿ. 4aL4.#aâIÎ oan be aaicl '.rqvm,!,
.  ^ or a ' the• real to ua; .the 'real is
revéaled .to us oii^ In and. by tbélr oo^operWibn#
giving might éeew to support this type./ of, obn# . 
■ç'eption of the corppbration of thpught : and, éenae in 
..the-(Cognitive apt# foÿ .he sàyè that thought 1$ heoès^ ' 
sary for knowledge sinee %e éàmot have content with- 
out form, and this form.;oaaupt be discovered by merely 
recèiving sènseriÂprèssions .passively" (l)c But it 
becomes clear- that he treats the activity of thpught 
as being, in the last resort, a vision or "seeing" of 
"objects" which in.effect differs only from sensible 
"seeing" or perceiving in that It delivers to the mind 
an intellectual or nonesensible "object"* He argues, 
for example (2) that thought is necessary for knowledge 
for thought alone-Can "see" the necessary cohnectlons 
which exist or subsist between certain sensible elements 
in the real# Thought, we may say, is necessary in order 
to:-re-organise the/empirical contents which are.received 
according to the temporal and spatial orders of our 
perception, and it does so in the light of the necessary 
relations of connections which it sees jji the real# But
90+
/Bât tliought Is to
what is give,a' là sehsiblé experience revoa'liàg bf ' 
the real, se^éihlç côhteat Mm its own reality^ ,
valaè a M  by itàëlfi* ïhàs, although Bvi%ig w y  be 
'said.'to . contrast thé activity of tlipught with the • 
j%àËiyity of sense, his actual accomit of the role 
of ,thought in. cpgnltion shows us that tlxe real.oon'#' 
trast is not h@3?0 but in the respective "objects" 
delivered\ by.|-- qr: revealed by, thought and sense* It - 
is, %  effeoty by.thelr^f^^ that the latter are
distinguished, and such a distinction leads to a
a real separation of what, In the 
Thomiat vimv4 are two^,#ct,# of ong act, namely, the 
act of cognition, .Bwlhg seems to view thought and 
sense as standing side. by side : _,levely each
occupied with Its own oar^ t of the, real,-, and eàôh,equip- 
ped to deal With this part on Its own# and without the 
oo'^ operatlon of . the other#
The implication" of shoh a view, however, is to alter 
the status of thought and sense from that of aspects of 
one complex but uiiitary act to the status' of separate 
and- sufficient principles, each founding its own act: ' 
so that the distlnotloh between thought and sensé becomes 
a distinction between two kinds of ImoxAedgo, "sensible" 
kiibwledge, and "Intellectual" knowledge, eaCh being oon^ v
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with the,real, in which the coneentiial activity of 
thought has no mrt.. to play.
/ Shis» hovjeyer.j ppeseata us...with an entirely 
.fOi'ant conception of the co.^ oooration. of thought: ana 
sensé;-than that foimcl, in St* i’hoina.s' theory, for we 
can h° longer oay that neither thought, nor sense can .
-hy. Itself repeal the real to us? all we can say is
.tlmty wither qf. .them. C.I0W  can he cqwldered am reveal-*
ing ail, or the whole of, the real to aa ^  but we must 
add that meh 1@ aapabie of revealing
the real* Thla, however, bringa its before.a difficulty:
If., thought,arid sense, are oaoh .occupied exclusively with 
their own "objects", and If each Is, In Its own.sphere, 
sufficient to guarantee the "reality value" of Its 
"objects" how can we talk about these two kinds of 
objects as belonging to real order?
With such a conception of the relation of thought and 
sense in cognition we Very easily fall into a type of 
Platonic idealism in which sense and thought each deliver 
to us their own type of object and ho satisfactory 
account can be given of the relationship jn the real 
between the two "worlds" of sensible experience and 
intelligible ideas*
However,, it is clear that Ewing does not envisage
saoh a division of thought and sense as would lead
to the erection of two separate real worlds * For
Ewing: it is the one world which is revealed to us
in sensible oxpefiehoe which is also characterised
by those neoesaa$*y connections which thought "sees"*
The real possesses both "empirical" and’"a ••priori"
elements, but these are elements of one real order
and it, is of this Order that our true a. nriori prop-#
ositions give'us knowledge*
' " .. . - ' ' - - 
Thé question we must now ask, then, is how,far
Ewing is successful in proving.that our a oyjori kaow^
lodge is abputj one and the same "real #orld" as is
revealed to us in sensible experience* It is in this
sense that we wish the phrase, "th© realism of the
to be understood# As we have said (pp.81*^ 82)
there are two contexts in which Eivlng deals with the
question of a prior1 knowledge of the real, and we shall
consider two arguments, one (4) drawn from his examine
at ion of %ntian Idealism (1), and the other (B), found
in his criticism of the linguistic Theory of 4 Priori
Propositions (2),
-&.# ,.m...mWWeaa Geometry.
Bwlmg wrlteg (1), "$M' ©«pl^ lcsal content given may 
and I if inference be .boealbie at all, must eometimes 
nave features wniehf'lead beyond itself", ind the 
escample he gives in illustration of this contention 
is a mathematical ohetf*
"I discover by considering a particular triangle,that 
its angles must be together equal to two right angles j, 
and I see that in #king this inference i have included 
in my 'prehisses neither the particular site of the 
angles of this particular figure nor the fact that I 
or anybody else have seen the triangle% therefore the 
Inférence is valid Of- all triangies, %thether perceived 
or not,"
Here Swing seems to distinguish tWo "moments" in 
the process whereby a universally necessary proposition 
is established*
at.. -The discovery that the angles of this particular 
triangle must be together equal to two right angles),
bv The realisation that this "truth" is independent of 
the contingent circumstance, and therefore, is true of 
all triangles, it is important to ask what are the 
relative statuses of thosC two "moments^" ire they 
psychological moments analysed out of What it in fact
■/fact ohe cojpiitive hct* or are they txiio cognitive 
acts eojmected as premiss and conclusion?
. We.' may; say, ; in the .first, place,:, .that, one of the 
reasons, so. it seems, .for. distinguishing these two 
."moments'? is to maintain t^ ®; view that all îcnowledge 
involves empirical elements, and thus to provide the 
test, whereby the critical value of the a priori elements 
.may be .established#: ït. remains .to, be seen, however, 
what is meant here by "involve". For Ewing's purpose 
,it would seem that, this must be interpreted "containing 
empirical propositions#" We might, therefore, be incl- 
imà to latevpret the first "moment" as an empirical 
prpppsltlon* (It has for Its subject, apparently, "This 
particular triangle.")
Hevertholess we realise at once that it is a peculiar 
soft of emptfioal proposition^ for It is not stating a 
"matter of fact" but a "necessity" ("must") and as such 
this proposition differs radically from* for example* the 
proposition "This triangle is big#"
To this Ewing may reply* "Yes* it is different* but 
who can deny it, and on wMt grounds are you justified 
in refusing to call, it empirical, unless you start off 
with the gratuitous assumption (Kant's) that what is 
given is totally disconnected* My whole contention is 
that in what offered to the mind you sometimes "see"
/"sés" ijtot one èleiaâat "leads beyond
itself"* Whus» in esnmple, I see that, the 
characterlstiû of. tr.ianglenesswhich is empirio-
beyond
Itself, pr aarries with. It* the. charaoteristic of . 
"having angles which together equal two right angles#"
In order to evaluate this reply we must turn to the 
second "momeht" which is apparently oomplox containing 
a reflection /on the irrelevance/ of any of the partie^ 
ular (ihdividuating) notes of "this particular.triangle" 
to thé first inference;, ■ and> secondly* the inferential, 
judgment tliat - therefore the, first proposition is true 
of all triangles * IVé;*' I can conclude.- to -an a priori 
universal proposition which delivers to mo knowledge of 
wtet is not experienced.by me,
•low;* there is indeed a sewe in which the first jud­
gment may be said to be evidence for the ultimate "con# 
elusion" Vis* reflecting on the evidence for I see 
that in this X have not included !^the particular size of 
the angles# , . .
But it seems to us that this reflection amounts to 
the realisation of the irrelevance of what precisely ■ 
makes this triangle to be a particular triangle i#eits 
"individuating n o t e s A n d  We may ask in what sense we 
can say that a triangle of no particular size etc, can
/cprx:be given, in eXporieme',:. That is to say# it 
is, not.*; in fact, the, "tÿiàhglenesB": 'of' this /portlot 
ular: triangle (fpr as such it,.would ;^ g the .individual 
trlahgl#) which leads .beyond .Itself, but the, '!isolate^ ! ' 
or abstract pharaotérlstïn of "tr^ lénglèdnesafi as such* 
and what it leads beyond to Is another abstract 
char^ ,0teristic'or ■ "isolato"* Thus the original prop­
osition Is not embiricai# In.other words# it is the 
réalisation that*, in fact, the original judgment is 
not #rely -empirical' that ombles the ''Inference" to 
be made# And When we say "not merely empirical" we 
mean* not that it contains other than empirical elements, 
but. that, in 'fact the truth of-.what'is •assertafc'ls inde^ 
•pendent of the:--empirical elemehts"'and' bears'- hdt on them, 
but on "isolates*"
This seems to amount to the realisation that in 
fact the empirical Clements MVé hô more thah a psycho- 
logical function to fulfil, and that wliat we Mve is 
one complex and exclusively intellectual oognitioh# It's 
object is wMt is, called an "abstract truth"* which 
expresses a certain relation between two "isolates" 
considered a part from their manifestation.in' a particular 
concrete existent# The relationship between the ap*^  
prehension of this abstract•truth*: and the "inférence" 
to -the Universally heoeB'Sary proposition is .we suggest 
that of expressing the conoretb consequences of the
'■ - ' . :!
' tmfa# ,1m,#©,#!%. ;Miv 'fiôfHfe' -sfe#:, Mb, . • ' • - ' ' ;
1%-; '.•„. ;■ • 
la ;é|p^ »lénqé*''*,' '@#aé: .:©gQW0e#lw " : ;
. i n t # m e  : -
:s#n#-;4a ■
gfatoS- iso'.as 'là|fe;; s.lqif fe ■ .{•■::
q'iiës##).
 ^ % ; m , ,■ ..
■éigât that -%ey à #  '#$ pm-ÿ-t il#' #  -.
. t>ai-; m© of /
them'ago 9h'l'f#Vi## .Is met'to. gtfo hm-aasaeg: to,'thia .
, '■ / ■■■' " y ;' : '
' ¥%|, iiiag. # #  'ooaoegai:%:':':'%w. fof®-'hf ?#yî|lMâ 
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/propositions to draw categorical affirmative con­
clusions (1) lhat this should be the ease is 
explicable ifj in fact, our pure a nrlorf propos­
itions are in fact "abstract truths." For if we 
consider the manner in which the mind can hold to­
gether or link two "Isolates" we see that this can 
only be in the form of an "if#....then" proposition.
For in all propositions there is the bringing; to- ; 
gether or synthesising of elements into a imity of 
relation# We may therefore ask what sort of "to­
getherness" or "conjunction" can be emibited by two 
"isolates"; aocording to what form can their unity 
of relation be expressed? If they are conjoined they 
must be conjoined ih a way compatible, with their nature^ 
and their nature is to be "isolated" from all concrete 
context# Gonsèquéhtly the proposition which states 
their relation caiwiOt directly refer to the'freal ex­
istential order, or to wiiat lias significance only in 
that order. Ihe proposition Cannot refer to the ex­
istential situation as providing the "background" within 
which it relates its terras, and within which this relat­
ion holds# (e.g# space continuum for spatial relations: 
the whole concrete subject for an individual subjeet- 
predicate proposition.) It must be the relationship 
itself which forms the focal point round which the iso-
99. ,
/isolates as.© held., . lii other wordsthe proposition 
which holds together ; the-two igolatos. must., itself:be 
.r.elàtl6hà;l_:l*.i f.orm. /'Ohl'y. thus' can. it, ,p%%s%.nt the ' 
eonjmotion of. two isolates. A. prqp.08ition stating. ' 
thé,'■togethomeâs.'.of .tvjo^ Æ'.çiàtës, will .then be, of \the : , 
f.oi'Ri,'. If .. ...t-lish. . It may; ba. objected at this point •
. - , , 4, , , . /. , ■. .--J  ^ , . .#
.tMt . prôpoGltloap. arq- #0: expraWlpn qf j*#gmeàt and
'iB; a. 'of
faoè pf being": that. In ail judgmont thprë i-B the
aaBPrtidh that the rélatlèn i,n %\fhlêh thé terms are . 
held %s true tVue'^ of reality*" Without dheet-
ionlng the. truth of thië.' hold., that! it is- still 
possible to distinguish betweëh à dlrept refereh#:
an indirect- rOferehco* and: that .this Is precisely the. / .
.distinction between hypothetical and categorical prop­
ositions • 0% at :'least*;.that, this is ' the m y  ihat■ these ; 
tW0‘ forms of propositions may be distinguished vis a vis . 
the act oi judgment which-.they express#, For if we- take 
the abstract truth and formulate it categorically we may 
say that it is the expression of the judgment Aness goes 
nl6ng-wlth or iS'Conjoljhéd -=%t
agreed (at least Ewing agrees, with us) that "abstractions 
do not exist by themselves#",(1) Therefore’the know?'? 
pledge of an abstract truth does not justify me in as^
sertlng that an instance of the conjunction it assorts. ,
/asserts realKy exists# Conséqàently witK regard :# 
tîi9-4eàîity V referaaee of nqr. judgment It can- only,; 
consist in saying If an Instanse of A Is given, then 
an instahce;of $' exists» But this gives US no'dlfect " 
information a#ut the real order*
It might be said that With this;interpretation 
Of the Mture' of *!ehtailment" we hSve given BWing w&t  ^
he wants - 1*0;. the neeessity of an emSif loai. elomeht 
If we are to make categorical necessary propositions, 
For;once;sensible: experience 'provides ^us-: With'"an iiiS't-'/ 
ance of iness we can go On to infer a necessary con­
clusion about reality, He might claim that in this way 
(by Insisting that pure a , t>r Onoslt ions : are %po-,C'.
thetical in form) he has avoided erecting a world of 
Platonic 'essences Whose -'hecessary connections 'can be 
asserted : directly, and oategorically:* and that he has 
thus avoided the pitfall of a "second world" of Intel- 
llgiblo essences alongside (ahd in very obscufe relation) 
to the world of sensible existentsy It can, however, be 
maintained that he has still retained if not intelligible 
es'sences.at least intelligible relations, whose relation­
ship to the sensible universe is equally obscure.
But what We want to emphasise Is that; in fact; 
nothing that Bwing has told us about the fornation of 
a priori propositions is sufficient to enable him to
" and/to break the barrlef between the "j 
„the- pe%lble;:,},betwécn wha't^  
the. .concrete;existential .Wer#; .
¥e.ybaVe‘4ealt"ià^ ;aetaîl'WitÉ::-his-:exampl©'sfor „ 
the f ollow.ing rreasbns
1# ..Î0 'show.tliat,. :ln:'fact;:' es, hé;,describes' it, the.: - 
nctivity .of'thought yWhich gives us, knowledge of, a • , : 
mathematical a or jof i nrOoosltlOn requires-', no .morç:',':; 
than psychological : help .from sensible',., experience.,., ,■ ,
,â*' To show-'that, in'fact j' thé'hypothetical nature' '
<of' cure-' a-' bfibf i -'bf bobsitions ; cah be explained' merbly
by cohsidefing' the'nature of propositions and judg- ■ 
:ttehts''';as'.s'heb/'tbgather-y.with'thb'Cptstemologica'l 
status of "isolates, " .' '■
cbnàéquehtly, the fact that such propositions are 
hypothetical in character does hot directly support 
the view that the real wbfld is logical in character. 
,'l.e, Becaus^my awareness of the conjunction of two iso­
lates must be expressed in the form If &, t'heh B., ythis 
does not justify me.in concluding that the real world 
must in itself exhibit sUch logical Connection. Itt 
fact» What Is.specifically.Ipgiçal in the relation via. 
enta ilmeht, character isés thé "is olate s" as s uch, and 
the question is not so much whèther thé real world can
//è.ànicGntfKdiot'' this'--f élit ion iS,' really-.
; without. sensebut y.iAo ther at; any point-, a ' brMgè ' 
.-''Oah:}b@'::''thr'h# hotween.-. ther-logicml.; or ideal world : - ■ 
..and,the. real, ,■world,; ..T,here.'-,Is: Indèed.-,nothing,'la 
:: .th9':nare;a.;hri-orl. .proposition which would justify 
me in,inferring that there is eVer,given an instance 
.which:r.Qàllsea: .ih'.-oonog'eteo- wtet. we .have/seen t®. be .. 
true in, abstracto, -Thié,. is particularly important 
.he,cause,. Ewing.' hims.elf -says,,that. "we ,may:, .see, that. .', 
what impHe.s B in a , particular case ip neither the.
#--:%ht;.,8om,e;g,enoriO:-,., 
property C," (1) The critical p%ase is "we may see?',
, for:i\:in:faOt'|(.''we,-dO: only.,,'-'.see-'i,,in. case's where, .the .
. pbjects of thought are fully present to the ,mind, and 
Wholiy intelliglhie to it» (2) This would seem to 
limit the';--'field ,'Of', pOas,i.hiliti'èS, to mathematics and 
, logic ;('for,.:Ewing;does' hot, 'so',.it would .seem',,, cohs'i'der 
hctog" ah, ’ intelligible notion Withih Which It 'may; be,
, p'os'sible'.-.to discoyé'f a structure of relationships,
-. . ,0uch h': limitation,' is, both .significant and unfor­
tunate» It, is significant for oinr afghment In that it 
is precisely, in the sphere of mathematics and logic 
that the "myth" of and? "ideal world " most ea'sily. takes 
root. The "entities" of mathematics reveal a consist-
. -
çohàistency and intelllgibilltir of tlieii* ovin sat^ 
fiotent, 'It':/ bè aaid* to;éatia^ r tM; mind’s 
deéiafo for o^ rtitucio and Intelligibility in ail but 
its Most deep rooted metàphÿslqai drive tbmrds the 
Conor et e existent# And in a somewhat similar way* 
in the miild’a knowledge of its Own "lawo of thought" 
it woiild seem to feach à point of eertituda and olar? 
ity which cannot be surpassed* were it not again* for 
the.-knwledge which it has of its finitude and depend? 
enç e in the act of knowledge #
This limitation is also unfortunate forCBwihg* for 
it is in these two fields that the logical positivist 
may claim most success in his effort at "dissolving" 
the world of "a priori" çonceots» With.the success of 
the ’’formalisation" of mathematical theory* the utility 
or even validity* of regarding the "axioms" and "con^ 
cepts" as 'pbsSessi% intelligible content hr Import be^ 
comes highly suspect* and under the general movement of 
research into the relations Wtween mathematics and 
logic* the same "formalistic" method and treatment is 
applied to logic itself*
B* Bwin^’s Argument Against the linguistic Theory 
of 4 Rriori Propositions*
This brings us, to the second Context in which the 
question of a oriori knowledge of the "sensible world"
/■world'' is oonsidered. fin Iris paper to the Aristot- 
ellaii. SpMoty op.? tbe ttoguistie' îboôry. lof A Priori 
. Propositions Ewliig has ■ an. arguraent which,"is, di.reotly
; The à%ümé#, oùaoé^s the 
analysis of the. propositiph "4 thing ' ooxmot be:0oth 
r#: âll pyer;" $hcl what W  attbmpte tp prpye, ^
is that the: oiily ; satisfactory aooomit of thé a wior l 
n%tWO of this propositiwi is that "we .se^. that: the ; . - 
objootive oliaraoteristic signified by :".gfèea" %' loglCt 
ally Imbmpatible; with: the oharaoteristic signified by, , 
"redTh: (I)' . - , - \ ' i :3 ;
' The theory of the nature of a hriori propositions 
against iAioh hé ié àrgüihg/is the "linguistic:theory" 
which he doscrtb.os as the theory that prop^
bsitlons are "trhe^ !^  and deduotive reasoning "Yalid" 
simply because, to deny the a; priori nrooositioii or to 
refuse to aoeept the reçsoaing^would be ,to qontradiot 
the rules of. language or to oomblne words' in a :way . ' 
which according to the rules of languag.e conveys no 
meaning*." (2) Wb shull not stop to: consider the 
accuracy of this descriptions Ayer himself in the Preface 
to the ëécond mition of lAmmiGE* TRUTH A# %ÜIQ (3) 
has adiiiittod the necessity for refining and correct ing 
[Certain of his earlier statements in this matter* IJhat 
IS of importance in the linguistic theory is the view
;/view that the néGésslty which ohavaqtériségi a nrlog 1 
protoQsttlbns is a result hot of the pequliar hature of 
tho ''objects'* they art "about", but bi' lingiiistié ÿules, 
which are, at base, arbitrary, : It follows from this 
.'that such .propositions' have no'.objecti'vé' reference nor.. 
a fOrtfori. do they give us anv ao.qitivh iiifCrmàtion 
about the expériâéhtal order' of sehaltle oCSuTents» "They.; 
qan neither be eonfirmed nor refuted by any fact of 
éxbérienôé.e. -Their' bàale/.'ik linguistic' convention# It* t / ' ' » • ' • \.f ‘ ’ . . , ' ' ^ : j - t / i . ' < * -
is this that Ewing: disputés * Hè argues that such a 
theory oahhbt.àeooùht-for the 'fact that we.know that the " : 
proposition "a thing eamiot be both reel and green all 
over*!-: would', be;.true./ In • wha.tever:-:language-it -were -• ©xbreeeed*-" 
He argttos that such knowledge would be impossible if this 
"rûlé/r %^ êre simply the resiü^ t Of lliiguistio/ conventions \
cohoerning the usage of the words . " , r a n d  -%reen" * . For 
VO jco'uid, Èù^- know in ^advance' ■ùSrow^  ■ eppiriqa|.; knowledge. ’ 
of any particular language that it must liavo the same 
linguistic/conventions we Wvo* But we do rln fact 
know. in .advance of oxporlenoe that any language which 
has adopted certain rules In the usage of colour words ?■- -..
cig* "that we must apply not "red" but "green" to things 
like grass.-.’in," spriiyi" (D* ? this Is* admittedly* an- 
arbitrary rule ■*- must accept as true .and necessarily true ' - 
the proposition "A thing oamaot be both green and red all
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/all over*" (1) But if thia proposition merely 
concerned the words "red" and "green" it would be 
impossible to know a priori that every language 
which had a colour word to designate grass in spring, 
and another colour word must accept the same rule to 
the effect that these two colour words must not be 
predicated of the same thing in the saiw respect. 
According to Ewing the only satisfactory explanation 
of this a priori knowledge we have concerning all 
languages which use colour words to designate elements 
in the sensible order is that this order (e.g. things 
like "grass in spring") is qualified by "objective 
characteristics" and that we "see" that, for example, 
the quality signified by "green" is incompatible with 
the quality signified by "red". (2)
In this argument Ewing is clearly appealing to the 
presence of the a priori in the sensible order. The 
concepts of green and of red are for him clearly empir­
ical concepts. And according to him they are the basis 
of the necessary proposition under consideration. We 
have already noted that in the sphere of mathematics 
Ewing did not succeed in proving that necessary prop­
ositions were really concerned with the empirical order. 
Prim facie his position seems stronger in this example, 
but we must consider the reply that the logical posit-
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/positivist could give to Ewing's arguments.
; : In the first pj^ce we miglit question thé legit­
imacy of introducing "empirical concepts" into the 
'debate* Thus it is clear that the necessity which 
characterises the proposition Cannot be found by con­
sidering the particular things to which the words "red" 
and "^e^" refer* ind if to this it is replied that 
these words do riot apply to the things in their partic­
ularity, but as instances of general or universal 
4riàractéri'stiés'»': thé logical: pos'itivist may iegitimateiy 
ask for an explanation of the r®nl or orltieal value of 
the concept of "green in general" or "red in general".
He will himself prefer to" say tiiat ;the pjèopbsition is 
necessary in Virtue of the fact that the words are both 
/colour'; wOrds.: ;:&nd' if. he is asked why we should all 
share the same convention about colour words* he may 
answer that* although it is arbitrary that we should 
î.Çhoosé to designate the' real by colour-wofds* if, we once 
do this we must be consistent: if our language contains
two colOur-wofds and by their means we ape to describe 
our ejcpOriencc then ihi/sMll defeat our pUrpose if we 
apply both these words to the same thing, for they will 
"each;of' them fail,in their/purpose*. The logioul posit­
ivist could still argue that this does not imply that the 
ground of the necessary distinction (reflected in the
: * 1 ; / :  -/ÿ:/" - / ■ ■'A',/:’-"
/thé ’proposition, imder cohsîdératioh), lies- In^ ithe 
real 1 in the fact that there are green, things; which 
" are'listàhé|e:''6f't #  # j#t&éy%#actéiisticr:gr^^ 
ani red things/which afe ihstanÇés of the ohjeotive 
\ charâct eris'tlc.' red, ' and ’'in'-the'^.faftt. t#_t thé mind- '"eees";, 
the mutuai exiClusiGh of these cilâ'rao:tefia?tiC's> ' Hé' îaay 
'. ; stiiïj/haihtain' thatÀthé: reél: WSrM' ah;offeredlté-"'o ,
sensés" is'diverse’but he may argué that it is à matter 
/, of?hôavéhtléh''tO';’dééidê'/whiçh differehces/we-'Chose/’to ■ ' 
give hahes/to* We do So in ordOr to distinguish, and
‘ . ?thé;fmôti'ÇëS;wMGh? determine: ■'which-distinctiphS/h^  'im-' ' ', 
portant, loay vary. But any langhago 'which findà it im- 
. ' pOitaht tolgive .names to coiouridiffefences ’Will reach 
the: same "rule" as ?W.e ourselVeS4ave. : On the Other iiand, 
if 4'language did;not find suoha distinction useful', 
then, in that case, the proposition under consideration 
coUld hot be transiated* There;Would ;be no questiOn of 
whether it?.wère or were not true in that language* It 
could not be expressed at all* If now the same'argument 
were posed to the lOgioal pOsitiVist* concerning the 
prop'ositioh "4 thing cannot be both coloured and hot- 
Goio#ed ail over" he might stili anSwer that this is not 
concerned with reality. ' I might quite-well not find it 
. useful ;to designate reality'by;'?the-’.word "cole'Ur"* It is 
only once'haying done this (an arbitrary Step) that it
•/it?.fbilbi}s:;aeqegsa^  ; th:Üig. ôàaabf be both
colqai'àd and hùt-ooloured àlï ''-6vér"'.; ■ This là /bëcaùsé 
#/hàvè'' prêvio'hà'iy ?4 'usè "èolpur" . aà; lesigt-
hatèr, ;aM; 11 I at ûaôe-;saÿ thing- là:, éoioùi.ed 'and 
'hOtthoiéiirçà/ àli';'#él*l déàlgmté ht #11#
, : E'wiàg points' oht tlmt il it'' bo: hrgùed tlih'f the-
Ihli.'ol .çbntrhdi&tl^  ^ "ohiy hoidh' boqâàs'o /its noh*_
'obs.hrvhhh8 '':W?tü.d/#):e ail- Ihhghage. ' ùsèlésà?"'4#'A ' '■,' ',/'//'■■' : , ■ , -,-.'// . ; ■ . ■ 4' ; • ■ , ■ ' ;/ '■/,tribrl truth which oanhot bo. said to ba depoMéht ' bh "
'iihgüistlc''hbhVéa%éft ■ mhàt • stll'l ' bé "prhàhppbs'ed* ■ vit»
'."thé h‘: hrlori truth tliiat- thô'.'ià'S} Ole ontrhdlç t ion is
'#é'ah#oséd-.ih ali'lazighagéa."' (i) ' ' .
H'm4'vé%4'v@n il' this point le 'epnceaed/lt 'mhy W  
àùegtioaed whether it is of valhe lor the p'ui^ bsh of 
;Éwiriglà ' thhi'is''?aghiïiât..'bhé ibgical..vp'ohitivi'st'si' 4c- 
cording to Bwing the law of nba-Contradiotàon is itself 
à piireiy: 1 ofnai princigib (âi and by this.we'niay ‘take 
, hiDi to,/mean that it cohoeriiS' hOt th® real ' Content, the 
significance of propositions, bat the form in 
’/Which/.the mihd' orders .that, content * To say* therefore, 
that this law is presupposed in all, langtfâges* is .to 
':Say''that all la):i#hagQ ' ihVoiyes a certain formalisation > 
i.yisè. a lürfifâlisatiün ,ol which one . of the "rules" is the , 
'prlhclplo of non^ Goh'tradidtioh) .
?H0weye.fi' it seems 'clear that ih the phrase "m.ture of 
language as such", the term "language" does not refer to
./to an empirloal, conoept it the sense in which the 
.logical, positivists , use the;, term^  "empirical", .for 
we would agree ttot no amount of positive information 
about languages as empirical facts would justify the 
"a-priori truth" that all languages .presuppose the 
law of hon-contradiotton, dnles,s,:. therefore, Ewing 
is.prepared to question the.whole basis of the empir­
icists ' account of: " immediate_. experience" and the ■ re­
sultant, theory, of the.nature of empirical concepts it 
seems: to us, that hC;cannot;"close the gap" between the 
empirical and the a priori.
It is, ‘true that an explanation of this "a priori" 
is st.ill. required. But we cannot see how , the admission 
of an "ideal" world of logical relations governing 
.thought (or its expression in language) itself■can 
provide the solution to the question*
To understand the inspiration of logical positivism 
we must realise that it is in great part a reaction to 
this type of theory. And if* in one direction it goes 
too far, in denying real import or critical value to h 
oriori propositions and concepts, in another direction it 
does not go far enough, in that it accepts the interpret­
ation of immediate experience which is the legacy which 
Kant inherited from Hume, .Having accepted this however 
it seems to us that in "dissolving" the a priori it is
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/is oïÂy being faithful to its own premisses,' It 
seams to us that Ewing, in çombining the admission of 
the' formality" of the priheiple of aon*contradietioh 
with the implicit acceptance of the empiricist view 
of- the mtui'e of human experience Is forced to deny 
-any ontolbaioal ground to this principle a M  this 
■being the case ho must either fail hack ihto ideal- 
■'ism or explain ' "formality" ih terms of "formalis­
ation,"
Séqtiôu y» ■ The- Loglo- :-6f-Pbsltlv#'Terms':^  ■
•/■•',■ ■•- . TramsWW^taitlIotiôh of Belnk.
Jn this sàme.àrticié on,thé tinghistie Theory, of : 
a. or icy 1 :prqp.ositiono Ewing mkes ,a point vhich.'is 
of copsiderahle . Impbrtanoe in holpihg.ha .to under-? 
;.8tand;the'.popition;pf.hie.,.iogieii. positlviat oppon- . 
Onts and to appréciât© why we find his ,gp?guments • 
agaipat them ineffectual,, it also enahlea us to throw 
light on our own position in relation to both of them, 
and for tlîege reasons we shall devote a separate sOot- 
ioh tb this question,
; Ewing says that the contention that "a Priori ' 
rules of logic are [valid because tbey could not be 
denied withput self-contradiction has a certain plaus­
ibility", but amongst the objections to this View he 
makes the following point,»- "It is impossible, to 
deduce all a oriori propositiohs from the law of contra­
diction alone, For the law to.be applied we must be 
able/to see that certain cliaracteristlCs are Incompat­
ible, with each other, and from the bare law of contra­
diction aioh© one could hot deduce Which these would be, 
e,g,, that red and green are such èharàèteristics and 
hot red and smooth or noisy," (1) According to Ewing, 
therefore, before We can use the formal law of contra­
diction we.must be provided with certain information
/i^formtlcP Icchoèypiag content of
' certain terms * betWen hhleh gneoific éontéPta wO 
■afig: trielogical; reiatibn/of' incompatibility*' ,;.&a - 
, befori,'. we.iaOy take.,Ewing , to mëàn that these, terms' 
refer-:,to. ';"objéotiy8:,'charaçteriptios',''ii''(l ).'' . -, ■;
, wo. find it very dlffichlt to understand 
-•■/.What''4$ meant-'by/.saying /that -before'-.%#/. can,, tell, whether 
-vthe-law of contradiction;applies/to twb givoh Character- 
■ istios/we:must -.see/thàt-;:they-'aie/inoonPatible-;--'that we, : 
'Y'.âW - - '6a$'e of-fed' and 'gr'een^  and that do
’-it red-;and \For.$, in faetf
the incompatibility here-/ refet#ed to is > not. something 
like inoomA# - .tempérament-. between husband
- and wife, qt? the ■ ! Ihqpmpatibill^ o:^, two colours, when a 
red blouse %oeq nbt go with** a purple sklri| ‘ but preoiè?
: ely ; thls ^. we ^ u^ means
the iMompatibility of two ter# 1#
of one and the same subject * If this is sov then ^ Ewing’s 
point is that the law of contradiction is in itself in? 
suffioient to teXX us which terms, oonsldefed in their 
logiéaX funçt&on as predicates are incompatible. If this 
; :iS;_90|-;however», it is of no usé;,'to. try to make -gopd this 
. deficiency by appealing to/wMtever it is that those 
.'term# peally -refer to.# Which is# for EWlng» objective., - 
oharacteristlGS*’^ for if we simply confine ourselves to
/té /éhch .qf\#é8é'/4hi%%:d#ÿlnQb ,. À
ent.ities*..,th©a,-ôf ©ach ,of -:the»u ail 'we'.caîï-gay ,1g 
that .'It ïà 'itiélfahd [ that. It /ia .hot ahv-éf.- thé'
û'théra. 'i v'ilverjrthtog/ls what it is and ,hot/.àho„thér.4'.,././/:■';'4 -4 :'./ ;:.44 . . :?thing'' ), ' The ; ''inspé'ç.ti.oh".' of. " objective - chara6t.©r-
istios?' ...is., irrélèvaht té the cmestién.'? of thé logioal ;
iriooiaaatlMlity of terms » When Ewing . says that we
é'S'é'ê"': itmt. red/ànd.y.gréeh are.'inhprnpatlble .wiiat he.; is '. ,
assuming is precisely that we are Viewing red and-green
■?.4 -r- 1  .as determinates of the, determinable* eolour. and in 
their.^ uhgtioa :as.déterminâtes#. 1.e# . as determining - . 
thé -place of an object (viewed as the possible subject 
Of a judgmàit) within the erdér generated by the deter­
minable.*. It seems .to ÙS that it is only in this context 
tWt, we?Can talk abOut logical incohputibillty* If so 
it is clear that as such this logical relationship does 
not bear on the terms in;their "reality réference", but 
on their fornàl chhracterlstias as détermihates placing 
an object within an order or scheme under a given deter- 
mlnabie. This being thé case, however, it alsp seems 
clear that the law of contradiction ig sufficient to 
g,Uarantéé the truth of h proposition like-'"the'same thing- 
is never both red and ^ èën all ovér" (1), for the terms 
red and 'green are hère héihg viewed in their formal aspect 
as determinates of a given determinable* How,,if red and ;
/and ^een a3?é treat^ dt as determinates of the determine 
able, colour» then their function is to place an object 
(% thing^itbin the order of çôldur* If both are 
employed, to characterise one and the same object then 
this Object is
within the order, which amounts to saying that thèse 
terms,:have ceased to fulfil their ftmction, and this 
amounts to saying that the order has itself been destr-
howeverV ^ wihg mhy still protest that it remains 
true that the law of contradiction does not Itself 
inform us as to which terms are, and which terms are not, 
détermina tes of ^ one and the same ; determinâbleV JShd, this 
is, of course» true» but bur point is that the question 
of logical incompatibility arid combatIbilitv dqea not 
arise-: until We :VieW tèrms in their logical function of 
placing things in orders#: If We ask how it is that red
and green are logicrilly incompatible, arid that red and 
smooth are logicallÿ: compatible thé answer is that in = 
j udging that is red We are viewing: exclusively
under the determinable colour and giving it its place in 
this order; it remains ari open quèstiori Whçthef it has 
a place in another ordèr - e&g$ a place signified by the 
termV smooth,
BWin# m y  still» and rightly, press us for ah account'' 
of hpv we may be said to Miscover^V that two terms are
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/are determinates of the same d^terzmWable# But here 
we must be Very careful to understand the nature of 
this question oprrcôtly, for b#h the term "d#térmlhate" 
and the term "determinable** are logioal ter%s; and we 
must avoid any.illicit transposition from the .logical 
order to the real ordpr# We must not seek iii the real 
for anything more tliah is absolutely necessary in order 
to account for the intelligible (or "useful", as Ewing’s 
opponents might say) employment of the determinable- 
determinate category In our ImOwledge of the real.
What is essential in the relationship of determin­
ates to their determinable is the notion of difference 
;%ity* The colour red»,, for e#mple, differs ap
colqur from the colour green. But the phrase "difference 
within unity" is Itself a logical phrase, and to trans­
pose this directly Into the real order would involve hypo?* 
siasising colour and treating it as the peal source of 
the unity, the differences within it being then explained 
according to some theory of participation. How it seems 
to us that Ewing would hesitate to consider "colour" as 
the name of a real subsistent entity, but it also seems 
to us that it is in this direction that he would be forced 
to go if he insisted that it is by inspection of "object­
ive characteristics" that m  .see- the logical incompat­
ibility between certain terms » We must consider whether any
: m .  ■ '■ ;
/any other course is open to us.
Nov,: ^ hen we are talking tjf the mind’s relation.
.to the.-âëèl'Vih'.imoT^ .insr'.i-'b-'5«'®kè!',,elear # a t ,,. howeve* • 
we may- describe this a.ctivity what ,ts distinctive, of . 
''knowing, the ,reai" ih the, putting or. finding Of.an 
order 'pr:'Order,s, ■in>t-he diversity -of r.the real ,as,.tMt 
is presented to us thrpugh our senses#, This » hpwever, 
would not W  . if'what\:06nf rout edr-h^ ' .were a-'L
sheer blank diversity of ihdividpnl sense# There must  ^
therefore M  rèsemblanoes in the real# and of sUch a 
kind, that they leavç ^ piaoe', #thln them for- difference « 
But we Use the phrase "hutting or finding" deiiherately, 
beoâusé while: the real must be such that we can, as it 
were, "fihd" differèhoes with in it, it is
only when these are taken up by the mind and employed 
'as/principles-governing'prédication thht they can be 
said to provide us with means for "ordering" the real#
In the real, for example,
but from the point of view of explaining logical ihcom*-/ 
patibility it is sufficient to say that It is by ah act 
of the mind that the positivé terms which refer to these 
different colours are treated as indices of ah:„prd%?
viz,, the order of colour# Furthermore, it does seem 
reasonable to agree so faf with Ewing's opponents that 
there is a Certain freedom in thé ehoice of orierp - that
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/that we db to a: certain esjtent, decido which dif-? 
ferences withih resemblances we are going to recog^ 
nise and employMn o.uf "putting of order, in the real",
(1). . - : ;
■ We ‘ w i # . ripw; to suggest a 'line of argument ; whieh 
Ewirig might 'have-applied-with profit •against his op- 
pbh'èhta * ' - This èonéerna ' not ' the ■ question - of Ipglohl 
ihcdàpâtibiiity, but the' question of logical oompat- 
ibility; If we take logical compatibility as dèocrib- 
ing the possibility of employing twb terms as predicates- 
of Dhe and the same subject without contradiction the 
problem which is brought out by the aboVe treatmeht of 
logical inçôàpatibility is that it is not, in fact, 
sufficient in order to describe two terms as logically 
compatible to say merely that they place objects in 
different brders* What we must be able to say is that 
they place'one: and the bame object in different order s, 
for, as we have said, two predicates like "red" and 
"smooth' are logically compatible if they can be predict 
ated of one and the same subject# Thus, "red" and 
"smooth" are logically compatible if we can say "X (e#g# 
This apple) is red and smooth". On our interpretation 
this means ' that one and the same object (This apple) must 
b© able to be placed or viewed in the two diffèrent orders 
generated by the determinables, colour, and texture. But
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/But we mUst mote that this possibility eaimot be 
grpk^déd Im either of these two orders, for ëâch'of 
them is ah order oreciselv on gohditiDH that the ' 
object is (by the law of contradiction) Identified 
• so'iélÿ. ■ by the ' detêrmlhablè ' concerned -». -.flie identity '. 
which ;èaôh -pf these orders can confer is . solely .an - 
Identity, within itself. But when we say that Xvis both 
red and smooth it is .clear that X cannot be identified 
solely by "fed'*, ■ or; solely by "smootlf# Hence the/ • 
identity involved in "one and the same object" cannot . 
be thé identity provided/for by the,particular orders 
of the. two déterminables, whose: terms we describe as ■ 
"logioally compatible*!, . : . ; .
Thé notion of "one and the Sam© object belonging to 
different’ Wdérs" necessarily carries' us above any one 
of these different orders and cannot be explained with­
in them: 'each oh© of these orders is» aà'"’it were'» 
absolute within itself» but, under pain of ruling out 
the pbssibiilty that more thah one such order can be 
employed in ■"identifying" a given object» we must con­
clude that neither singly nor in shm (since each is 
absolute in its own light) can they themselves contain 
the ground of the Mentity (the onè-and-the-sameness) of 
the given object* But hère again» to make oUr position 
clear, we must insist tmt the notion of "one and the
/ '■ ■ : ' -' 'MO#i
l; /th©. «a# oMeot*'. 1:8* ,©:t,p.lat!3.y,:S|)®aki.iigi, a M g i W -
/  «.otlm». amà-lthat »_ - therefore* what we are • arguing, ’
ig- that thid notion» whtah-wn Q,ialm .Ig Involved in.
;-fehe; notion :of logtoal coapatiMlity.,. cannot'bo.ac«»
'■' baVQ ■ mterprot.ed the latter,. Where. is. more to It than
[:.,; . ■ this,-, hçwévfrs', fOr,;we,mhst note: that if the,.■logic of
.p.otitiVQ-,terms. serve#-to mark .off objects, from each 
.other* .so .thatI for''.example* if we .know that k is. red,. 
we :.%Ow that #  is. different from B, which is green,, it 
now.; beiOpen .,c;lear', that/tf .nonçvOf .thçge. -oisders can be . 
oçnsi,eleréd:th©'groiMC of the,identity ,ef..aa .obiéÇt which 
belongs, .to more thah one of them,, it is also., the.case 
that, whilo they Oah'rçach be employed, in the task of 
; "marking off" one object from another., they cannot either 
singly or in;sum be said to contain the ultimate ground 
of the difference between.objects#
■. • .our contention .is, that when we mark off objects from - 
one ..another We, always do so within a unity». Me have 
d©y.eiop,0d this in terms of the notion of a unity of order 
géherated by! any giyea ,det©.rmimbl© under which positive 
terms,:are. gribuped:, e.g.,, the determinable., cblo.W.under 
,whie,h. w© .place "red" and "orange"» Me can then say X , 
#his apple), is different from Y (fhis orange) in so far 
as X - is red and % is orangey .again, we can say X, is
/is..4i'ffer©htj f rpi-Y in -so far -"as x is s w e t f is 
bitter:’, o r* . again : #  3Q far as X and 1
ia.:rbugh*- b;u|‘* ttist: as ha# ai t #  orders generated 
by the-partletoar;;'4etbrmi#bi^ àoio'ur* taste*
textdre:; ''eaà!#roŸÏ# the hoaditloa for saylhg that
same 'X llie*V‘o #  ahd the samé appia) is fed and
sweet'.'.and 'smooth. '.ahd ' -#0isame.-f (lie»",' one.and ' the 
eame-.bràhgeX/ïh' orange and 'r’Ough and hlt't'er"* -'s'p. hone 
of these 'ordefs can pfhylds saffieient eondl#i'on 'for 
gàylng' "fhis (one and: the s.aW- aopie ■ js : different 
''fro* 'this /(o# and the same) 'ofahge"'/ " If'we''Were 
'jimtted'-'InVhhf ' predioat,ion ,'t6 Viewing .:#.i#S' Molely 
from.'Within,ainhmber of- par.tioniar.-oilers- of\dlfferent 
d'etermihabiet!-we -• sho'#d'.be. limited to- saying;.'"x is . 
different-■fr .^^ f-i#eQloar:if' -..'X .1# different, from X M :  
textiir'é'î' ' :X‘: là.-.dlffer'ent from Ï ln,,tastte’*:.,.» ■ But' we
should not*: In faot* be able to say that "X" and "X" in 
this' 3erle8:-:'ofstatém#ts stands for "one and the same 
ob|.eM"l- We. .$ho#d';..not, that is,;-to say* ■ be,,able. to say 
that one and the same, objeot (b»g>,, fhls apple),. which is 
smooth and red'and'sweet la different from one and the 
'sa.me. .object {«kg*, ' fhts orange), which is -rough and orange 
and bitter, fhue, we have, once ..again, the problem of 
difference within unity to explain* But this difference 
within unity mugt transcend and at the game ti*o contain
.. , . . . /j
‘ • • ----' ' ...._______________________________________ .. v-j.'. : ... ;.  v&V .  /
■/’contB'ib-’the fari'ohg 'differeacbs within unities 
' ëxpre'èsea' :in- the' ié|iç-©f positive terms'* for these 
'iattép: hnitl# cphcern âetérminahïeé'-■'whieh-afé ail 
'Oh 'On'a 'lé'vel*ÿànd'''the brdhrs''' they -géhératé- :fail out* 
■pidé-'eaçhV sthlÿi-’'■ 'fhé' ôra'er' wé :"éî?e'■'seekihg- is -one' 
/-fith'ih'Mhieh 'ill ptirtio'ular' différenbes' -of: ôoiôur* '
■taste,-'ête,-fà'li,- and. it. is- bn# whibh will e#hié us 
to ''uSe'-'thë' /poiitivè! terms 'likferèd' and "smooth ‘and ■ ^ ‘ 
‘Swéeti'and vordttgo’ and hOUgh a#'bitter' in mikiag. off 
'onë' object (ihis a'ppië) ■ ffom''ahbther (ihls drahge').
,l;nd: hbr#iW,':'m#t'' hôte that-'it-^ hb" longer -niakes- stense. 
to taih..about' '."deoidihg- 'l^ hioh 'difîpbënèe'S' we shaii’
"hote"-'» "for' Wei'ire nb longer dealing with 'an 'order 
(alongside bthdr.ipOsiible 'orders''; but with mi- order which 
.'ib''àna':;;mhst'Àe;fK^  ^ C'ho#Wr we may aeserlbe it),
.'for- it-is-thétordef which is to provide - the ultimate 
'formal req'UirlaentS' of logical compatibility and which'
' is'''tO('W».ke:,no&8ibie the- pOsaibillty of different -orders 
Within WhiCh 'One and the -game object may be plaCedf We 
can say* thereforethat this Order must be'a transcen­
dental and ■;,pianent;:...b£der * meaning by this that the place 
to Which an object','is asaignèd. in'this order (and which 
is -the ground bf the notion .of' "One and the same Object") 
carries soS. ' rahihtain'a' the object in Its Identity over ahd 
above and in and through the places (and "partial'* id en-
- ''.F- '1..'" \ V . ............... ....... K:.,"',! C, ■ iii'-'"-'
''a'asigîiëd, to t #  '-bbjèe’ti ,ih':-any?b^  ^ a
'humbbr'bf" pb#it|be;bM#a«- '
be bailed:'abs6iM#:.&  ^s%Më tftatxno-' bbfleci-'-ia.
b à | | ^ o ; b f ; #% I : ■
'r@gi#Ées A: Isgmat j^g. , '
given
és! bXist'tag bioiiggiië: ; b#ei«br#br s'* . tiieif thlS /Implies = ' 
tha#i%/is-:iegioiilÿ%G'@si#è/'#^^ 'noîv ia-aetùai:. ■::~r't>:~T'' .. :'.'ÿ ; • vSæ^ f:::,:. ■'■(■' . : T . \  ' . :
:'faCtïitri'à ' é#/#d-'ih#-rsam#"'0je#:«RX . -
feelofe-afe-onae ;te"th&' èrd'ër:'ef:#ib#.:'àna-;tb
But apvWCMf©'ârguedf;.
■this vpôssibiiîty caWtt bi : .
©###*': #  ih. any'brâer: whloh we trè&t as .,.an,...ozMr. 
a À m Ë # _ a W : K _ Ë ^ W ^  ■ HéôCè'i. to beJàblbib'talk bf
an'.'#d# in/'thes© :tor#s*;yikGk *)as:!a\partioUiM#'bider 
biôhïs^’l^ othst' pigibîe, OrdbrSf' is, 'tb-peauPbae'an 
„ibs;oiut« brier wi#i-im mieh "Obe %#, thO'-eOfte; Objeet'' ■ 
is-,plao,ei* .a# it-is ■
ban- therefore;' provid# hs, with-the''subjeot-:!#^ ^^  
to which Wb Can view the positive terms of '-thbsè'iif* 
fereat; prtiohlar -orders 'as'- 'areiioatos*! liv-bf^bburse we:,vf 
treat - the--order-- of*:-.;for ■eMinpio,, oOibP/hh' bbKoihte-: thOh , 
it is itse-lf-saff-iO||ht to prOVide us %fith' 0:-b.#ieot of 
-prodlhatio»-. But -we, should-th#h- -# .-'limited ih- the logical
y,: ' '. . ' '- It f - ' ' ' : . ' - I  . . -
., i> l2h« ' '
!■ - jflogicai ■possîbiiitieë’-Of pr edication to - those positive
/' terms which' 3#ve bs'- iîîdices oi the .ordë» of çbicùr»
/■' . ÿu%therborb,'bb' mh#' degcrlbe:' member ship of tills 'order
;£■■ ’ is. 'mcoftditl'OHal, 'I'lt: the.- s'énse. 'that • the hoticn' cf "*con-
/ iitl'Ohs'-of' mebfeoVsh a . giVëh brdcr" présupposés the
'.possibiilty 'of jvieWlhg'b:- 'given••.object as a ■'sttîîjsçt - of 
pr'ediptlbh -'bhtslde'-.o'f its .membership o î ■ thisglvto order. 
%;'%!# ask'wbbthcr-' or' hot It possess Os' the.oharac'terls- 
•tic's ':#cm,s'$ry'''lm ' #dcr - 'to be Viewed, under "thé given ' ' 
order/.' But,:'.‘prior to mémborbhlp :of .thià-'absolute. Order,
' .wfe?i-ibve..vao, posbl'bio bhbJeot 'of .'oredioatioa». ■-' ■ ■ • -':
■ ■ '■ " ' ;Ét 'sé'éWâ'-:'to dg'that; th'è's'e’ fe'dalréâients of the funda- 
mehtaibrd'ër within which we mubt place" all" differences 
w'ithln.' 'hnity.,' and ' hencd'bll o’dr-'e'fforts 'to "of'der -the 
- fêdl"'£.'are prbyidedpfof 'by' the'fhbmist thebry of the trans- 
cèhdehtal notibn of being, as: W© have deVelbped this in 
Ghapter I, and especially in Section 3 of that Ghapter.
(I) We there draw attention to the fact that the idea or 
notion of being eo#d not be entertained by the mind out** 
side of at leant an Implicit reference to a concrete 
ob.1 bet',jn.,..an.,a,'Q.t.:,,p.f.iudgiaënt (fhis exists). Thus, we may
, • • -r ' •  • r ■ * » i \ Î. - ' « 5 • • t ~ t • ■' ' ' ~
say that simultaneously with the notion of being there 
arises the notion of a aubject .'.of. .oredtcati.on, and hence 
a given obleotfbeceiaes in the logical order a subject of 
predicatibn under the nbtloo Qf being* If we ask whether
JSC;;
/whether', aa- G^ectica# become a sabjee.t-o.f pred'lo,stio.n 
w#br any. ath«r notioh'the answer is ooata.l#d in .the
is/the - first intelligible".;, - whatever. : ■ ' " I ■ /  ; ■ ■we-.oehQèivç w# eondRivè.'ia;r8,latiba to. toeing.*', fO'view 
nh,, btojeot.hs^ ^^ d «j£-,nnisy. or .smptoth-.is. and' priaer- 
ily. tp;'view i#-ae .toeing: red., ©te.-: The veleVanoe,. of this 
in deWlihg:V'i$h Bwihgis .oppo#hts shtohld new toe.-, blear,,- -, 
.for;.what;.' in.febt; ..W© '.#ve: arghed is that .the^ ; .too. mhs.t. 
..hSiVe:^,# î’firstyinte.lligitoXe!'.*.,iB;:;,'the' s«'kse.''of '$.'funds*- 
,Mental. Order: Withitf Which the per,tie#ar orders, -ooneerned 
.w.ith\pàrtlealaf' positive terms may- be .shstalhed* .and 
,':emplb#'d ,'ih.;.th®;dét,efmihattoa.:Of g.iven objecta,*
'#');Wt hlso dfew attentibh thfPO to the ,miiq* relation 
whibh' holds tobtweeh ;b«ing, as a predioate, and :that of 
,whtoh it .is prldioStbd»: B'eihg»;. ds .a prediô,at©*, ■ às 
idbhtiçal x^ ith'the-'tohbjebt in its oonorete .eatlret'V (as 
opposed* for oXamplO,*, to the redness attritoutbd to a red 
rose' in which, àttrltonti.on the identity is realised under 
the condition Of viewing the rosé from within the aspect 
Of colour')I, a M  at the .Same time this predicate,. being, 
points beyond this partienlar subject to other possible 
'tùtol®°^ *^ '.tod'.'.'we-further pointed, out ttiat the unity 
Whi'to all objects ehjoy under the notion of being can be 
d'escrlbed as a'f uni tv of order. We may now underline the 
unique position of this order,- the order of being, in
. ■- -•■"'/V/:- " 'A-:.;:--y /ft;.;"'/?;
s.
/In relation to all other ordsrs». It is in and-through 
its .jabmbeBshis: of this ordor that, any given-ohjoot ean 
be-vi«wtd: as-a->suhjh.ot of-pradicatloa» To gay of any . 
gtvon: obj.oot that, it,-"is not-.of this .(transeendental) . 
OBdOB/'if-,, .indeed j, to employ .a, terra faralliaf-'In; the .^ œlt™ 
ingi; df;'|!wing ’-s opponents, -"selftsthltifying/, siape at • . 
one nndv.' #ie s@$é tiipe-we. treat,an-object-as, a possible, 
subj#-t-,#f predication .and deny .that .it ,is a-pesslbl©, . 
S;hb#ht '.of Lpr'edleatiph» -, But here, at this, level*, no 
tons.eyeah,'hf. ..;|iven''.ib-,.the ,ids5i that-we ourselves.- choo.se. - 
to - vibw.' things,uihdor this order».- . - -
'(J;). /Sp' ■ Obj0c,t'.''dah' bSC!UPe'.-ff om. the,.order of being,. but 
•wl'tehin thio -..'brder:' .each .o'bj'ect its otœ unique place •.
■which'is the mark.of its self-identity and itg distinct- 
-ib'h - from, all otheB .kbJect.s.- -•-WO -have: said earlier - la 
this '##mlnatlbn. thât #r,i effort,- to,.know, thé real is 
no'cetopril'y on'.effort , to put.or find .order - In -what is 
givenf to Us in'experienceV. îÿhat is distinctive in the 
Ihomist ia.torp.r'C'bation-of - ■fâiis cognitive effort is tlmt, - 
for .the.Thomist, wbht ,1s always being sought.is the eoa- 
Crete-existent in - its place within the absolut.e* .uneond- 
itioaul order o’f béittg»' But for the hmmn mind this effort 
is ..neoessarily '%@frie.d. out at the logical level of "com- 
position and divigibm" Cl»e»,s'of j.udgmente «.raplbylng 
abstract concepts) by reason of the fact that we have no
/no direct lnt#l#qtûal vision (or "intuition") 
of. the concrete exiitent in its Very being,* It 
true thnt.» in the judgment of existence, we know what- ■ ■ ! ■ 'I ■' ; :■ : :
is "most intimate" |l) in the given object, but we 
know this oniy :in ah imperfect and obscure way by means 
Of an idea .* the idea of toeing » which is applied to 
everything else that exists or Ws being* If, therefore, 
we Were content to femaln at this transcendental level 
of ordering the objects of our experience all we could 
say of each one of them would be that It Jâ, that it is 
Identical with itself, and distinct from all other 
members Of the 'ord«r of baingi,;/Me, oould Indeed say that 
"it is iwhat. it is and not another thing'!* but we could 
not say what It is, and in what way it is not another 
thing. Hence we., may say that this original judgment where*
; by'hh;'-object;'becomes a sUbjOct of predication recuires and 
demands to be complemented by other judgments bearing upon 
one:and th^bame:object which will gradually "fill up" the 
.distance between the subject ("fhis"), and the predicate 
("is"). But none of the predicates of these other judg# 
inènts can be viewed as being on a level with the prediaate, 
being, since the precise function of these other predicates 
is to determine the manner of being of the objectr; under 
consideration, 1,0», thé particular way in ànd through which 
it and in and through Which it is distinct from other
/ether beings* .fThbfterms. employed,''therefore, caiaiot 
be transeeadenthl:,. hpplyi# to- all snbjeets of pre- 
'.dlcattonns. snoh* ;fbr they ,are.the. terms by means of. ' ' ' Ü ( ' : '
■Which .'one aubjobt of. .prédication is to be .identified 
;by, being- Vwrkèd: off", from other subjects of predio* ,. 
'.ntionk. -'.-.Me .my isay,/therefore, that, according to this 
theory.'there is/ncei-for .particular non»,transc.endental- 
•.Orders, in.'and. through, which .the members of the absol­
ute and. 'unoonditionài. order -. of -being my, be Positively 
■Identified: and. marked off from .each other* . The human, 
.'m'lnd..'or'inte.liectj.rahoording. to .S-t* .Thomas,', "has to 
gather knowledge- from individual,-things, by way of the . 
.senses"- (1), , Theae• non^trahscendental 'orders, there­
fore-., ,'Will be based on the - experimental data, in.-and.- 
through which-'we first become acquainted with existing 
(Objects-,- , ■
(h) Wa must note, hWever, that the "finding" or 
"putting" of order to the objects ■Which we experience 
always' involves-the "conceptualisation" of the sensible 
data, or.k to put this to a %#y more fitting to Ewing's ’ 
Opponents, involves the "formalisation" of the words 
which refer to Censcidata * M’OW we do not suggest that 
"conceptualisation" means to the Thbmlst the same as 
does "fornfâllsation" to the logical positivist. But we 
wish to hold thèse two philosophical theories as close
/close together as possible in orrier to show what it 
is : that is required at the logical level If we are to 
employ orders based on sensible data in the work of 
identifying and distiriguisMng the objects of our 
experience, ■In thisrCohheotion the significance' of 
the theory that "Wing is the first intelligible" ahd 
that everything that the mind conceives it conceives 
as being'* isy toieflyV sis‘followsSuppose that 
We formulate two" judgments‘5 (a) This exists» ahd (b)
This is red. The purpose of the second judgment is to 
act as a complément to* the first in that it, (b), be­
longs amongst those judgments which we employ in order 
to understand more closely Iz; what wav the’object refer­
red to by ’’This" may be said to exist* ‘ Now, it is clear 
ttet the concept'of red is distinct from the concept of 
being (although it must be said to imply it since ’^béing 
is the first intelllgible’O , and hence we have, in these 
two judgments:» tfo distinct predicates attributed to one 
and the same, subject* It is clear therefore that what 
these concepts refer to cannot be viewed as characteris­
ing the object ih exactly the same way#, ■ nevertheless, 
in each case, if the judgment is true, we must describe 
the relation between the subject and predicate as one 
of identity# There must therefore be a certain difference 
in the gyound of this Identity* In each ease the pro-
X -X " \ f'- Y.-^? ' / % ^ Y "=: ' " 'r-, 'Y Y/ r;-%< 1/ '
"' / ' ':' -’Y  ' ' ’ ■ ‘- ' - T . ', /•■.“” " 'i- '■«■■•' j’*-' ■•'•■', • "■ - ' ‘ ' ' ' "' ' »
5
./:p#eato#t«. Is. at^ Bltolîtéd.' ko t# gubjeet, ,â# to 
' the, ton^ :. aab.leotk a#' tiieBe attat W  tooatitÿ- toe* 
;twé:«îli;t|i® aaftjeq.fe âm# ppedtcate;, - bat tt is 
•tbat-itSiis . idemAyk^mmbt; ,ooag«to--to© ! a #  Jàéfe, in
a#:that #
/raaqt/tbgBafoBe bl •#]!« to view th© .subject ■ from .
.'more, thap, .one s#hdpü%ht* • lîoM;, the ■ dlgtlnottoè 
■jiiUrk, hf the ideh|:t.tv l'betwôe» the .pr.edioates .beipg 
.'##.':itg subjeot ig'|, .as ,we have already adt'ed. that . 
it!is.,ha. .identity with, the subject in .the'ia.tt.er,»s . 
.■'Ohhor|te'«httofty, .The. àubj.eàt, "This"-Jâ-j '.#'has ' : 
bhihg.; by a.li-'.thôt .i.t‘.,ts.,. aad in a,11 .that, it is,
Shy.that #«%'.% View an obj.éot ,'from',the .stand*., 
point of .Wing ,we y.i®w=.it from an absolute .standpoint, 
'In .all .other .casés.*.. Wwever* -Miièn m  employ-o.ono©.pts 
■(ihich are distinht'".'fr.dm -th©. condcpt 'nf -being, -in order 
to increase our Impwlédge of a given objeot, the ■iden­
tity between the'predicate and the. subject concerns 
the latter only as .■viewed fr.om. a relative- standpoint; 
e,g*,.T.he .subject ."This" which is. is, from the stand­
point of colo.ia?,. red.» , This *es not mean that, only 
part of the given object is red; but tiiat it 'iQ, red ae 
considered under.,a certain aspect.
■ft will .be aOsn ffom. this short account that the 
fundamental difference between the standpoint of being,
i'i '1 • •
«f.
' ■ / £ / ' "  ■ ■ ' / :  / . % *  '
?." ■ ,, /bitoâ-k.a#, th©: fttoâpoliît »f # @ 8#.other''-Concept©'-
£;••"' . ■ which:#r$:Àigtîwh\& :%%%' ié'.tmt,; tMle-;##'.; ■■'; ,
/£' ! order^ .to' .
£;■■ l8dgè:.bf',@h. _ ' .
;£■ r@ J@to ;t#. -giŸè# ' object. ."■'■ ■ ■ ' -' " \ •/. “ '■ r  V' “> £ f" ; .' '1
t#ô%Ir th#sç.çowes#^% ,'toc M#l@4#£w
‘ . the'.l&tt#,.# and mWt .rémai# @.#trMc&£ for , : While-1/: y . ' .^Y'. . 7 : ' '
ù6nhéyri(3 the givéaqSjeot
. „ . ■ :to:%«.Jtggment
jûdgmtot).:;it çoftc.ornf this . object view# aWtraç#y; . - 
from ,a.-certa.in..pototvof view,,-or.;;from, a_.numWm".of- point's
' ' , ofr'vi#; :#iCh cah' never add .hp'to: the absolute point of -Y  :a.; ., :,-■ ' ./"'Ây
view*. This: Qbn only bo 0#pMed tbroagb the .pr.ed-idate, 
being; whioh alone ban present the eoner.ete\:existent as 
a ..shbj'éet 'of preaieation*
We :#y siay/'therefore,),'that' the p.oss.ibtlltÿ-.of, vlew- 
ing an:.objeot from within' di#brent orders;.-prb|.upposes5 -._ , 
(1); -the. possibility' o.f' rebognisim.# theyobjebt' as.-a 
member .of .an..absolute unbOnditioWl order to. whlbh It 
belongs ■ in .its oonar.ete existence §-. .and (g), .'the 'pog- 
slbitity Of viawing 'this Objebt from *
Whioh' Oaa -bo;-rreeOgni'Sei. a$- @#h; .and the .:ident.itieg 
involved in predibatlon âis-
/distinct frcm the all embracing identity Involyed
-i ;in the absolcÿè itaccalitional order» If we have no 
means of disttoguishiné- between, the identities with­
in the relative cotoitiooal orders and the identity 
within which thefabsoiute unoondttionai order then 
it seems that Inevitably we shall erect these relative 
orderë'-'intO' absotote Orders, and we stell no longer 
be able to explain hoW it is that concepts or terms 
belongln@:‘to/#eseMof^ each of which ib^now not 
simply abooiute in its own light, but absolutely 
absolute, can be applied to one and the same:s#Jeot*i 
' ini-eed each of .th#e£cOn#ptSr.or, ttoms' will neces- 
sarilv- be ' viW&èd'/a à!; r eOresêntlnh'à. value - Of'-'being' with 
WhiCh^th#^^^ .identified:, absolutely, and the
haitv-Of'the given object (which la reflected In the 
notion Of "one and the same subject") will be reduced to a 
mëfé •t.Og'ethefnes's; or collection of absolute tefas,*.
We have thought it worth while to compare, as far a’s 
that has been pos'stble, what we have called the "logic 
Of positive''terms"- with'the fhOmist ' view of the place and 
-fuhl.tion ' Of empirical .Concepts .in our knowledge of the 
Concrète existent/ because it must not be forgotten that 
the forinalistic interpretation of the logic of positive 
tttfmë/hai 'been put forward in the name of a radical 
fealiSm, which is to banish, onCe and for all, the threat
<:;,: ££ ..  ^ I ' : .j;;;,/ . ' , ,■  ^ , ■
/thÿèat. of a'- "-so##- w#M""Of ■toivergal-,idea's». Me 
sùggèg-t;; thàt the - f #m#&; #«0^/: of prediOoiiOn; : as we 
havO pre3én#d':it: throws,light on the -diffteul- 
ties--bhioh .thts'p|rtiehlar "rémeây" ihvoJvOsy ahd:, in 
# r m W % ' b k p t o K #  "it is timt’ we so f#Wntly' ' 
-ShspeCt'- that - the femedy is .not. effeotiy'e, and .that the 
.mOdefh'-nmpifieists .present ,tts with worlds' whioh "seem, 
tooo##to: no roai %hihgs hut only subsistent 'oowhin* 
n#iène'ÀOf '#iyerwô%w.;.#.)y
? : T
Y'.f
to- Xii
#;r--c
e oïléinsion.
(%) With tout (andy,;.todèêa, Mth.st* Tho%@)-#wtog 
holdsÀtWi;g###y:aiWe dànnçt: give"Us. knçwlèdgé,.■ 
h #  .thùt -thé démoperUti'#, of; thought is :requi#& \
For'Ewtog'-thé. ûQtivitÿ. .of thought, is. most oioatly . 
mhtWt/ih thOy l m M # . m %  «hut tsy "givçh" 
ih s:lhaih|o.; experiohoo' ,; a ' ..pf #«sg .wher ehy ‘thdught 
oah(,.9#0tiW@: ■ftodyttS:'''''!®/" ffq®. certain elOaiOhts;' of 
thé ,.,,g|voh(to ,%:éftato. ’Othor...::èidmëhts* . ;fh0.. çrit 
. qdottida : WhiOh :.%hk is. the ; quottidh!Of AhoW'..
fafy/if -ht uli»: we'%re,.JU8tifiOd!%- .Widi# those . 
"ihtéitogihlér'dowé# /;dO/ ylhi faqtV',’ 0#f hO|éf|ié '
the/foal, wofld:*^ ‘^ ootobdtW^ %
datu':,..tomethlhg which has its''So#Oe'to tho/thinfcihg 
.#uhJO#t/ .Or ...i». it ;sO»othing whi'Oh tho.ttght-diOddvors in 
thO£rohM:)^-Mi% stdohd ! aitOri#ti% »
prdfotsihg'.what wO ha# oailod.;'h""realiom!ofthO'& 
:dhtWim. towe#r..> the-foriayof his. arg#oht # y  j.ttotiy . 
heÀOàllId nohvofitiOai; or dOgiaatid,. and it. .fails- to. 
e#iaih, what, is moant- by the mc.osshry eolboOration of 
..the.ught.'ahd'. sOhOo to.-the oogntti#‘ae-t-y-.for, ihstead .. 
Of.-'.tfOating thhhght.'hhd. sehso- aS'.cOttpohohts! to'ohe hnit- 
afy-hot» '##y are. .Oftedted to the. stathg: of ihdédohdmt
létodés;. of, toowledgey- eaOh.dealihg with.'SpbJedts" - with 
whidh'it albné, oan'dèa-1. It is'true that-hwlhg-views y
  —  : 1  ^ ^  -
/yWwSrthÇ# 'two- typés, .of .object as t'elonglng to the 
jâM,tèài- order, or:a s  hol.#.ffd.uhd,:.toget#^
difflomt -lo "% #tW ' hO%')W 
hîs;hôaddfitifal oppydao'h,.': a\,%éahing': oatttoo,'’ git#n. to 
thO^'phrasd 'priol:hoth.tho»|it:;¥^ .
pOhd### -dddupi'ed 's.oieiy 'with.'thoff owh, ohjo0%% 
aeit#f:'So@m.S''fitto whfoh: mast ■
be/^ afl- 'to ehôdmpaMs-'them! hôth£%; .ihtoliigihility y -■>,; . ,.'7-7 . X/i'.'Y'.;- £/'.,'>£ A- :'£/l:.f aiÆIâ" A'.' _m#iyy.;.'thO:-rèal.. to::J^Qh.::Or.as -aSOOets ofy.Whloh.A both . 
obJOdis'A are to be viewed » Thèyè is,.. therefore ,..'0. tend* ■ ,;££;/m££Y%A Y//;. y-
. ehoy 'tewàfds£the diyis.ioh. of tho; ""objpots'' bf:'NOvled'ge 
i t t t o ¥ | W b. world's' eaoh Regarded:à|;’ posabao-ihg". ah-‘abaoiuto .
aW# #m /it' '
e # i s e " a ' o # # ' # j M i b r & #  ' .
Theti.it' term%o|Ogy;We''m say'-.that.,. for ÊWihgy£ther.e Ife-;
' # t# s t'# 0 l# W  i^#b|#|#àity- ' '
■ v a l u e " 'm u s t a s '
.■oottsidOr- that 'this, .throat 'Of "tWO'^ worlds" Aha.S' beOh- 
borhe./o.ht by oOr- oto#i#t.ion of'.b.ertaih:arg#bhtt ■■'.whioh'
'EWi«g,..omp|oy.s.- to ■establish the. yteW: that':.fJthero..;i-S:'..some*
' titoS' â. loiibaJ; 0.o%eot.ioh''.b.ot$ooh differeht^dharaOter- ' 
istleo or retotlohs£giyen-»'.oapablO''of. bbihs^ giyeh in.. 
■ etol r i ^ o e * ' . » ;  • ' l o r - ' E w i h S v  t h o # h t - i s : ’’h O b d a s a t y . : t o ' : i h a b l e  : 
.bb'tb'';kh0W' the .real at it réaiay::is,;:stoOb:!tO^  ;.
OjharaOteriied' by yarioua >sy'st©msy.in whioh/wbat'; i#;.:giy@h.y
/giwh/'br :-#' eapable' of: belÈg = 'gi#h'in 'OXp'driWnq#--''
•is .b'phgecWd by a';';omWi (or toeftoha'turai -or: htoy '
.eiBpirioai)'- relations;,/Wbioh: tho);^ ht ‘ aipi|0' -'aan- disOover.
By- faB/t%-'. mo¥t'to##ant'0##mso: wiat - ■ ■ ;
#ortato'$'#g&hi- #i¥ti'dn9, ■fbr^btompie, onta'iiMont, j
ioÉioâii'tooomOatlbiiitvy ' ana:;:the;- npeelf ioOaliy :othioal 
(a#''.nbtT#reiyvËOg%ài)'''r'eihti% o#:fi 
tb#'. #o#oht''4Mptof: ©x*
nmlhlii's; nrgmonto! toi-whi# Sf ing-::attf aits:. to fabOw/tliat :
What:;tb£liy©»:'to' i«toiblo oxioriobo© ■btpettoos/haof n o #  
'gOb«ib|o:*vOr nm*#t¥r#'' or-' ##'#iirio'al'' O#r#Ot0#  :
Istlbb'Of'n-biÿ' 'tiinli'ii is-' moat baitabiy'-%:sOrib#no. ■,', 
f’l#g%¥idy;#ltbO#gh/£# w # l e ’iapOft pf these
'â|Çguatotsi‘''îs, •■ tOfprOvO ■■that-'thOOçflogto rb|,a tiphi fare
•not tiiily ■' "logioal'!/ bntfaMO and in' tao ■|îr¥| ‘-ilaeè * : 
#talè’ ' Me QonsidèrOd,(two'suOh ntgnmonts* thO' first''la,%.
'to: factf a-i dO'soriotion-tf 'WWt :ii>-.invo3.#d. :to thO: process.
Of knowing' the: trnth of; a proocaition Of Eiic.jideon gec- 
. mctry; ' the sec end :is. #eaented in a diffefOnt''context, 
nat#iyf 'that (Of -"the:. ooisect ahaiysis ;.of "'synthetio a 
'j0 lj^ :'.p#PO'^  and echstitutes a criticism; cf the-
tihghistlo thoory .ot-.noeessary truths »
:t3')f fwc points ..Of -Importanc;©. .■'arise 0#..,#'. chr;‘consider-- 
.¥ti#'''Of the first argument;. ;/ (a) The .pneo:Os3afy-.con-- 
noition'*'..which Ewing nlaimo #  "s.ot". .as, holding,■..betwe'cn
/between■'Certain ©IfMeats in a- gl#n fxperlmfntal 
wtoif .'if tha.relatifn' ff entaitoent.» %nis relation, 
hQWfver-i? holds ■net' betwO0a''tbe''.-%rapirical:..datn''ag'
■thaff.i.àre given -InAffnfibif / expfri©#'© but between 
ni'solatet’!ÿ, and: ■thèf'->".if * i. «tben''''.: fora, ■of.-the'psbpog- 
i tieaivean;bè;.'' explained- as ■ ,tba t -'-fora 'in wMeh ' âneb • 
ièo'làtefc-êan be held- tegethèrA-by: the Mind in an - intel- 
ligibl'0;''m'ity#,:.'Snfh''a relatimr is.# of itself,a.essén*
A V À f  ; v : / A ' 7 ' : r ,  A ' . - : ; ' - Y  . y  ■:'tialljr>& flokioal: rflmtifn, had ;M;.'S.àeh 'it isvhbt- wronga; - vYMV;.:.- a,:- ,:'Y,r A r. , . .bht,'3|nbe|fS8','te thlfe: Of -it: as ; .eyif ttoa.;:toi.:thB.:#al
.ijûigLâ/’ (b)-- omn $bSorlbe' a ..hniverfàl' proppeitibn as
f$prf#s'ing the.' fonelet© .,0énéeq.ninees' of nn abstract
' W # # " ' # £ i m r e # m  ifek'howf^fe'^ '# w  '■
f'ah;;eiaiM::,t© know the trnth-bf'the striftly..$ilversai 
proposition, ■ "In.a'll/trlanglbs'the: sum-of th#A angles ■ is 
’equal to'two right4ang'i'e.S'".',;. khiS' is- becauafj fto''View­
ing:; any 'ConPrete''àéhiibly given shape as a:;, triangle., we 
haVf: already imposed-oh’it, '■or 'iifted'-it 't0‘,. a/ifVel of 
'.'intfiiig'ibil'ity - ■vAtb.in- which.“thfe rules- of-Buclldéaa 
.&eomtrv-;must '.work». - %. ' this- 'benne'ction '$fcmust note 
•that, in ièséribing:., àhAabg-traat truth' as■ ■&:'"truth concerh- :. 
'ihg;--"■Isolates/. W© ha#' not Committed-''■OhP8,elV#s"-to hold*. .
■''ing .'ttot the ‘terms ''ôfA-thisÂ-bruth ''.Cthè'' "tsoiateb #A -
b,è.'‘'Vifw®d.a'S. fmpi.ribà'l'’concepts■•'Which hà'#.' been 'formed by 
.mbàtrbbtifh %6m the. @@##1©'' qu&litieè' .Of- a given- pirti©
'. ' A- -A'-; ■ 'A _ ' Âft (aA-v:,, AAavv; ; - , , ,7; A^À;:'. -
■ ' Y a ÀAAAA'A-".,. ■ %' .A  •; ■; L  a  , ; J , A v A y A ,  A : j A ; ; / A , . . . : . , . A  '
/ ' # r . # # u l a r  A # J « c W  ' ' i b S A p c t o t  i s .  # # % / '  f e c  t  :
t # a t h ! a è # é B « ¥ k é r - i a t o : ¥ f e r # l # i â t t o â / : i ¥ 7 Ï ¥ o  ,
t o Q p / t t t e i r . . m é a t l é s t a  t e t è n  : t o # A
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.sft#ys
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' to êivea, hors and'tow,-1&- , •
«Xpèrlàtoe» liu^ b*ie g'olesftotttlea;-'©f
Ptomi#!’: is '# 'provW: t o : ) w i # # £ # i # # 6 W ^  ' ,
,thè\6bsSS||t7:#fâthj.;Sÿ \
jAst '-#%#'-a#a#i6m to .
kinitltoè"
#' 4tgA#h#¥0ÿ:è , - a;,
argutoto.: ! A#':#thtog:;';W 
'aaid': is : ¥ufficifiit to- prove ttoAèbatr0y/£;M#îSUg|¥ât -
.. .?. * V -. t ", . ."if ''" 4 * to" ’to- ' • '-.., «- '.< .. ' ‘ '* •« M  -• /» ■ ' '^/■:to-V' - \'V ;/./ * ■■.? -,: 'V ""  "T j-  "k!" f  , V4-.- /  ,  ' ? ■» -i ' , “ , • * ' Y» 7. » . . ' '- y  .. *  g s.. ?
v'SSS,;. ; : \ / t S  ' A A A JV, A ÀA . ' ' A i À ; y  ■ ■. .v.«pi##m0i6gy fto at
'Mçe/.trWsfÇàd# #nd‘:Ço#àito,ali:.#b and partial
Vlèwa;:iôfAth#,-rèal;AWè s01ivtoVëfc:b¥..abJ©: to rejpinj-.the 
lotofÇ M  ’©xistpnt ; #-'its .abs.oiu|ë Vaï¥t£ofrke/togt-a# 
wf /phéll Mve AdépifiVèd ,,',oi«?pelves. ■ofA,thf:0h|y£.ppto%£ 
view ;%o# withto; whioh-si%‘'^ ¥#d%e.., ppspto^  ■ ..
##''pri#idâl-.valwe';6f. ailBUr ;abatf§Çt‘¥toi§itÇ4£'^ ‘^ . 
do 0t'„a«att;td @Mgç#t£;tMt thisAAla/a'Utëm^l# 
to-;bys;t¥ôpgntotog ' thÇyCptoëpt;,pÈbem#!0ê%a^ 
abatrapt 'OOto#ptà,:bùt/'pnly:ttot£&uph ■. ■
this: ppàg|bi|lty/, -
dlffèfpni}. types■ and' t # ;.pampA;t#attont::ba0 pfe;be/ap^  
to: them ail») : Mor#pVfr,'..to,;rpttoh&#^  poâitihn,/.
v/è: cap aée hOwYlt 4s -thatl for hlm, it must Indeed be-
aie‘ hypb,$hetl.eal
, 1,
A'À iSStoir/-:
' ■ : /'to : £. \
,.*'■■•■■ > • . • s ••'. ' - "' -'i'- •» ^i. •■' * ' \ - .. %. 1 ■- ‘4- - " <-
, '.Shtts ,
ott. /tMt a; aimlbly ob|e'et.. (&0 : ls',>,3£>- c
tAe; goAà^Jtlùils ; ; 
ma^ÿ. .MhlQh %$,' caïi;:f?3aiffi:'t;b'-'teov/: %!%%:%., .to ■ "
B'ât -ït,.#QtheK 'Mb ':à,pt #14", M . ' iR; Éaot}-
is tavoiveà-in -th:ls;'i',k#DWii% 'ttet A, is-, 3£'!> ,..'(jiiis'* ' - 
'agà’îAÿ; .qAebtiW, to, 'a.3k'jA-f.or.
e m p i r r @#^@0. lio- .ajoye ÆXjilankt.iba, tMa 
''doe's-. '?4:‘P3?ïbÿ'ivk'at)fl^  .> :Ho?0' ,,##%. .$gaia Bwiag''s,
#0a?0*ltida3: 'àgpÿ , ) ' tlie : tro # l8 Y ls ' tM t ,  ï-flth"* 
in 'j ' sphezo"!  Q'f : mtiibaatio's;;_thep®' ‘’seems 
■to'.; W':%, veÿy.'P#'l-:sm^  j^liicto t#,,'maÿ,:bë.,S4W .to 'ooh^ ' 
flti>t|Qt. .#090 ■.c'oîJâitâSîiâ.' Sop ' ôu^oeifesÿ 'Vfo'. siiggê st :'that 
th03?e'. is..' 0à3,y-..©ae ;poiaf, at .'we oaa- tie :8üg.e,,.wlthoüt.
tâ?è'vioiis.,of it'ioai. ':^ Sflaétioa ..that. ià :tHé .’.1 iidameat' .% is- 
;tlaf,40'ti^ity:'..of':;thOi>|lit is'-j-.'as'. it--wë.?'0-,fully.-e'0£iitâia*. -, 
ed' .and .ade.iiust'ely: moasbsscl •by.its.>ob^oct ^,-and. tMt. is. the 
.j'adgmWt '.ià 't&leh stand® 'for'the .t'nahso'eade,nta3L' ;valtte 
.0-;?; feeing. '(Ses-Ch. - I.,.Seatlon S.d. ■ It is .also ;.oà3Ly fey , .' 
this-iitdgmeàt.'thffit,.'V?0 aÿ'è; ps^ -efidéd with @ :s##et for ., 
'f.it’then.ipmfdieotipsia. 'by. 'Which- 'oiw îmowléàge ^of.i-..s£-Ss.il'. 
'my. be.'.aiiyanoad*- . - . , . -' ' - .•.- --. ' -■ '■.
may-wliKt .'out hez^ 'tlW t 'k t / ie  
the; the' à b:plwï the' ' of ethio8.$\.W&'%g ' '
6értàlh aifflGultÿ' la moving ahg*t%'aot' -
.-i--
..''I
> •- i
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/abstract truth (a synthetic a priori proposltlea 
concerning "objective characteristics" and their 
"fittingness") to its concrete consequences (1):to 
put it paradoxically) Ewing is bound to admit that 
these latter do not always follow. For examplei 
because it is true that lying as such is wrong* it 
does not follow that all particular lies are wrong.
This suggests that we ought not to conceive the form 
or pattern of intelligibility in Ethics as being the 
same as that of "mathematical intelligibility" * and 
it so far supports the contention mentioned in the 
Conclusion of Chapter I* that "intelligibility" is 
itself an analogical notion. It may indeed be that 
notions connected with the idea of "intrinsic good­
ness" bear upon objects in their concrete existence* 
and consequently require to be traced back to the meta­
physical order of being* and viewed from the point of 
view of metaphysical intelligibility (2).
(6) Wo are now in a position to appreciate the strength 
of the Linguistic theory of a priori propositions in 
the face of Ewing's non-critical "realism of the a priori"% 
for we must realise that it is in the name of a radical 
realism that an explanation of the a priori constructions 
of thought is sought) which will entirely exclude the
A M  W  'ftwoMoyia" - xt'is;.
to.-gtate
'oye3*.b&pli#eatloaj./Ww -tJils., .ts .'adaiQVââs : hut pm. v 
.Important,îaas»ît ©f - the. mpth#': iïiyolvèct' is -, the ■ refusai', 
to -, #0at-, 'WbHQSâtioàèf' a^ :■ éotX'^ _,
'cepts.'.wi.ÿh a ephteat- %#lGh'w@\#iëW fÿ©%: withlh'f 'Cçf 'i. 
ihtus:le.Here) * example»' .tM, truths ©ohoerniag ,
'Ittéli'deâri. trfehglss- ars-aèt :gàôig'iâ9d la. ,an .iatellect- * 
M i ; - #  $#:. %8sgM®\! ' G#:, trdmgdlarlty:. qoabdd#^
B.uqiM##, gèsmëtyy.is:-dpflaod»suohyaa'',int'^?”,-,'.- 
pre.tatlôtt-.pî; tM- MGebaazy. truths-., of - ' - ■
■piete'iy; 4##p'y@■ t M  of/©. 3foria:":.*.;a#.,.
it- also. Mriyo#: goasiêeMbib fÀàge : ###, t M  -'sMO es S' '©f.. 
a, formallsMo.; troptMoat- of,- wMt 1$'- ’. .
;gall,©à bforml- logio" * , It: i'a .tru®'» ,of- be!a?3Q,»v that.^ -a.o ■.-
MprQ' ttea. ott Swing’s- thefeyy? ban- àiioh, .truths'!
he. said} ©a #is- theoryi,.. to reaah: domi to the coao'rat'e 
existent. But,, then, thd? .theory explicitly, .clenies the 
reality referenee of. such truths, in this, sense-that
truths do not ooncern the i^ e^ lity-val.ue of an, 
.pbieo.t,. hut, precisely,, its as ,y.le#d.^om
withih an arbitrarily defined system  ^ 8 uoh"knowledge" 
therefore cannot give us any information about 'What any
.r.
'/ânÿ: give#. ob ject , "ÿoallÿ: ÎÈ** g" and' to tblnk %at it / .
ikr to viow' suid# . '
d'ogmtld dtaM'pOiiit% '. " It iâ'- hor'd A#' dan-ded-1%'
&eàtlvénéaà: -of :Bwlàg:iÿ' :'df- his -oppoi^ ^^  /..
à ' r g i m i è a t a $ ' id à)efüdi#g:tp'takè hp-\'.
tho-:dri'tioa'l"dtan^  ' /- - -' '% '- ' -' ' : V '. ' .
(7) Wè oüroelvéé ouggGStdd a lïnê ok^ argument 
wlilôh: we thWt' Ewing dlgbt have doÿêilôpQi againdt the . . 
L^gu^atie thoi^h we a3^ e fully amre^
L" % v.'."-' '/T j.;/ ..--''.I'/.:adequate:présentation of euoh an argument would require 
a wiâ$r. and more detailed"exami^ ôf';"L6gioal 
Poeitlÿiem^ y are in a position to bf^
$dt qur argument against the Logical c
a^fo$tlori  ^anârgment agâindt^ E^^ ^^  for what 9 ia faot$ , \
we Mve been eùggèétlng le thât thé former do not adopt ^
à 9#ffiGieatlv ôritieal atàndùointA àMy against Ewlng, Z
%fhat lié wièh tb lààist on le tWt "èmpirloal Imbwledge" 
required a Juêtlfioatioa Mât.as: muoh âe "à #icu*i ka6w4. . ]' . ' '. V'V
ledge"* Ifÿ in empirioal knowledge* we employ tèrms ; <
whiqh rofér to êèWe'^datà) e#g»; the terms* rëd smooth, :;ÿ
etc#) then what im wnt to know is* mder what conditions 
çâh suéh sènse^ fdata ho viêWd as "reveaJ^ing the real'*; : \
for this is* iMeéd) their fwotiôh in èmpirioal judg'^   ^
mentè* which* abbording tô both Ëwing and his opponents*.  ^ ÿ
do givé ué Ihf^ ormatlOh gM^lLMw^^ oannot slîaply #
3
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/islmpiy say that thé terms réfëf to data* and that 
SÔ long as we llMt ourselves to using them wq oan^ . 
not/be. sal& to'^ dlstort(^ . or phahgod or'moved- 
a#y from-the . i s ?  fW the point is- 
tMtii %^e# tWso terms are ompipyod In advahqlng our 
k n o w l e d g e ' o f  t h e  r e a l * : t h e  a e n s Q - d a t a  t o  w h i e h  t h e y  
refW .:are 'viéwbdy''n^ àë,r#ealing themselvôâ but Qà \ 
fôVèhlihg a raaïitv Lof : they are; tlie real qiml- '
itlbs\ or. GhâraqteflStioê^ It is. this fadt whioh- ro- . 
qùlréà tp be o^ plaihecl) ahd .it seems to us Important 
to note that the "logic of positivé} terms " is * In 
fÿet * âh attéinpt to dodl %Ath thé question at the 
Cbrréét lèVél* hamëlv the ipgléàl léveli* For thé 
question does not* in iWélf* eohpern the àtrhctwe of 
rpai thinga (and tho%»éforé we should be misled if we 
thought that the intrddûotioh of some màtànhyeieai 
Category* like Sûbétazioe - aooldent* would help us 
at this paint c but it oonoerng the foraml _eônditlimà 
Which rehder pOsaible the' upë of positive' terms* whloh 
refer'/to e^nsè^^âtâ* ill propositions in whioh these 
terms must be viewed aa reality-Value of
a given objéôt# Our contention is that à "logic of 
positive terms" is hot auffioiënt to provide these formal 
conditions*: but that it requires to be crowned by what 
We may call the "logic of thé transcendental notion of
I'W..
/of feélag’*:,.. -îa. oite' .opîîBtôa*. it; Is teoaase they- dô 
mot tM'sY.- that, .those whO' profess .a. i^ adteal.
empiriotem oomè very close to a position which seems; 
in direct opposition to the fuMamental aspiration 
of empirioisDi*: which is the desire to hold fast to 
the cbnoretely real, and.to avoid the "dream world" 
of abstract imiversala
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CHAPÏEB IV. Tm COKBEQÜEHGES OF EWÏHG »S EPISTEMO-LOGICAL THE (BY IN THE SPHERE OF ETHIGALANALYSIS.
Introduction.
We noted in Chapter II tiiat Ewing differed 
from Moore in arguing that "good" is definable.
This difference is not* however * of direct interest 
to us here for Ewing is in fundamental agreement 
with Moore on the necessity of recognising at least 
one fundamental and indefinable "ethical" term.
(Before proceeding any further we think it necessary 
to draw attention to the significance which is to be 
attached to the term "ethical" in wiiat follows. Both 
Ewing and Moore agree that ethical goodness is not 
the sole type of "intrinsic goodness" and their non- 
naturalism* while it is often described with the use 
of the term "ethical" la meant to extend to all in­
trinsic goodness* and consequently to be based on 
evidence which is not exclusively that of ethical 
phenomena * Wherever possible we sîiall therefore sub­
stitute for the term "ethical" either the term "value" 
or the term "goodness"* taking these as synonymous for 
"intrinsic goodness"*)
A problem* however* presents itself at the outset 
of this examination of Ewing * s theory of non-naturalism 
which suggests that there exists a difference between
/between Ewing and Moore of a very fundamental nature* 
and. which, we suggest* Ewing himself does not. recognise.© 
The problem is to determine what exactly Is meant when 
it is , claimed that the autonomy of ethics as a science 
oan only be safeguarded if a unique "object" is assigned 
to it# \ Does-:this statement have the same .significance 
for .Ewing as it has for Moore? A passage in THE DEFIN­
ITION. DP GOOD (1) is relevant, Ewing admits that it is 
hard to understand how* :lf goodness is simple and quite 
intelligible apart from its relations* there can be syxi- 
thetic â nriqr1 iud^ments connecting it with.other pro- 
portles,- and ho witos* "That there should be any 
thetic \a/,prioyi. propositions connecting'a simple -property 
%\Tith other properties does seem incompatible* not indeed 
with its IrredUÔibility by analysis.* but .with the notion 
that its full internal nature qould be. grasped apart 
from.its relations to the other properties which are■ 
entailed by it,"' And he further .says? "Granted that.a 
concept is simple'and unanalysable* the .correct point of 
view may be to look on it not as for that reason intollig- 
Iblp in itself* but rather as being too much of an ab­
straction, to stand by itself#"'. (2) .This qualification by 
Ewing seems to m  of the utmost importance. For* if we 
feel dissatisfaction at, the.nature of Moore’s final court 
of appeal <i'#è* inspection of the nature of the object 
of thought designated by the term "good") we must never-
1$2.
/nevertheless ^rait tlaat it Is the logical outcome 
of Ills method of analysis. For tliis method, crao- 
tised within the theory of noo«*roalism, presupposes 
that the progressive analysis of the complex "objects 
of thought" is at the same time a revealing of the 
ultimate irreducible eloments which "make up" roality. 
To reach a simple and unanalysable "object of thought" 
is to reach a unique and irreducible element of the 
real# On such a theory it is literally nonsense to 
talk of a concept (if by this is meant what is meant 
by "object of thought") which Is simple and unanalys­
able and yet is "too much of an abstraction to stand 
by itself." For Moore, to reach the simple and unan­
alysable is to reach that \idiich is the source of all 
intolliglbility. Once we realise this wo see that in 
separating "intelligibility" and "simple and unanalys­
able" Ewing is cutting at the very roots of the systcan 
of thought within which the problem of naturalism-non- 
naturalism was originally formulated by Moore#
We can see that in terms of Moore's philosophy tlie 
autonomy of ethics can only be guaranteed if the real 
contains a unique and irreducible element corresponding 
to the term "good" # But if a distinction is made be­
tween the irreducibility of a concept and its intellig­
ibility it no longer follows that because a concept is
1^3.''
/is irx'edueible ■ to other concopta if nGaëssariïy
' '
reflects a simple and Irreducible element of reality*
On the eontrarey*, if a concept requiros other concepts 
la order tO' be rendër0#'/%têlliglblé this mèaae that 
the reality which it -presents to-the mind is not simple 
bat complex, aM; this complexity is- pyesimnèscd by the 
latdlllgihility of the given iinanàlysable concept* / 
This complGX 'therefore mast be present in 'some way to 
thé mind* and it muAt présent a certain ônitÿ of Intel- 
llgibility which is prior to the distinctions reflected 
In the mutual Irredaolbillty of separate concepts & To, ■ 
recognise;at one.and the same time that, value concepts 
cannot be reduced to non-value concepts: and yet that , 
the former, can only be made intelligible with the help of 
the latter is to recognise thatLthe source of intellig- 
ibility and must be found in a wider
Unity which grounds the distinction at the level of con- 
ocpts and at the same time accounts for its transcendence 
at the level of the rml. In spite however of this 
remark* Ewing does in fact argue that the unique- inde­
finable concept "fittingness" represents an irreducible 
element of reality* and he does attempt to unite this 
Concept with a natural concept in the complex concept of 
goodness* without appealing to any further/principle of 
Unity and intelligibility* We shall,examine the success 
of this attempt in Chapter V• In this present chapter we
.î"  3
shall examine,, the: mtwre- ;0f tW; epnaiÀëra#oiiS'' ; . . ' L ' ' ' '-L \ . ':B#n$/phts ;f0r%i$râ; for: thé'. preWace-. of nou'^mtûral - 
y'qôiïdëpts - (:or. pnp/auGh obWept)''1^ judgmeatsi, ' -
I# thé'yoai^ 'se/Of/T.thi 0%KWatlpn /it %illl-bocomé : \ -
Wldmt: u^t. tho.fuMàmeatal poiat':at i$sué' betwèoâ : : 
3 w l à g ; : a h â : ' t h O ' -'obaoeras the, Ultimate ' . / 
Sbufoe' ôf intelligibility^ Bwlmg i^ lshes to "ouwe" '
: is ' imbosslblo* vE^ 'îlag's ; Ihtrpdùbtioh of epistomolbgloai 
_ :obàsïaëarations^  là# '-tW
debate reveals to debate is* la faêt* close­
ly connected with the emplriéisWratlohallëzTi opbpsitloa 
a W  i# the final section we: shell consider the repèrcusr 
Sion# of thio for:#/clearer imderstahdliig Of .the nature ' 
pf thisidoWte:# . » ' '
&s##ij,* '-'###%, '
In Ewing’a opinion the least Implausible forms of 
nhtilfàliêtio definition are those employing pbyohological; 
tëfmè such ha "approval" or "àeaire" andit la to such 
théories that he déVôteà the longest oriticiamV (1) W 
Shall not deal with hie arguments in detail Since* on hia 
W n  view* "the saw insight ahoi)s the falsity of all"» (2) 
We can* he coi^ aidèra* "perceive directly tWt good la not 
analysable in payohologic^l terms," (3) The two moat
/ / / i
/most Important elements In the reflection leading 
to the realisation that "ethical concepts are generic- 
ally different from, and therefore, Inoaliable of re­
duction to, the concepts of psychology or any other 
empirical science" (1), are; 1. the .fact ttot from all 
naturalistic definitions the notion of qbligation is 
missing (2)5 while this, notion is, according to Ewing 
involved in "at least some meanings of good* for 
example,, morally good" (3) and, 2. the fact that, "when 
we see that something is intrinsically good or some act 
morally obligatory we also see that , it must be so - its. 
factixal properties being, what they are#" (4) It would, 
however, be impossible, according to Ewing to find such 
a necessary relation between the factual properties of 
an experience or action and any purely psychological 
state or attitude, for our approvals and disapprovals, 
and aversions may change without any change in the factual 
properties of the experience Or action under consideration; 
they depend not on the cteracter of the latter, but on our 
own psychological constitution and this is subject to many 
contingent factors* (5)
Ewing's views on the correct analysis of the notion 
of obligation and its place within the complex notion of 
good will be considered in Chapter ¥» We shall here
J J f
/here, examine tho implications .of the secoiid point 
we have noted* mmely, the. characteristic of neces­
sity, which marks certain value judgments* It is 
irrelevant to our. purpose that this.considération . 
taken by, itself is directly effective only against 
psychological forms of.naturalism^ for our. intention 
is not to examine the. validity. of Ewing.'s particular 
arguments against naturalism^ but to attempt .to dis­
cover the ..basic assumptions which ■ govern his method 
ù$ treatment of the naturaliat#non^natwalist. contrpm
. For our purpose it is important. to .ebnsider the 
significance of tho. .final phrasé, of the quo'tation made 
aboyé on 'the characterlstlo of necessity in value, judg* 
monts»; Ho calling .our examination. in the, previous ■ * 
chapter, we .may say, that for Ewing- the,, necessary and the 
are direcltXy ■ characteristic of abstract pro­
positions# "Wo do not know affirmative categorical ,a 
. propositions * though .granted, empirical premisses 
use hypo propositions to draw
categorical affirmative conclusions#" (1) Thus* if the 
exporience.of à particular act reveals to us the fact 
that it is necessarily good* this Is always in virtue of 
certain factual properties which it instantiates, and 
the function of the particular experience is to provide 
the "empirical data" enabling us to draw a categorical
r y
/catëgprloal opwluàlon; Hêiioe epiatemological 
priority belongs to the âbstraét propbsiti.bn in  which 
goodness is attributed to certain "factual properties" 
as subh and in abstraction from their embodiment in 
particular individual existonts*
Once * however* this is realised we appreciate more' • . ' ' ■ i ' ' ' ' .fully the grounds on which Ewing insists on the presence 
Of synthetic a .priori oronositloas in ethics, and alsp 
the necessity of characterising goodness as non-natural*
For if the basic truths of value r those bn whose intel­
ligibility depends, thé intalligibliity of all particular 
judgments of value - concern the goodness of natural 
dualities considéré# in isolation from their concrete 
embodiment in existent realities it is evident that this 
goodness cannot be cpntained within the concepts of, these 
qualities* For to say that these qualities are consider­
ed in isolation "from their concrete embodiment" is to say 
that they are considered purely in themselves., To claim 
consequently that the concept of these qualities contains 
the concept of goodness which we attribute to them would 
be either to break the . Law. of Identity , or to fall into 
tautology# Such an argument is not* however, sufficient 
to establish the existence in the real order of a unique 
and irreducible "entity" corresponding to the concept good* 
or to part of it* To suppose that it is is to assume that
4-
/that, the existent realities : from which thé natural 
qualities in question have., been isolated are In 
fact, no more: thah: oolleotiohs of those natural 
qualities ? ' If $ however, . it • is recognised that, the 
"natural, qualities. which, the mind represents to 
itself.in "the concepts of.natural science",(D conr
stltute merely a partial aspect of any concrete ......
existent or being, then,the fact that* when,viewed ■ 
mder this, aspect, the. goodness ..of a .being is not 
"contalWd %vithin\' the concept of these properties 
does, not prove that this goodness cannot be accounted 
for by, the metaphysical principles whereby the partic­
ular reality, is constituted in the order of being*
' .This line.of argument, consequently* is relevant 
only when it is employed in dealing with a positivistic 
theory of the mture. of individual beings or existehts*. 
It is .clear that such a theory leaves no place within 
its world for.the presence of value or .goodness* If 
then we are convinced of the reality of value or good- 
ness we must add another "world" to the. "wbrld of 
facts"* and since* as philosophers, we seek intellig­
ibility we must at some point "recognise" that these two 
worlds are ."intelligibly^  comieoted»" Hence the need for 
synthetic a priori propositions and the corresponding 
"mental.-intaition"* But the question remains: is .this
■ - ' ' ;, >■ '// 
/thié redbgnltip^ recbgnltlbh/and^  are these .
ëdnnéétlpnë: really I’out thêrè't to be/ÿoéôgaièèd (or - ; ;
or are w  here .dealing with "a rationalist /:
9Uger;$tltlon aqeordlng to wlileh a quasl^logieal neoea- ;
slty binds moral predloatès to othera?¥ (1) y
Bearing In mind that it la .by this aot of Intuit- : 
iph that the Intelllgiblllty of the of faettml :
prppertl# and value prbpèrtlea Is realised and tWt 
ultli^te Intelligibility lips in the linkage of faotual 
properties to value properties by thé synthetic a priori 
propositions* We sh^ll oonfliie Our attention to two ,
Pblnts.arlsing out of Ewing's Own treatment of the place -
and function of these propositions in éthids:~
1# There la* as P*F, Strawson has pointed out (2)* an /
Ineompatiblilty in the. Intuitionists * _ aooount of thé 
necessary and universal propositions upon whose Intel-*' 
llglblllty Is ■supposed to depend the. intelligibility.of . 
individual..instances .or eases of value-.predication# For ^
If it is the case-that the "reason, why" -a particular act -X'-;
or state is good* Is that It possesses .certain empiric­
ally ascertainable features from which the characteristic,
■ of■ value .neoesaarily follows* then it/should be the cape 
that whenever these features are present in a situation 
that situation Bossesses the same value characteristic *. • » ■ . Jfcr t ' ' - '
;* In fact* Ewing, and other, intuitionists (3)? admit
...v;.
-  ' . V
./admit that the general, propositions 9# ethiog.cannot 
he framed, in "ahgolutist" terms* We cànàot, for example, 
gay tï^ at the, promotion of pleasure. is in all cifcum- ’ ÿ '
stances good* Or that.it is alwys a duty to keep a pro- 
mises and yet, ac'cofdihg to Swing, wheh we aonsider them 
in ispiatioa 'from,thé' particular ' o'irQÙmstanoes ' of their . 
realisation* see that il%ë oharaoteristlo'of'goodneàs :■
follows from tWs® empirical features whioh characterise 
a state as pleasurable or from those features-which /
■Characterise am act as belmg one of''prom'i’se-keéplmg.e ' Now* .'L. 
Who#Ve War ih mind that it IS In this "seeing" or,Intuit-#
Ing that the source of the Ihtelliglblllty, of bur éxper- 
lenoe of value or gbodneSs is.supposed,to lib we realise 
that the recourse te» synthetic a nribri bronositlono does 
nbt* ln fact* render the particular bxporii^ce Intelligible# .
We still require a principle oi\ prinolples to emble us to 
asSêsS thë relative Weight, to be assigned to the rival 
Claims of diffèrent aspects of bhC and the same event or 
act, ifOr* aooordlng to Ewln^* ’^the primary ethical IntUlt- 
ioh*#\p##ls not that any action as a whole Is fittlng or 
uuiflttihg* but that.lt is fitting or unflttingln certain 
respects «, " (1) Hence, these a nr lor 1 ■ synthetic propositions 
cannot provide the ultimate ground of lâtèliiglblllty* for* 
in a particular given case* the relevant a nriorl propos­
ition la only mde to serve Its funbtlon bÿ being con- 
dltloned or qualified by the addition of some pliTase. to thé.
161»
/the effect that the facts of the caseA. under consider­
ation are su0h that t^ hile the a priori proposition: con­
cerns directly only a certain aspect of the whole sit­
uation there is present in the latter no other aspect 
which would counterbalance its applicability (1)* The 
necessity of such conditioning or amending of the a 
nyiori by appeal to the particular experience in its 
entirety is clearly inconsistent with the claim that the 
latter is rendered intelligible solely by the former: 
wliatever part these a priori synthetic propositions play 
in rendering a value situation intelligible* it is clear 
that they cannot themselves provide the final ground 
which establishes a value situation purely and simply 
as a value situation.
2*x The second difficulty we find in Ewing’s account 
bears directly oil this last point* and consideration of 
it will carry us into the heart of the dispute between 
him and those whom he calls "naturalists/* According to 
Ewing* the necessity of recognising an intelligible 
connection between factual properties and value character- 
istics is forced on Us by the characteristics of our 
experience of what We may call "value situations"* or* 
at least* of those in which we recognise the presence of 
intrinsic goodness or moral obligation» He writes* (2) 
"goodness and badness* obligatoriness and wfongness are
not properties that could possibly be removed from an
■•A...;
c àotioïrwit^  ^ .é%^wiën6e- oir-
:_': action''being' ln%:athér L^ ways ..differed;. and/ this - imbos* - - 
: ''r'âlbiiity,'%',ho Çausal''l a w s "
'/.'::T'%W/:^ aoç^  .tM-ë .ÿaÇt':;#Wùt':% *'
' . thè' ValU'G^^^^^ -ia'' -
y 't.'quéstiéhTfôIiqii#^  'f## .thé- factual 'pVOper-"
'\.:y. tieèlyby '.W®' action -or' èa^ eriëncéÿis-.^  '
" : %  thq^  pnly :i#têrpr ôta t iùh hé glVès of the phrase 
' yl " W i t h p % b r  : action ..%ing\ lh "pthér #ys . 
''différé#^ ’' ib:'Withbùt the bxpérlenoe or abtloh posses-^ ''' - 
-àiM âlffèreht, eholrlbàllv ’ ascaftàlhmble' eharaoterià- '
'. v tiçéL^  " . He never- raiae^gthe-:-qhë#ioh, whiter it la - /,
ppédihlè to give h What is ih
'v/'faotLone-: oxbbribhGe' or situation* i# terms of obhoept# 
Whibh: hhVA common prlhçiplë they are
/formed# , (lX Th# ^ *gap"; betwéèn the poheep is supposed 
to ,he by the "#tblligible oonheetipns"* but*
on his own i^ forde* "relations between terms dan only 
obôur within.a/Wlder unity eonneotlng the terms (2) and* 
/again^.,"bo far frbm relatione ^ béing,independent of their 
terms the qualities of their terms.are most relevant to 
the ipeburrehce of the relations." (3) A relatibn is not 
^jie ihteiligible by being "posed" as intelligible and 
if the empirical concepts whereby ,the ^ miiid represents. to 
' itself ,the 'factual, characteristics of its experience 
liavo nbthing in common with the valhe concepts in which
i.'-.
/which it reprébonts the vâlué dMf#Q:beristios of 
tMt; same ëX#riÿnoe it is hard to see what oould 
be : mmiit by shyWg that they are related by an in#*
teia^ gifele ooimQfetiQa which is /stjëà dlredtly In ,
the real by ah act of Ihtuitibhi. / .
, i s ortu^^ÿè that.Ewing. does, not œke.more, 
clear what M  xmans by."natural coapept##" Ée merely 
say% d) ."I thlhli:, we may uMprstand a haturad 
vicii? of ethics aà, one which#,c#»analy$es ethical con*# .:. 
cept# soiely in terme of the eonoepts of a natural, 
aciehqe." ÀM from, his general treatment of the. . 
qUestioii of the relàtiônehip between factual and value 
characteristics we may conclude thdt he considers that 
#11 Concepts of what he.calls "factùàl.characteristics" .
possess the name formal eharacteristics as.those of the 
concepts, of the natural sciences.f #ien this, is realised* 
ho%#yèr* we see at once, the absurdity, qf trying to "find" 
the charactêrié^  ^ of value or goodiies.s within the i^yorld 
gf factual characteristics? for this.world is equated 
%^ ith the world, which can be represented solely, within the 
Concepts of the natural sciences? But the fprml. oMrac- 
te^istlc of .this "world? is.precisely that, it contains 
that and that only which.can be submitted to observation 
and niqaswement in space/time; it is. conoerned.only with 
tMt aspect of human experience ,which is oontrollablo ^nd
3.64. ■ >. '
/ancl veriflabl© by obaaotivè, posl,tive,;--aethoa9..
Clearly .the .notion of va3.ue cannot arise a .
universe experienced in this positivistic mode© it- .. 
is. hot that value .is opposed to the World, of the .
.SOlent 1st-* - but. that the scientist as.-, such-is not and 
cannot be concerned,with the affirmation.of .value or 
disyalue© This point may be illustrated' by consider*# 
ing the ei^mple Ewing offers:. (1) in illustration of 
the necessity which âs, supposed to•characterise . 
certain value judgments:-. "Hitler could not have done - 
■ the actions ■.which' had the factual- properties■- his ■ act- ■•4 *■ » r »' * , * ' i  ' ' « » . ' »*'•  ^I ' k « " ' ' » . • ... , ' « ' » >
ions tgi^ ards the Jeivs possessed and : yet have prevented 
the/actions having the additiona]. properties of badness 
and iopongness#?'^ ^^ ^^ not list these "factual
properties," but at first sight we have no difficulty in 
suggesting.what type of fact he has in mind* as* for 
instance^ the Infliction of bodily pain* and* in more 
detail* various forms of torture with which reliable 
testimony has made us familiar in these recent years.
But when m  examine more closely wtot it is exactly that 
we are here describing we ogme across certain difficult­
ies w. Is the infliction of bodily pain as such wrong or 
bad? What* again* do we mean by "infliction?" Even more 
ambiguous is the term "torture" which already seems to 
include a valuational element, Are these terms concepts 
of natural science? If we were to confine ourselves to
,/tp aspect of : situation %';hioh :q6Uld}^ b
exprossW: In terms of a natural solenoe we ehpuM 
have to limit ourselves to the oçpurrënoo of.bodily 
pàih in one h%ah\organisia following on (of caused 
by) certain mqvomehts of another humn/^ And
when we ask WMt/in scientific meant of
eighifled by the i'JOrd* "pain" thelànewéf would u^  
ately W  in terms of observable "beMVlour"/ In çhort* 
in the iteasufe in whloh W  giving ah aocount
of the éituation within the Concepts of a natural 
TsciehÇe* we, are forced to diVest thié siti%âtion of those 
very elements within which thé notion of value can arise, 
We.do hot deny,that a value situation has physical : 
aspects nor that/these .are relevant to the assessment of, 
the value of thé aitUationt hunmh action, is and must be 
embodied in the material universe,«, But this incarnation 
is not a simple juxtaposition of "émpifioally verifiable 
factd" and intuitively grasped valiie characteristics ;
#qf* in a Valiie situation thé "factual properties" hhVe 
• originally a different significance from that represented 
in the concepts of a natural science; they are from the 
outset integrated into a system other than that of the 
solentifio universe* they are the object of quite a 
different point of View# ' . "
These brief commenté are not Intended as a solution 
to the problem of the Ultimate sourde of the ihtelll^
\.r
eliigilaiM of value aitiiatlqa^  ; ^ they are 
merely IhtenhM ae ah indloatlon that thé elements 
■neoéésary‘for-;erieh a èqlutlo# are far moire eom- 
IplloatW tWa Swihg è^ Sgeats: by % é  usé 6ÿ the term \ 
tural eohoepts^ * ^ àhâ ; by hla appeal to {**intelllg"^  
ible éenhèotions ; " The problèm must be thekleh 
f Ur Wer back « for ^ if the world of sélenée as re^ 
preééhtabie ih spléntïfle ooheepts lé ôîbéed to the 
'world"bf value and vice 'versa, théù uâïèàs ôhe Of 
thêsè Is denied the real Value Which' it might
bé held to posSeas la'virtue of its presenting at '
' least a ôàrtlài àâpeêt of realityÿ wè' must seek a 
'sour# bf unity more ultiMte than eith# of these 
/\#rlds" ahd conourfently with this a . prinolpie of 
ihtéiligïbllity more oompfehenslve than:those uklthln 
vhloh pur, ôonoepts o'f ; sçiènç© and oui* conoepts of value 
are respectively engendered,
: W pan no^ j understand Mly it is that we find Bwlng*s
method of dealing with the mturallst so Inefflpaolous. 
H#, writes (1) "the philosophers who give hatursilist defi#» 
nltlons of ethical terms do hot/despitey^ predil-* 
#tlpn for emplrlolsm) oomrne# thely oonolûslohs as^  the 
direct result of a plain empirlGal investigation of our 
moral e2cperienoe$ but put these forward dh the assiimpt"'
/assumptioa tliat If they can find.a hypotheala which 
will rid them of any concept different ffom those of 
the .natural sciences they ought to accept.It whether 
or not it seems intros.pectively .plausible," There is 
in this criticism a certain ambiguity' in..;ihe. phrase ■ 
*!pla:W: I"*: if true\that if.
the philosophers under discussion were- to describe the 
Whole of .their experience in any situation in which, 
they Were involved, they would be involved in.listing 
/sentiments and attitudes which would certainly ..be , 
"valuatiGmlx" Bût the, empiricist, as^,indeed,- every 
philosopher, is concerned to do more than simply de*? 
scribe. Ms experiences he wishes to discover the ul~ 
timate. .principle qf.intelligibility in the light uf 
which he can determine.under what conditions and. in . 
what measure he can, attain cognition of the real#
The empiricist principle which redupes t# field 
of kn6%Aodge to that of "fact" positiviatically Inter-^  
preted Diay bê x^ rdhg^  but it is of no avail to ask the 
empiricist to remain wedded to his prlhpiple and yet, 
at thë same time/ to admit what by its very mturb can* 
hot be introduced into his system of conebpts# Swing 
is quite clearly determined to concede as' much as 
possible to the naturalist aW he claims for his own 
theory "thé advantage of providing the minimum no# 
naturalist theory of ethics $ by which I mean the hon4
- . V: ; 16&;:. \
theory which a çqaVërted hathrallst 
qohld . accept with/the l#st dlvergehdé. from ^ h^^ "
Pr evious : views $ " (1 ) This è tatemeht " eho%vs : ly
tiiat Ewiiig considers^  t#: (*oonversloh" la question to 
b& Ohé: bf degree" rathêr than k^lhd"; :tha .
is hecessary is that the haturallst shôuld extend his 
prinçlpiê a little füTtheâ?* But in rëfuëiàg to do 
this thé imtuTalist is #relÿ be to his
principle./ 0h the other'MM,/those who aÿràpothisè ' 
with Bwiiig*s o6hcern to sàvo value from dissélutioa 
within: positivism bé equally ihimical to thO' 
met&od he propose# @ rOoOghising with thé naturalist 
that it cannot be used for the task Ewihg'imposes on
3i t i ■■ ■ . . ■ '
This enables us to support thé contention we put 
forward in Chapter III that a form of noiWiaturallst 
qbjectivism whiôh does not meet the demands of a 
critical eplstèmology serves to strengthen-the force 
of theories' of the Expressive typé.- For -our examine 
atipn lias led us to the point whefe We appreciate the, 
impossibility of "inserting" value into the wpfId re»^  
presented in scientific of naturalist concepts? We 
appreciate) too, that Ewing^s attempt to "enlarge" 
this world by the "imposition" pf Intelligible con­
nections between factual characteristics and value : »
' Ir i
/value characteristics lacks justification^ he does 
hot prove that these intelligible connections corres­
pond to anything..in the real, and, on the: side of the 
cognitive subject, they do not appear to incraase 
intelligibility.
If, then, We are persuaded that it is impossible 
to give an adequate translation of statements of value 
in. terms of scientific or naturalist concepts we are 
faced with two possibilities : We must either say that,
a statement of value as such does hot, correspond to any­
thing in. the real, of we must admit that the empiricist 
cphception of reality and of the intelligible principle 
which governs the ooghitive act, is too narrow, and, in. 
fact,. fepf eaents" only an. impoverished aspect of the 
total: intelligible situation. _ .WoW',, although it may be 
said that in one sense this is what Ewing does when he 
introduces Value Charact.efistlcs and the corresponding 
mental act of intuition^ it femains'true-that for him 
the impoverishment is made good by the simple addition
, . ' - ■ « ; . • > . . . t ' jof other elements to the already oonàtitutéd Wofld of 
natural science, and this we have shown to be critic­
ally Unjustified# ' \
In the concluding remarks of Chapter I we offered
certain reflectiohs, drawn from Thomis%. principles, oh 
the notion of the "intelligibility bf being"^  these
/those refXeotlôns enable us to give an Interpret#, 
ation of this failure in the following terms
’ 1# Being is the "first Intelligible", and all the
mind's concepts are contained within the notion of 
Being. . .
2à The cognitive act consists in the conformity of 
the mind to Being#
■ 3V-’'Baçh conformity -is séif^consçious, #ioh implies 
that the mind is able to assess the critical or real 
import/'value'ef''-the: concepts: through which it expres- . - 
■bea: to ■.itself,: in ita judgment thé Conformity 'of these 
concepts : ltd being#
. Such ah asaêaà^ht can only = be made in the -light 
of thO hotiOh of béingi sihôe the latter is "the first ■ 
intelligible/"
It/^OllôW# îÈrbm Wia that what the mind ;ls able 
to ground Oritloally Will depend oh the richness or
depth of its notion.of-beingV
6’V Conaeqhently, if tméonditioned or absolute critical 
value is placed on a concept or on à group of concepts 
in.virtue of certain specific characteristics which they 
exhibit it Will necessarily follow that these character­
istics become the condition of critical value gs such/ 
with the result that the notion of being within which the
-
,;v ‘-.v
/thé ôqËhitiyé activity works Will become wrrbvjed to 
thè\èQncëptbfa.ëWolfÎ6.ty#. of:.being/.. ' - -
7; It will then become: Impossible by reason of the 
Very Mtürè of : the. oognltive apt to groimd là being 
to orltlGaiiy justify) any element/ of the epg-
nitlve aithatlbn. i^ hioh does not exhibit' the bharaOter* • 
istlës.bf the specifio type of,.being to, whlbh. the'notion 
of being has been limited# Such elements will have to 
be discarded from the situation as intelligible (?*Beihg 
is the first intelligible");, and a quite different des­
cription of them and of the situation which: they charac­
terise' will'have to be 'given#.
The "Third Theory^
This intêrprétatiph tlrrows light on, the relation be- 
tween. Classical" naturalism and certain more recent’forms 
of non/intuitional .ethicsy and thereby helps to support 
the. contention we made in the Introduction , to Otepter III 
that there is a connection between .naturalism and theories 
of the Expressive type# It is clear that if absolute 
critical value is attributed to a specific type of concept 
then the sphere of statements purporting to inform us 
about the nature of the real is| and must. be$ limited to 
those utterances which are composed solely of terms Indic­
ating concepts of this type# The various forms of "clas- 
slcal" naturalism m y  then be described as so many efforts
' '
■r//
,/efforts, to yediioe ti'ansXate ©t’nj.ssl a-ssertioas ■-
iato. .gtàtémeats, beXôîïfi'àg ts: omo or other of the 
positive sciences , whether psychology, spciology. or , 
biology* , Ih ose thihïcers however j who, accept; the 
empiricist -principle of knowledge have beeome in- , '
oreasingly aware of the objections to be brought. 
agaihàt the attempts to rédiieè ethical sentences to 
sclentific statements# (1) In the effort to save their 
radical empiricism they aro seeking a "third theory" (2), 
which will preserve them the "metaphysics of
altimcy" ( **pf inthited unanalysable ethical character?p 
istlos") and the "tough metaphysics of translation#" (3)
it is hot easy to see one*s way, clearly tlirough the 
variants of this "third theory" nor to understand fully 
the intfioaoies of their position as this is described 
by certain thinkers# However, àÿer, in his %ifork 
cited above, does put clearly Certain negative aspeotè 
of his theory and these are important in emblihg us to 
illustrate to some degree the reflections we have made 
above, and to justi;^ Our contention of the close con­
nection between naturalism and theories of the "expres'* 
sive" type# A.yer finds himself in the position of beiiig 
unable to accept as possible the reduction of ethical ■ 
terms to non/ethical terms* (4) dt the same time, ecn'^  
Sistently with his "radical empiricism" (ÿ) he cannot 
admit àn "intellectual intuition" of ethical properties
. . ' 4 %  , : -
/prppertles or charâùterlstlGS#: WMt aocomt^ then, 
oan be given of ethlMl tqrms? Els . answer is that these 
ter# are not In faot ^noents at al% "we say that the 
reason why they a#e unanalysable le.tbnt they are mere 
pseiidb'^ ëqhpepts#" :(l) %  plarifles contention 
by éaylhg, "The presenoe Of an GthlGal symbol In a prow 
position adds nothing to its faqtual oontent"; and, 
agein, he says that ethical judgments are sentenoee which 
Mve ."no objective valM whatsoever* * * , /# sentences; 
%AiGh eimpiy ^ preas moral judgments.do not say anything* 
They are phre expressions of feeling and as such do not 
come under the category of truth and falsehood." (2) 
Reflecting on Ayer*s position it seems to us clear that/ 
if/,Oh the phè,handÿ we refuse the possibility of transw 
latlhg ethical terms into "natural terms", and# oh the 
other hand, we àeoept the empiricist principle as the 
ultimate principle of Imowledge (and therefore of intelw 
ligibility) then the course which Ayef takes is the sole 
one open to him in dealing with ethical terms* We must . . 
refusé to include them in the intentional order, that is 
to say, in the order of mental terms (or concepts) ivhere- 
by the mind thinks the real or refers to the real# When 
we employ such terms in our language we are not, and We 
cannot be, referrihg to the real as conveying information 
about it, as questioning its nature, or as paying to our/ 
selves that it is thus and not otherwise* We can be
■j.-'
for' roaaqh /
that we :hayê ii#ted the %telllgiblllty of being to 
thaty aa'peot of the 'reM Whlcli can W  'Goh#ihed; WitM 
émgiriëal - Thusy it seems to Us
thai;/ on its negative side at least/ Àÿer^s theory 
eleariy justifies oûr"cohtehtiôn that there Is a close 
qdnnèctioh between the théoMes of èlâsàiôalMtUral- 
'ism âhd theqriès: ;qf \the Exprééaivé 'typév and it also : ' 
.pr'OV#'' ah' lllustrâti'Oh - of the vâlûè of the 'oohoeptioh 
bf the. ihtelligibility pf being, in enabl;lng us toyunder"^  
stàhd'thé d'evel^ ^^ èmplriGism: into its Mghlÿ'^ .^ '^ / /
êritiçal prepèi]^  form as illustrated by :the work 
of a logical positivist sWh as ^pfpssor Ayer#
Ewing refuses to folioi") Ayer in his interpretation 
of ethioal statbmonts* He holds that thé value/.terms 
in a proposition do oorréspohd to something in the real; 
that ^lue statements are genuine propositions) having 
objective validity. It follWs therefore that his 
notion of being must be richer than that of tlie expon­
ents of Expressive theories* It seems to uS) however, 
that he does not sufficiently develop thé èpistémo*' 
logical eohsequenoes of this enlargement of the hbtion 
of being* For If the latter is to contain both natural 
and Value ooiioepts and these are formally distlnot it 
is clear that absolute critioal value eahnbt be. at:*^ 
trlbuted to either: to do so would necessarily involve^
.V .'J
/imvqlVQ) la last: resort) either the r #  
qf.qnG/^ to the other/ or,/the
a'lready suggested, V##, :the dropping of one of :6tWr 
, AUt: Of :thq "Intelllglb^ ploture"^ Ewing refuses 
this -latter :al^  and yet he attempts/to avoid
the former* Thefe is, however,, an inherent: lnstab:T . 
ility\in his epistemologioai position in whiqh, as. wç\ 
noted : in Ghap^^ the j mqtapqsitlpn, of , _
t%^Q, quite diffefeht "prln^  knpwlodgp; (sens-?
ible of intrqspoqtiye experience and intuition) and 
two équité .separate and equally "ultiAte*/ spheres of 
reality* Nptf/Vthe Impossibility whièh he h 
acknowledge a,. (1) of aeoeptihg this as the Mtimte 
■ metaphysioal position, indicates: directly not only the . 
possibility but the necessity of going beyond this . 
dichotomy on the side of the .cognitive subject as well' 
as bn the side of the object knqim?
Seotioa k..
This raises the Crucial questions whether this "going 
beyond" is to be realised through %n Giimjhation of phe 
member of each pair or whOthor it is to be realised by 
- transoending the dichotomy and reintegrating it in a ■ 
higher unity both on the side of the cognitive subject 
and on the side of the reality ImoWh, Empiricism and 
rationalism may be said to represent thé results of
. : ' /i :
/of. 'ièlimimating ùne Or .other, of\ the members of. eaoh
paiV/,; Éwlng:Më point^ ^^  (%)/ that la pMc^ .
these tërw indlqatGj t rather than
positions# .Meverthelessy Iftwe cpàèldér:them . .
0pist#ïplDgioal priaCipIoA they; are ^ ptrlotly. èpeak^
ingp q^lupive of one; another#. It is ,for.. this reason
attempt-to suppléent the iMdequaoieS '6
G#irloi$m by the .8#ple addition ;of--aypnioyl; êlémêntë
lacks çr#i#l jùqtif ioatiozii. For/ while he ref uses / !
to/aopept .thé- empiricist prihdiple ae .the' sole^  prin-'
oiple :'of% knowledge/' he /nevertheless.;appeare to leave - it
as, %qyweign or; abeoluite within à. certain.sphere*.; . This
sphere is desoribed/var^ the. sphere of ; "faots
of oxlétehcè" (2) of "faOtUal properties" (3) and, also,
in terms of the corresponding mental activity, .as the.
field : of ."sehaihle experience", and of "emplrical;
qÇnçéptSv" If , ho%MVer, We;admj.t that thère is a sphere» . > - of rea3.ity within which the empiricist principle is
ultimate what we are in fact asserting is that there is
a sphere of reality whose final value as being is faiths*
fully and adequately presented in the data of sensible
experience# Knoxjlêdge in this sphere will then consist
in the correct registering of what is given (or can be
given) Ü1 sensible experience# The intelligible value
Of the corresponding concepts will then be reduced to
the daita, real and possible^ to which they apply# Hoi»?«
; ? V :
(-1
i-S:-• ■ j:
/HçWe ask for the grounds on which sùoh a. prin­
ciple might be asserted life find, that they m y  be of two 
kinds, which we/shall call dogmatic and erltioal# in the
first has.e we have a reasoning of the follpwlng type: we 
have .i^ Oÿzlëdgë of given he in sensible experience#
Therefore i^hat is given us in sensible experienoe/is real. =
WMteyer). therefore/ can be verified by means .of sense. . 
eÿper#nqe. is_by tW and
The^pg^tism 6f tM position is revealed pnce We realise 
tlmt the empiriqist/prlM ie a principle of M  
only if àn equation ip made between "what.is g&vea tq ha 
in sensible expprlehce," aM,.JjwMt. i^  ^known by hs .through 
sensible data*" ^W/ epiStemblogiqal realism does not 
justify us in making/this equation: it merely justifies us
in,saying that in sensible knowledge we are aware of a real­
ity distinot from oi# act of knowledge; it does not enable 
up to oonolude that this reality is exhaustively and. faith­
fully presented to uq in the dat^ of sensible ê:;pêrlenée&
. The second type of ground whioh we have oUlled^orltioal" 
would tnke into aooohnt the above eritiolsm and reoognise 
that to sustain the empiricist prlnqiple of knowledge it is 
nehêssary to formulate it in terms of beiW as intelligible. 
Thus it. would eXpiioitly identify being as. intelligible, 
and the data aotuàl or pos8ib3.e, of sensible oxperlenee# It 
might be objected that such an identifioation is, taken in .
' " I " ,
. % •• -
. :
/In itsèlf, qaitè: dogœtiq* This is trUe| but, in 
fact, thqsè wbp'have held it have had reasqns for '
holding' it# x|. 4é, for example, the principle of .
knowledge whl# onnfprms most elesely to a material- 
1st metaphysics'* But it may also be held in # non? 
constitutive form, that is to say, in a form which .
does not imply a metaphyslc of the oognitiye aqt and - ;
of he • object'known* There is still an identification ;
Of being as intelligible and the data of sensible ex^ ' 
perioheo, but all : metap^ r^sioal import is .resolutely ' '/l
banished from^  this, identification# W h a t ' are left 
with is simply the "regulative" ; prihoible that Inteli 
ligibility Is measured by the data, actual or possible, ' ; : 
of'sensible experience* ' For the groimds for holding - 
the, principle in this.'form, and for^ lts. correct form- , '//;'
Ulatiohk we should have to consider the work of a writer 
such as Ayer * But what must be noted is tha t 
whether the principle is held in "constitutive" or 
'"regulative" form the implications of holding it are the -, 
'.name for EWing? If the principle is critically formai-, 
atedy then, in abeepting it as valid for à certain sphere 
of reality Ewing must necessarily limit intelligibility 
to 'that sphere* On the other hand, if, he accepts the 
principle in its dogmatic form there is, it iA true, 
nothing to prevent liim asserting another sphere of real- : /
ity and another "principle" to correspond with it. How-
'.aa
. 1^ 9: %
ÆôWévér/ : an will be as dbgmatlo a
his orlglml aôoéptaWç of the emplrlélst principle 
and Ewing.thUs puts himself in the false position of 
.Wt being able tb raise tW critical questipn» For, 
if : #  admit "thought" a M  "sënsè*- as separate priH'" 
qiplea Of knbwledgë) we are iiimiOdiately oojmittM 
the dogmâtiù attribution of ah absolute/#àiûé^  ^o^  
to each of their bbjoots; t;e are then ihoa#bie of ex- 
plaihihg either the unity of one ithOiÆëdge: or the unity 
of being which mèaâ% On the aidé of being we
have two'distinct and irredùoible ephèree; On the side 
Of thought wo haVO two distinot and irrèdholble typeo 
Of bohoept, eabh mifforliig obmplOtely and exhaustively 
the reality of whioh they ai»e/Oonoepts#' ThO' logical 
Order (i*e* the order of oOnoepta) )#y be distinct from 
the real order).but it is/ in faot, no more than/a 
faithful replica of the real order* .
it; seems .to us that this is the assumption which 
lies behind Bwingt^ Whole treatment of the epistemol^ 
ogical issùés involved in thé hstUralist^hon^nat^ 
ëontrèVêrsy* tifhen this is made Clear the impossibility 
of solution of this debate# as the latter is envisaged 
by Ewing/, becomes evident* This will ehhble us to sit-^  
uàte the debate in its widef philosophioal implications. 
We shall therefore dévote the following, final, section 
to ah examination of the place played by this assumption
W  ar'gimehts) with a%view'tq
.placing :the/debate In .its correct philùsôphiôal'. ' .
setting*.. . y . "., ' \ ... / '/. ':' . \ /
,„ ■ ■■...œtw?aiis*--nonwnat!Wali0t dptjate. iS'Oftea . 
des03?3,t)ed. in. terms of ,oqnèepts, i»e.«, whether the - - , . 
Concepts of value can be. defined by means of "mtural!!"w' ' « “. * •* ' " » .  ^ * ' * % t V > , '^4
Or "acientifle" or ".empirical;^  (here treated as synqm-^ 
ymqus) in a pqeition to see that
if we treat this debate as being Gowerned solely .with 
ther objeqtiye donte : eohoepts) then, unless it is 
aÇsiwed .tMt the Iqgioai prd is a mere replica of the 
real pMer ho meM qohclusioa can be drawn . .
dkectly from the irreducibility Ih the logical o^der 
between concepts of yalue and empirioalqonoepts/ Oh 
thé other hand if this assumption be made regarding the , 
relationship between the logical and the real order then 
we are carried immediately to an ultimate dualism of 
value and fact in the real world which must necessarily 
exclude the possibility of finding an intelligible;- re-' 
latioh between them# Bearing these reflections in .mind, 
We can now turn to a consideration of the position of 
the opponents in the debate4nd the possible efficacy of 
their arguments# If we limit ourselves to the question 
of objective content, the argument centres in the pos4
i 1
/possiMlity or Impossibility of replacing, the'term . 
"good" In our thought by a term or terms belonging 
to a 'natural science, without altering-the meaning 
or-intention of our thought* By What means can we 
settle the datete at this level? in Ghapter XI m  
have already considered Moore * s method of direct 
"Inspection"#  ^The difficulty.hère IS that/ in fact, ' 
it leaves' no room for debate, either, wé "see" thatt 4 » , » > 4 . # » I « ,
When t# consider the term "good" it means something 
different from What We mean (or could mean) when we 
use any term of natural science^  or We do not "see" his $
Swing s argument (1) from the character of neces­
sity revealed in certain Value judgments Mght . seem to 
provide ground for debate) but it remina to be seen 
whether it necessarily oarvies him in the direction ih 
Which he Wishes to go* /^ lihen we see that something Is 
Intrlnslcaily goqd*.##we see that It must be so)" Wherer 
as "What we learn by observation might alWys have been 
different, at least for anything we can see.? The final 
pMase of this statement makes it clear that the neces­
sity to which Ewing, refers is a characteristic of our 
mode of judgment* and not- necessarily of what-is judged* 
The necessity characterises the connection betwbeh:the ■ 
terms of our judgment* It Would seem that if EWing could 
persuade his opponents that no proposition composed.
/cpmpôéed sDlèly of emplrlqal concepts ever bore
1- . ' ■« t . , * *«  ^ * . " .- i  ^ * - » w • . I  ^^ . •' > ’ • ,' ' ♦ . ' _ »tbls jmrk of aecescity bê .w oase:
his opponents would be fqrced to admit that valu^  ^prop*^  
isltlohb bamiot 'be comppeed sClely of emplrlôal ooncepts#
... /Wè'.havê sebh/:hçWever) .itMt' %
Mturai; qualities .or-C^MotWi^ lé. not the 'only 
altër#tlyè to ciaesicàl mtih'allem ; It it self ^evident 
t%t Jthe flwther 'elepients: beyond the: empla^ lcal Conoepts \ / 
of a judgmmit are genuine joencepts? It seems to Us
that,. In .the last/resbrt) Ewl%'muet.,fall back/oa/an 
Intellectual IhWitldn of the real characteristic of In- 
trWelc gbedness/ in pMor to establish "uhejcrltlodi; value 
of the ^object of though how do We Ichbw that we
really see" wMtYi# iihink we "éèe" ; and hbiv do diàtin- 
ghlêh çWWeën the bônçept, df the quality or characteristic 
ahd\t% charac^  ^ Itself? - " " ",'
'It êëemé to us therefore that Ewing^a position does 
not) in the last resort, differ In any important Way from 
that of Moore* We are thrown buck on the simple inspeetlon 
of onp "objects of thought" whether these be considered 
solely in the logical order i^ e* as oonqepts, or whether 
as "real entities" reached,dlrectlyvby the aet of intel­
lectual intuition* in neither case do we find grounds for 
fruitf ul debate ; the method of ".simple inspection" leaves 
us in the position in which all we can .say is that we
1: ..■
/wâ'/'ëlther 'dp!'or'dq.:âot ."'âeè? thé: àonùèpt''-%: 
qntlty in queptlpa aad itë (ill si^Ularlty.
T%' é3^ %miaatlpir%Aiqh Wé sp far pçémÉ tp
lead us . tq thé-, cqàqlüslqn tWt :thé debate: is/simply 
a. dispute abpüt what is prepent' in a MqOgnlsqd field 
in which some peonle do not "see" what others %eé"*. 
ThiS'/iç a. pequliaf "'situatlpà. and wë ' W  f#l =
a :qértain disaatisfqetiPh 44tlh .this' .deqcriptiph/ Pf ... 
l#t:weXtook to .be .,Fqr 'Itr-
géëms to us tWt phiiosophloal m  ultimately ,^
dharaoterised bV a t^o^fqld aim: to dlseover at ônoe 
the Ultimate aathre of the real, and the ultlmte prin-^  ^
oiple of GertltudO) Or of knowledge of the real* These 
are not two separate aiDis whioh qah' be pursued in\isol- 
atiOh from each other; in the wbrk of every philo­
sopher they are in a dyh&mio relation to each other. / 
How, while the mtuyaliat and the aoa'^ aâttiralist m y  seem 
to be disputing about wîiat is. présent in a given field, 
in fact, they each have their own conception of what this 
given field is, and this conception is influenced by their 
View of the Ultimate principle of;:knowledge, flodre'. and 
thé neo^reallsts resolutely refus© to false éplstémol- 
ogiéhl questions.but' even they are hot free Of àn epistem- 
olOgical'theory/ vis. thé dogmatic,identification of the . 
logical and the real order. But already this means that 
this g^iven field* - a field Which we can describe
PfY éUbf/:;. ^
siatê#. ëntltlea,': ?objects pf thpught" or Popnoppts"^  - 
will :bp d i f f é r e n t given afield pf; an empirl- 
::oist,) differpnt:pgàln from % e  ?fleld" pf ratipWl- 
yi8t,//:lt.ispnlyy^  we réalise;.thfa tha-^ .^ we/.qan pndêr- 
;stan^\%e .phllosppbiGUl : position of. %p  ^ ^Mtwall#-'npn-
andf pf Bwlng^ S: plaoe and slgnlfiGance 
yln.thlS' debate*.;' ..". -, - : . -. .
y ' y 'TI%ë'\rèàson t%èr^ . iJhÿ the;, natüÿàilst à W  the- . 
'non^ jUaturàlip on What they ."see": is': thpt ^ they
'%rë'/M i^pëklhg la the-^ eâme'^ ^^  ^ 4 f .
wp %ht; to agÿÿè# deeply thèir respective/^ «
Itloh^ mûst W ÿ  to Understand thé üpderiylng eM##0'' 
iQg'i#! ' prIhql'pleÉ; 'Whloh/ dbmi^të' thélf/''philosophical 
''ènqùi^ y'i ' ".lf"'wè ' pènêldèr' the- débate ' ffpm- this- point of 
' Vlp#: %  ëleàr tMt' the point ât lèéuè h the
disputantS' boars pféoiàeiy on thé quêstlôh of deolding 
Whlôh élëmëhts iii" our thought rpally are oonoepts' Mylhg 
a. fWëtlpn t play î^ hëh thought le Considered èoiëly 
from' the point of view of its cognitive refèrenqe to thè 
real* The field pf' sUohxdonOepts seemis imrrower; for the 
nâturâllBt than for the non^naturalist* The naturalist 
holds that we o %  know only thosè faots whôëe éxlstehee 
is testified (or can be testified) by the data of sèn"^  
Sible experlenoe^ ; The hbh-naturallst holds that our 
knowledge extends beyond this field and acquaints us
18g)
with a noh-séaslbla reality whiçh oan only b© . 
reWhod by thoughts Thé disagreement therefore opcT. 
GërhS: the hàturé of the field, opeh/to our opgnitive 
â'Qtlvltÿ#A M ): while at first sight (and, it wouldy - 
appear in own.'opinion) the diffërenee seemC. -
to obhqera. slmpiy the widtli .of variety of this field, 
on Glosez^  lnsp#tl0n.;wo sliall see, that tlie "field? = 
Itself changes là:nature as the epistemplpgloal as- 
samptlons qf the doatestants are brought to light.
The explanation of this lies.in the fact to;which we 
have already drawn.attention^ there is fàn intimate 
ôpnhçotipn.between the two aims/;hioh qharqoterise . 
philosophioal enquiry vig. to discover at once the 
ultimate principle of eertitudo) and the ultimate nature 
of the/real# At what point and under what conditions 
can.im be certain that wq possess;ah adequate represent­
ation of the real? The search for these conditions is 
the search for the principle of,intelligibility which 
Will serve as the ultimate principle of one knowledge. 
But at the same time this principle of inteJ.ligibility 
Will and) indeed, anust mark out for us the sphere of the 
real which can be i/eached by our cognitive activity and 
this marking: out will be not simply, one of delineation 
in extension, but of cliaraoterisatlon* Thus empiricism 
aM-rationalism necessarily leave their mark on the 
character of the real i^ hich they claim to render dhtel-
/intelligible# Reality for the emplriGlst la in the 
last resprt rédhqed to éènaë data/ real or possible; 
reality for the ratioMllàt is) la the last resort/
rMuaeS-'to thé abatraot entitles of our oohGeptual 
thohght) together with their logical ëonneètlons*.-
Now# Ewihg hag said that empirlqlsm and rational- 
lem fépresent tendencies rather than exclusive positions: 
"By ratlphallsts in générai I mean those who ompha-sise ; 
the a priori factor,.by empiricists those who emphasise 
more t W  empirical factor.. I do not mean those, if any, 
Who altogether deny one of these factors. 8hort/of dél 
Claring either to be the.ohly factor in knowledge there 
are all manner of shades of view." (1) As wé. have pointed 
out.% this description of empiricism rationalism may be 
true in general if we limit ourselves to ah external arid 
superficial view of examples of each type* But if we, 
place ourselves within the movement of thought of either 
"tendency" we find that we are carried to a more and more 
exclusive and radical formulation of the primcy of One 
"factor" of ImCwledge over the other: indeed it becqmes
inappropriate to speak of "factor") for ive ultimately 
reach the position where the factor has been raised to thé 
status of the real principle or. souirce of knowledge#
Now# it seems clear that the consistent naturalist 
treats sense riot simply as a factor in the process whereby
/whereby; otpr ethieai Knpwlédge Is acg.aii'ed, but as
the soihrce and priaclplo of that kaowledge. On the
' ... . \ \ . . . . .  - .
other hand# If om? emmlwtlpn of Ewthg's thought is 
accurate, it'is' évident that, for him, it is/ i n  the 
last resort) thought, as bearing on the necessary con- 
nectiphs of/abstrac t entitles # which is and
principle of pur knowledge of value* And #  have al­
ready dealt in detail with the generâ.1 difficulty of 
bridging the gap b#wé0n the world of thought and the 
world of sehsêè 3 Ewing wishes to consider thought and 
sense'-as'factors In the, acquisition of knowledge, but, 
in fact, the. implications 'of his whole epistemology f.ofoe 
;him''to'/treat/each, of. thém as autonomous ■.principles of 
knowledge# - The metaphysical dualism which this carries , 
with it is) as we have noted, unacceptable to him, and we 
Consider that we are justified in concluding from this 
that the direction of his thought Is towards an ideal­
istic rationalism which, in spite of his claim to diverge 
as little as possible from naturalism, (1) will place 
him at the opposite extreme from the mturaiists# The 
Ultimate point at issue between Ewing and the naturalists 
is the nature of the source from which the mind draws 
intelligibility or the principle in which the mind finds 
intelligibility) For the naturalist this source Is to 
be found in the data of sensible experience; that
is intelligible which is verifiable in sense experience#
Fori Ewing, .the. mlrid. finds Intelligibility
la the aeôëssary ooaaeqtiohs.which It latults Intel- 
leetiially with ao mora than. payohologloal al4 
th® of .searil^  ^ e%perleao0# If / howêvêr, this is 
thé pbpitioh bq#^ the oombâtaht's of the ^ debate, then 
, it ; is elear /that., beoahse. the. cohtestqhts'. stàrit; from, dif ^ 
forèht prihoiplée.ofy iatëlligibllitÿ there la la feet; 
'no.p'os.eib.ility. of iririsolvin'g'thé-debate#' . . ; :
It ôëeme %  ^  the efforts of Ewing to provide 
an ëpibtëwlégiêàl Môkgroa^ a6a^ ;^ i;uraliem of
Woorie reveal Glmrily that this debhto must ëarry us into 
the wider arid more fimdamehtal: dispute bçtwea empiricism 
a M  rationalism; Once this is realised we see that the 
attempt to give à blear meaning to thë terms of the debate 
between naturaliàm and nph-nâturaiism is aucceStfhl pre­
cisely in thé measure in which this forMâlation/carries 
with it the Impossibility of solution* "Naturalism" can 
only be sucoessfully desdriibed in the face of "non- 
naturalism" and yet to formulate either clearly and dis­
tinctly, is by that very fact to destroy any possible 
basis for discussion# Tïie naturalist, as an Cmpirioist^ 
oamiot begin to accept the."elements" offered ty the non­
naturalist# And the mn^naturalist , as a /rationalist, 
cannot accept the elements offered him'.by the naturalist# 
Bach must, by the very nature of his position transform 
the foreign elements in accordance ivilth tlie demands of his
■ \
/hlq. pripC of knowledge,' aM; la dolag^éo M
bar^K hMself ' off from the\i)qsC debated :
ÿhls eorioiüslôn eeeme to 'ue bb bè bqrnë out by the - 
t#hÉltion frbm ^hmturallam? to .?e#3qctlvlsm" whloh'. / .; 
Reflects/ là the field of èthiaal âhalÿslà,. that general 
development' towards a critical formulation''of the emp- /.
Irioist pririelple Which'marks'thè work of the -lôgloàl . 
positiviste*. V DWble to' ignore the différence .between ^. 
ethlôal thought qhd 'éoléatlfle»'.thought, they attëmpt/ tè : 
achquht' fori It' ia a' œ y  which will leave Ihtàot the- / 
emplrlolst prlholple of khowlédgé, by .dényi% tMt thë^  ^
'dlffèrehdë qharaèteriéés the logical or Intentional order 
as ahCh* And finally i# can appreciate the basip for the\ 
tehdênoy' amqzig logical positivists tq treat thé ai^ gomenté' . 
of-hôn-hathrëlists.and Ihtuitiônléts as."ratlohallstio »" 
(Ref .1) - : ' - - ' . ' ':
It may, however, be objected that In placing Ewing, 
in the ranks - of the "ratlomllsta" we are, in fa.qt ) mis­
representing his thought,, for of him; it cannot fairly be 
said that he ignores.or transforms the empirical elements# 
Bis .'argument -with the empiricists is not that these 
eioBients . cannot be treated as Ultimate but that they are 
not the sple elements which An attentive and unprejudiced 
.examination of human )mowledge reveal as determinants , of ;
/ ■  i
/qf thîs' but we.
thlrilAtha% :-wé'\MVëyëh9im. thàt -Ewing! #il$. :prçÿG' his 
Qasë :àgain8t the ëmpiri^  ^ and tMty. w^thi# his ©pis- 
tempiê^^.thë-.bàKÿ;/# th@'!#t.aphyslëal dUaiism
which hé flàdë îiMëceptaM^ bë, tp Confer . ultimate,
and Absoiute-.rirlWoy-: on. the a pribri factor :iii''-our ' .
khWKWgo # #  admit, hoijevpr$ thàt this. is nht Ewing ^:a
bwh prqfeèëed pPèi^ ^^  that .his wgent/prë^^
atiqh is tp;^ the value of. the empirical elements
là bûri buow^ shoi^ ing '.thb .i^ poesslt^  of reeog;^  . _
àièlngthe;pÿë'#^ .uon;4:empii4dal) .elements'
ia that same kiiqwl'e&ge^  "Kant /again I think," Ewlhg
right , in hbidiag./thatbensA /exper,- . 
iériôëÿèhMô^. give .any: knowledge;. in order to give Icnow;^  
ledge :/Pr e a judgment expressing opinion th© mterial 
must be to some sxtent prgnnised) We cannot hâve oontemt 
withq# form* a #  this form ô$nhot be discpVered .by 
merely.' receiving 'sense, Imprp'ssiphs- passively, " .Thohght 
and sense ■must àùcordine to Ewin^, co-operat0:y\4f. we are 
. to /have.: : khPwledge* if this however , is the initial 
position, from whiah Ewing. develops his epistemology;We 
qorisideÿ that, nevertheless', we have shown, that EiVing 
does .hot provide ■ for,'/"c.0^ opera'tion";) and that .there is. a 
faliihg apart loif 'pense and thought and, their r.espeotive, 
obiwW.
. : Thf. effedt o,f this cli^ dj?os oanj .w .think, h® clearly
/o^early eUdmi'to the definition of which’
î&TüdLiig; pieo%)()E;es, aAâ vy%il:Q]h \de niiialk iicy** eükaâiojLfiG;,
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Intrôdiiçtlbn..
$he: purpose of this chapter is to eaamihe ,- with re-^  
ferèace tp the particular example of of
goodness» rth# unltihg of, natural and noh'^ natural 
elements in an intélligihle:(W^tÿ We shai3. gee 
that» While, Ewing ?:s aooquht of both the Simple eoneept 
6f. fittingnoss and the eômple^ s .qohcept pf goodness re^ .^ 
quires that: the division between hatu^  ^ and non- 
natural be broken do%m$ his eplstemologioal treatmeht 
of these.elemehts Tenders this impossible# àooordlng 
to: swihg\it. is ■ the ■ pres'ehoe of the ' noh#iatural Tel- 
ation ■' of fittingness lihibh - transforms. the world of 
**matters of faot" .into thé' world of ■ yaihesk. ■' $hùs» the ■ 
dondSpts which have application in this letter world 
are concepts of relatipml oMrabterlstios which are 
'alike. in' so far ah they'all' contain 'the\%ote^ * of fit- ' 
tihgness and which differ in the empirical %otés" 
which they Contain# hence»? goodness»: badness»' and Indif^  
fprencey are so may forms in which the charaçteristib 
of '^fitting to be"*ed*^  may be specified» all difference 
: between them lying solely in the empirical content with 
which the *'^ ed" is filled up. In all cases of value 
terms or Concepts there is one thing» and oné thing only 
which saves them from a complete naturalistic analysis
/analysis and that is the noté of fittihghess# This 
relatich is^ '^  ^ and» as snoh^  it in no way
provides , ha with a distinction betweeh\% good» the
had* and the ihdifferjant#. It seems therefore to. have 
at. #00;nhthlhg to do and eVefythihg- to do& . It has 
nothing to db In. the sbnse that, all distinotioh of 
value and disvalue, is to he sought; outside, of it in 
the''sensible data jbf'.the. situation,;It has everything ' 
tb db ,i^  the sense, that no ohservatibn of what is 
glyen in senslhle experlènoë oan eve^^^  ^enable us to prb- ^ 
nounce à ivalue judgment », for the. letter bears the /mark 
of neçèsslty and thus points to an origin other than 
sensible experienbe * Henee the appeal to intuition as 
the sole, .3ustifidation of the reality value of our value 
judgments ». and the.conséquent impasse with those who do 
not see**,. What Bwing /'sees"» - If.» however » Bw.lng abandons 
what Wo may call .this,last vestige of rationalism» he 
must fall into empiricism, for » apart from this a nribri# 
nonéhatùral relation of fittingnessi discernable by . 
Ewing) s intuitive eye, the /'real" to which value judg^ ' 
ments refer is Gbmposed entirely of those natural elements 
reobgnisbd by ills empiricist opponents » The most import­
ant question therefore for an understending of Ewing's 
definition of goodness is the question of what exactly is 
meant by "flttingneas", and» as we shall see» we are led
/led fact) can be. ,
rendered Intel^ InJLsolatlbn,from the terms
between which It le supposed,to hold, It will be-- 
pome clear that the eiepent in value faôÿs signif-. .
'led "#tting% :#hnot % treated/ -
fIp^ Lënt to transform the world of. "natw?alia.tlo" 
faets' into ; the world of vplue/ faots »: b #  that this 
element.pan pnly be rendered intelligible in» the. ' : 
light of bertain other eiementa.which danhot be - treaty 
#  as "naturalistip" Inthè eensé in whie.hE%/lng - 
:pmpiby# this.term# W# shall e%gest/tWt» in oi^ der
to r#dervth@ ,nptipn of fittiiigness inte^^ it
is hepessary to prpsei^ ^^  ^it within a relatioml: unity 
of terms whppe pritlpal value transeendsYthe empirical 
data to which they may be applied* In-the fiml phapr 
ter we Shall sketch briefly the/metjaphysical theory qf 
this relatioml unity which is-to be fouiid In-the 
Thomist doctrine of beihg-ln-pptenoy and being-ln-aot.
Section 1»■ • The Meaning:of "Ooôd"# '/
"Mûorë and Ewing agree in recbghising the term "good"
as non'*%mtural^  for Moore# however# this term. Is simple
and thus indefinable,:» while for Ewing it"is definable#
"Grobd" means "fitting object of a pfo-^ att'itude" (1)#
This » according to Wing is "a strict definition of what 
g^ood^  means" (2)) when we apply thé WOi^ "good" to an
objGot we are asserting that that object is 
qharaeterised by having;» or standing in, the rel- 
.atloh of fittingness to a pro-attltude. This rel­
ational Çhëràdteristic is not something entailed by 
the goodness 6f the object; it is, quite simply» 
that in iifhlch the goodness of the object oonsists, 
j^ GCbrding to B%^ ing we can form à concept of this
"abstract distinguishing feature whlbh belongs to all- / ' . . . : . . . ' ' .. ' ' ' -  : . ' .
good things" (1)# This concept, the concept of the 
relatibml property which ig, goodness, is thus a com-k 
piex cOhoept of which the compohents or notés are fit-
It must, therefore, be ,, 
these which together'' express the content of our thought 
whëh we think of goodness $ #e shall first note briefly 
the ebaracteristics of these t%fo components, The first 
point to notice is that this complex concept is non- 
natural in virtue of namely,
fittingness ( 2 ) "Pro-attitùde" is, itself, quite 
clearly considered by Ewing to be a natural term. It 
is "Intended to cover any favourable attitude to some­
thing, It covers, for instance, choice, desire, liking, 
pursuit, approval, admiz?ation" (3)..
The concept of goodness, then, is noh'^ natural by virtue 
of its other.component, fittingness, This term, borrow­
ed from ^ ofessor Broad (4) is» according to Ewing, the 
term which rehdèré most satisfactorily the content of '
;/of .thought;when; wé'say of an.aoti6n\that it
ought to!be dohô» or avoidéd, and when w# do hot" 
neoessariiy mean tb Include ih thie judgment the 
thbught tWit/thê! obimiesloh or omibeioh bf; the aot
eohstltutes "a moral obligation %'?hloh wb ful­
fil or be guilty of sin" (1)# Èwlhg: points 
the èpnéêpt of atr,lot moral obligation .pfeeupposoe 
the éônôept of fittingneçs» since we oannbt bê under 
the moral obligation to perform an àot unless it Is,
Or is believed to ho» the aOt appropriate to» or fit­
ting, the situation» The twooohqepts are» how 
distInot, fittInghess.ôonoefhing the relation betwëên 
an abtion and itè enviromieht, %i?hlle moral obligation 
is "something anélagéus to ah imperative on the agent"
(2). Fittingness» then, eohstitutës part/ of the sig- 
hlfloahoG of the term "ought!*, but sihee this latter 
term is ads^eemployed to Indiqate moral obligation, its 
use is not free frbm ambiguity» and it is advisable to 
employ the mofe teelmioal term "fittingness" rather 
than the ambiguous; term "ought" to ihdidatê the non- 
natural component of the oonoept of goodhess* Further­
more» fittln^esS is not limited to the delation be­
tween âh motion* in. the. strlot sense of the term, and 
its environment; it may also hold between psybhologioal 
states and.an environment» ifhereas, aooordlng to Ewing, 
^oral obligation can ohly concern actions (3)
a iaay say» therefore» that Bthlos oontaiaa; at least 
two hon4haturaI concepts (the qonoept of moral 
obligation may oohstltûte a third, but this:does not 
qoheern us here):, of 'irAiioh one Id -IMeflmbie, and 
the: ' other - definable in terme of it togethetp with a 
aertain mtural term; and the autonomy of Èthioë is 
'safeguarded by the-'noa-^ naturalism of the: oonoept of 
fittiAghO'ee '-Cl)#'.- 'Ih: this ooneopt, the oonoept of a 
mique irreducible relation» lies the ultimate limit 
of ethioal analysis:,, Prom it, together 'with the eoâ4^  
dept of pro'-attiti#e is Constituted the Complex ôoâ- 
qêpt of gpôdaeesî: : are, we to envisage the "Utiion"
of these two. concepts iju- this complex 'concept? This 
is the question %#ich will occupy us in what follows#
Géctioh 2» "Fittihghesa"*
This; term, is» as we know,; indefinable#. Wb eaa, how­
ever, say something about it, and, in particular, that 
it is a non-mtural relation, and, like other non- 
natural relations (e^ g,, the."logical connections" 
which we considered in Chapter III),, it holds directly 
and. in tihe first place between "Objective oharaoter- 
istios"» Moreover, while these latter do not exist in.. 
isolation, but always, pêouÿ; às particular
existents, this condition of their "real existence" does 
not affect their intelligible content nor their Intel-
/Intelligible connections* Thus, eplstemologlcal 
priority belongs to the universal propositions which 
assert Intelligible connections as holding between 
objective facts as such and in Isolation from their 
embodiment In particular given instances* Ethics, 
then, as a science will be based on a number of uni­
versal propositions, each asserting the relationship 
of fittininess to hold between a certain objective 
fact and the objective fact indicated by the term 
"pro-attitude" (1).
Now, Ewing says (2) that "relations between terms 
can only occur within a wider unity combining the 
terms"# 4hd he goes bn to say that In the case of uni- 
Versais the wider unity is "a relational system, by 
which I mean a set of relations arranged in a determin­
ate orderV under a given determinable such that some a 
Priori inferences are possible within the system# I am 
inclined to think that all relations between uni versais 
fall within some such system or other"; These remarks 
may be applied to the Case before us, for it does seem 
that, in Ewingview, certain universal ethical pro­
positions exhibit the features referred to in the above 
quotation as characterising a relational system* In 
the final chapter of THE DEFINITION OF GOOD Ewing oon- 
slders the relative weight to be attached to intuitibn
and to the coherence test in establishing prima facie
'/faclë;;datie$.. (which constitute Wû .Important; sphere 
of ^ "f Itttog ob| e.o.ts,..■ of -a. pro^ -attltudçü ) _ and •_ he . argues, 
that: certainpriori inferenqes are possible betwean-.
(1)*. us,, th9S7.efore c.on-.„ 
slder,the retotioh of fittingness as:the determinable' of 
a., set; 0^ determinate, relations which together provided 
the conditions, of a system of universal ethical pro-.' » ’ < > « f V * ' . ■ « I * I ' ' - 'I , I 4 '» s . - « . * • .«1 «. K I . * —  * »
positions. ^ The, questiop here, is:, in /what-;; does- the- -
relation between determinable and - determinates consist? 
:àt'.first'.sight_the.,.answer^  .my .appear simple, ^ It ifonld 
seem that the do terminable# the abstract relation of 
fittingness,, is rendered determiaate the ^ additiqn to - 
it of the concept - bf ■some .one .objective fact on the one- 
side, and the cpnoépt of pro?^ attltude ; on the other .side,
■ or ,, stooe,- proVattitude itself .covers.. a variety of /types, 
we may go,further and render the relation more determin- 
ate by.specifying a certain type of -prorattitade, e.g., 
the attitude . of desiring^ . > We ••must ■ note, however,, that 
what we have dôn|-rvhere is to employ something natural to 
render, natural something non-natural* Such determln- • 
ation must cleariy be extrinsic,, for the noh-mturâl» as
such» lh_^ no...w%y contains the.naturaland vice. versa.,,
Once this is realised We see that it is not so easy to 
discover the type of relation which exists between this 
determinable, fittingness, and its determinates* In a 
footnote to the above quotation from lOBàblSM Ewing
/®Vîing',wites j ."It - .seenia, ; obvious that. the, distihçt- 
lou hOtWëeh:déterminât® and:êetermihU^l®.APP.liee to 
volatlorig ;as,: vrell :Us,-qualtties." , but : he does net,
State ta ,wtet, hxab.tljr .this dis.tinetioîi, cone.ists., It 
seems Qdi te -.clear, that the .distinction, between ...fi t- 
tinghess,.as..a detérmimbiG,..and .littingness, as:'-t.his . 
appears in .a .set of .relstlons. connecting.certain ob-A 
iective '.facts .a#,.hertain types. ,of proruttitude j, i# 
not the same .Mind pf.distinction.as,that.nhich exists.' V ' ' ' ' ' ' ' - .. ' '  .. . " ' -tt. t / ' . .  . .
between; ;.for example,, the determinative colour, and,/ ., 
its determinates, red,.green, etc*,». Colour in:some 
way contains the differences %#ich mark off one colour 
from another, wliereas in the case we are considering 
tW: jto delations qf fIttliigiies$ (which qqn-
ptithte ,$he ."ëetè of relations") are dlqtingutohed. from 
each other by that which Is essentially extrinsic to 
the determinabl©#
We do not want to ,Insist too far . t h e  applic­
ability of Ewing's remarks on relational system to the. 
caeè of the universal prépositions of Ethics,/ but these 
oôhsldçratioiis serve to underline the difficulties we 
find, In trying tq détermine the relation be'Ween fit?* 
tlhghess and the? natural elements with which It Is united 
In value facts or situations» Recording to Ewing $ all 
value facts are chàractei'lsed bÿ a noh-natural relat'^  
iohhl characteristic, and- this Is the only non^natural
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/nàtizeàl of the sltmtlbh# Npw» %# hhve"
already éhqwn» all differenGa betw^ ^^  value fapts , 
must lié etrlotly oütslde thé relation of f 
âhd Ih hO; way- aff eqt^  intrinsic Mthr'e:, /lf. we 
are to pÿéséÿÿ^ the strict divisioh between the imtural 
andy thëv-héhT^ tuÿgil^  - v&iuë. faotsY' 'tbat' i#'- to /' say» - / - 
agr#y.'Wl#it 'Other- so far;"as-;t-héfë- Is: prêéehtyin;/ 
theÿiàliyoné a#' thé.'Sâmê;relation, flttlngnees)) - they 
dlffer'':'bhiy'in %Aat %0onoerns''their natural' character?^ ' 
isttos*  ^But' If this- Is 80 then we mast be able to ab- 
j&3aüa^ / a #  every fact' of 'Vàlüé-.pne/p^ ^^  ..
j&à%''éS)i#Oh élezüen^  the- itoidhp rGiation of
fittihgness,#/ A M  thé value facte i6uot be
explaihM: by the fact that tWfe. ip present In: èabh. one 
of - :éâmè-..^;Wày#, ohe single- Identlbâl
element#' This plëmeht Is pfocls^  ^ is Indicated
by the term "fittingnese^ '; we cannot-even add the spec-
iflcatlon "prp*4ttlthd0'') for this would be tp Intror^  
duce èpméthlng! extrinsic and, natui^ al# When, howpver, we 
reflect on. tills analysis we hardly thlnlc that. E^ing 
would b0 satisfied with Its results\ For# what Is to 
save Ethics from being Immersed In a natural science now.'. . . / . ' k , . » . • - -X 1>— , » . < * ' . • »  k . . 0- • f . ‘  ^ . ., .
appears, as a very thin abstraction, something which Is 
hot ..In, Itself sufficient to distinguish not merely the ■• 
good from the bad» but.both from the Indifferent, since 
there Is "a fitting, attitude to Indifferent things» the
-
Ahè attitude of i^ïoring thêm"' (1) . We are thus ;' 
led tO" support thé: criticism of P»F# ËtrâWsôh when 
hé ihrlibes (2^ , tMt' in all sitmt-
ions ■ ih whioh any" or no reàotïôh is' 'fitting» sdW- ' 
thing Identioal is'presents' the àp'prôpriat'èhéba to ' 
their/objects' of laughter, pêrfdrAhoe^ tears, -ihd-if- 
féréhoé,ylôW','fear and'loathe ohé and the 'sgme' 
intéllectWlly dlsoériiahlé relatiohi^ M  non-*  ^
mtural^ and uhiqu# indéed, pursuing thé anal­
ysis' to this dlréotlon We seem to reach an entirely /' 
abstraot re purely formal in éharaotef»' whioh '
obtaihs all content/and sighifioahoe from
what/is exterWl to itself and mtm»al*
"If we àre to avoid this final implioa'tibn of the ■
analysis it seems to us tlmt we must go hack and quest-/ - ' . -/ ' ' - ' - . ' '. ' ' : ' ' . \ L'- ' 'ion the initial step which was to treat the relation of /. ': - ' ' ' : ; - ' - '  ^ . * - ' - ' ' . ' . " fitttognesa in abstraction from its terms * This* we
argued, must b© possible on Ewihg*s own distinction of
natural and non^hatural elements * But it is most pert-. " . J , - ' . . ' . . - ; - .
inent to question this possibility* Gan we* in fact, 
form a Concept of the relation of fittingness without 
tociudlng in our thought the concepts of the terms be­
tween which it holds? it is clear that the lo^io of the 
term "relation" requires for its elucidation the use of 
the term "term"* (3) It is not, howéirer, this purely
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/purely formal structure of "terms" and "relation" 
which concerns us here. What we want to know is 
whether we can give content to a relation which is 
the relation named "fittingness" without in some way 
specifying the nature of the terms between which this 
relation holds. If we cannot do this then it follows 
that we cannot abstract and consider in isolation 
this non*natural element of value facts or situations.
If we accept this line of argument it is possible to 
defend Ewing from Strawson's criticism, but it remains 
to be seen whether it does not force Ewing into reject­
ing the strict division of concepts into those which 
are natural and those which are non-natural, and such 
a rejection would affect very deeply his whole epistem- 
ological position.
Ewing says something which is relevant to this 
question of the abstraction of the relationship of fit­
tingness in IDEALISM (1); he writes, "For a relation to 
occur at all a necessary though not always sufficient, 
condition of its occurrence must be found in the nature 
of its terms;" and he continues in the same context, 
"....most, if not all, kinds of relation presuppose a 
specific common character, usually or always of the type 
called by Johnson a determinable, in the related terms, 
without which the assertion of the specific relation would
i* *
/would,bé, not merely false but absurd In %#y which 
the que.attom*- is virtue yellow? or 'is the British 
0 PhatlWtlon a /triangle? : are to anybqdy who
knows. ' in • the ' barest ■ outline ■ what ■ the - words mean" ♦ In 
this aeoond quqtatiqn Ewihg makes it clear that he does 
not Intend :to make a oategorioal statement hhout all 
relations, ■ but ,we may with prO'^ it utilise • his remarks 
about %b8UrdityT* He-wo.uld,-w@:,sug§est, admit that it 
was nbt merely wrong but "absurd", for anyone who khows- 
"in the barest outline"-what the word "fitting" means 
(When used in Value judgments), to ask - is benevolence
a fitting object of polishing?, or, is carbon dioxide a
fitting object of admiration? How are we to explain
this absurdity? Is It grounded in the nature of the terms,
one of which in each case is such as to preclude the oc­
curence of the relation in question, or is it simply the - ' - outcome of our tendency to dismiss the unexpected as the
impossible - or absurd? Is it simply the case that 
there Is a point at which I stop finding things fitting 
and "rule" that things Of a certain soft, and only of a 
certain soft, can stand as terms in a judgment of fit- 
tingitéss? This last suggestion would give us an explan­
ation of the presence of "universal propositions" in 
Ethics and of their "necessity"# But the consequence of 
such an explanation would be the denial that such nee es-
/haoesaity in any reflects a charaet0rlstlo of
the real order» We know that such a "Itogutotlo 
theory!' of propositions Is uoaooeptable to
Ewing; oonsequehtly another exptonation of the . 
"aWiWity*^ must W  sought* : .
Reflecting on the first of the above tWo/quot'^ r 
àtiohs» we seem forced to admit that the "nature of 
■ thé ’ terms'" 'is relevant nbt merely ' to. the' occurrence' ’
of thé relation In fàot* but t6 its Ihtelligibillty: ' 
és thought !,by/-the ..mind/:, or » to put it 'clearer, to Its 
- presence' in the mliWi as a" fixed ahd clear objective • ■ ' 
content;■ We do not think that Ewing himself would' 
object to this, for, in T Œ  DEFINITION OF GOOD (1) he 
writes » "Granted' that'a - concept is simple and unanal­
ysable, thé correct point of view may be to look upon 
it not as for that reason intelligible in itself, but 
rather as being too much of an abstraction to stand by 
itself". We Seam justified in concluding, therefore, 
that the meapln^ of the term "fittingness" cannot be 
grasped in abstraction from the nature of the terms' 
which this relation relates* And, in Ewingtermin- 
ology, we can say that the nature of these terms con# 
tribute to the intelligibility of the concept of fit- 
tingnesa itself. But we now meët the gravest diffic­
ulty which has threatened us throughout this examination.
%  the 3?0.al order) , th@ terms, . 
hetween ;vjhioh tîilë relatio» o.f. fittihgnese ; holds,: are 
".^ g^irical; facts"' it. is„ dlear' ithat'. the qoo.ee.pt#'.
- through which we .preseat, to ..ourselves;, the :Oatig‘e of 
.thesè/..terms ; will what;Swiag . calls-"œtural^ *.-'.or
"eaptrleal" ,concepts. , therefore .the difficultÿ before 
as is to understand how it is .that a. aon-.mtirral ooa?. . / w ' '■ ‘ ’ . • i ‘ / . * ■ I
.q.ept, cam-b#, remde.ved Intelligible., by a, ■mtUral/ooncept.
/ Nonrnatoral çonççp^ are fqr Ewing opnoept$: wllldh 
are "nqt derlV# from mere empirical observatlùn". (1),
Arqm Mitob. that, natural Gbnceptai Uré àb
derlVéd*. And hë talk$ of non-natuÿal oqnoqpts a© "the 
frUlt of an. Intuitive Insight into the real" (2)»: HOw*" 
ever, while thee# remarks tell ue/t these two:types of 
qonoept. have entirely distinct
the one "emplrloal observation" and the other hon-seh# 
slble peroeptlpnCor intellèettial Intuition), they do not 
answer the question xifhieh is vital from. the point of view 
'of-, intelligibilityV; namely.».■ xtot is their critical value 
as media in the oognltiveaot? Does each type of odnoept 
merely reflect the oonoeptuai level) the datum from 
whibh it has h@0n "derived", or the "opntaot" of li^ hièh it 
1$ the "fruit", or does qonoeptUal activity raise the data 
to a new level of intelligibility, and, if so, how would 
Bwli^ desoribe the prlnôlple governing such coiièeptual
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/coïiceptaai aotivity? These are questions which our 
exaMiiatlon of the Thomlst theory of being as the 
first intelligible in Chapter I, and, especially, in 
Beotlpn 2 of that chapter, lead us to ask, and we have 
not been able to find answers to them In Ewing's work*
But Is seems clear to iis that they are questions of
vital liaportanoe in this present context. Thus, it Is 
clear that^ we treat these two types of concept as 
each referring to, and having, its orltioal value ex­
hausted in sensible observation (in the
case of natural or empirical concepts), and in what 1^  
;,fi!iven--to-intelleotiaal intuition (in the case of non# 
natural or m nrlprl, concepts) then, since these two types 
of "perception" have no common measure, it will follow 
that there will be no common measure in the concepts 
which are based on them# In this case we shall have two 
distinct orders of concepts, and it is evident that mem­
bers of one order cannot be called upon to clarify the 
content of members of the other order.
In the case before Us, therefore, we can put our 
difficulty in the following tmy*# If by a "natural con# 
oept" Ewi% means a concept Whose critical value ( as a 
medium of knowing the real) is exhausted in the sense 
data, actual ancl possible, which justify its application 
in particular cases, then it is hard to see hoi^  such a 
concept can contribute to the Intelligible content of a
/ér-Gohoept -whose • ooateilt : is/ éâ'seùtlàlly' and " exclusively ' 
totolicctuai* Agüln» if thë terms bet Wen which the • 
relation of fittingnèâs is ooadeiWd as hblding do no 
more than provide asWrt^bahd registration of the data " 
of seWible and introspêotiVe then a meré
ihcr'èasô'- in the number of suôh data-'wiii: in no way to# , 
créàdé^thé'intelligibility of the hbn#nathral relàtion 
Which is'supposed to cpnnect! groups of' such data » ■ '
. . We seem* therefore, to be faced by two alternatives,
each of which is in contradiction with thé analysis we 
have made* We mUst either relegate the function of the 
.empirical data to being a mere psychological condition 
for the emergence of a clear and distinct idea of fitting- 
ness. unique and purely intellectual, or we must go to the 
opposite e#reme: and. identify each case of fittingness 
With the empirical data Which condition its occurrence in. . - , . - . I . - f' - ; . . ' ' , ' . . . ' ' y ,
each particular instance, so that» when we have given a 
full description of the situation in empirical terms * we 
shall Iiaye éÿhhUstéd the meaning of the situation* Once 
again W# find ourselves placed before the alternatives 
of empiricism and rationalism, a dilemma .which seems 
forced oh us if we try to remain faithful to Ewing's epis#
temOlogy, but one which his account of value terms de-
/ "  /  ') : ' ' / .  : - ; ' ' ' : , - ' /  .. -.. :  .. ; ' : : « .mandsthat we transcend* The first alternative is unao# 
oeptable to Ewing because, as we have shown, the terms 
between Which the relation is considered as holding are
0"î p-> '
/éfé .vequto no.t merely aà; psyohologlcai-ralds Ih 
the formtlùa pf the a6h4MtUral : dohôèpt ;p^  fittihg^ 
nWê)- thôy are nèdèéeary àe eontolbuttog to thè In­
telligible oohtent of thàt ooadept/ Thé èetohd alter# 
native là aîeo Uhâo^ Ewlag for it déniés
thàt there is présent ih all value situations ohé 
uMqué hoh#nat(h?al élément#'
' In this 8éétioh wé have' examined thé oohoépt of
fittlhghëéS' and' we' have attempted 'to determine the oon-.. ■  ^
dit'idhé; of : Its intelligibility*'' - Wé irnvé shown that, 
'toiloWihg'Ewing* s.! remarks .bn "the nature of ..relations in 
général, and hia ooWehtA in'T^ OF TŒ GOOD
oh sii^le/ unànalyeàble notiohé» it seems'éîéér that 
■çàmiot". "thihlc of*? o'f form a : oôhéépt of fittingness in -, 
abstraction.;from.'th©' thought .of the natufe ' of the .'terms ' 
bétWen /%Alotoit hbldé; we may say that the notion of 
fittinmes s is ^ onditlonM as a
This ooneluston is important for it suggests that m  earn 
only provide an intelligible content for the term "fit- 
tingneee" by viewing it in a wider intelligible unity, 
Within which the relation obtains its meahing* If, how-, 
ever,, this is the case, it follows that while it" may still 
bo the case that flttinghess is a.'distiiigUishlhg mark or 
feature of all. value (and gjg-vàiue) phénémem» it will no.
,yap, bë .possible, to treat it. as- bètog that which,
in and by itéèlf, trànaform© the world of facts :o 
lexiëteàde!* (or "matters of Into the Wo&ld of
\ 6f ; We: eo&mt look mi the latter as the
 ^j?es(iLt.'.of. the simple '^' tojeetioh!^  .tot.di thé : empirical 
world of a imlque, hèà#mtlLeai: element , the relàtioh of 
'fittlagheae; mpr oàà we treat thé so#eàllëi eoncebt of 
fittingneoe-ae.the mental.êxprèssiôn df a purely intel­
lectual; intuition x^ldh eiidiahotS ite objeet ih a dlreot 
yieioa, and wMhh the moat, pgyohdlogloal
àid/from: empirical .0^ The toadèquaèy p =.
juxta#pogltidn of totally disparate éléments at the,per  ^
, oeptUal: léVel la iRàtohéd by the IMdeqmoy ;pf totally,*'3 1 . ,, \ - 1 - I  ^  ^  ^ , j. . . " *'••“ . %. » .
,disparate elepehts at,the dphopptual level. . .
Ife must now bpnslder the effoots of this analysis on our 
understanding of the complex concept of goodness, which, 
acGording to Ewing, owes Its place among toe concepts of 
value to thé fact that it contains the note of flttlhghess* 
it Is by feaboh of the latter that the charadterlstlo of 
goodness Is "^ toon#natural", and thus falls outside thé order 
Of purely empirical phehomeM/and 'toeto laws#
" ' In the light of the analysis we have juàt made we can 
now appreciate thé difficulties of this theory of the 
nature of' goodness& 'Ewing appears to think that we can
/can form separate concepts of .fittingness; and good# 
ness and that, comparing them, we see that they differ 
in that in the concept of goodness there IS added to 
the notion of fittingness the concept of oro-attitude. 
Furthermore, this latter concept can he considered 
apart, or in abstraction, from its "combination" with 
fittihgness, and when it is thus considered we see that 
it is a purely natural concept* But here hgain we face 
the same problem: can we form one concent of elements
which, when considered in isolation from each other, are 
Viewed through conoebts which have no common principle 
of intelligibility?
H W  does B#hg envisage the union of these disparate
éléméhts? We can obtain sème indication from a passage 
in T m  DEFINITION ^  TŒ GOOD where he explains Why he
deiihes "good" to terms of "oùght" rather than "ought" to 
terms of "good"; He Writes (1), "I found that I could not 
form a clear concept of intrinsic goodness, without Includ­
ing in it the concept of ought, and that I could form a 
clear conéept of ought without including in it the concept 
of good; Ought is also a wider concept to extension, for 
there are mental attitudes which we can, describe as fit­
ting .which are yet not directed towards the good; There 
are also fitting mental attitudes possible towards evil 
things, the anti#attitudes, and eVen a fitting attitude
. ♦
/attit Me towards Indifferent things, the attitude of 
ignoring, them'*. : , ... I. -Y ..
■,;, mUst, interpret;; tMs-^statompnt .yeyy^ '^ apGfulljr.
ii:,iir#;,,8ig# itf;!Hay-appeal?,,.to.;giye.:ua,a ##igM: - .
forMsM'ansT^ er: to the -Qiiestipn of.the Tormgtipn/Of the 
cpaple^ ..concept,.of. gp.oiness».. Go.od). so. it.Wppia.. seen?'. '
#i; ..quotatip^ ..ls a. eancppt,.whlph 1 ç. fpfm# .hy 
speeifs'^ ing/as,_ the jî2$â :pf.,aitituae,....(pr,.;. ,
.à#M3^ #\ttltnae) ,which. staMp. in the. (relation of .fit-.,..: 
i^»SMs.S';to:an pVpe^ and .-this .•specification Is '-by, jaeans'' -■ 
of ,e#piflcai '’notep.'! &, .'* 'f Erof-attitude ! .  Èwlhg writes 
"is intended to coyer any favotrable attitude to some*- 
thing., It coversÿ fot instance, choice, deèlre, liking, 
pursuit, approval, admiration" (1),. These attitudes 
"have something in common that is opposed to the common 
element in condemning, shunning, fparing, regretting,, etc., 
which would supply the corresponding definition of bad" (2). 
And he uses the terms "positive and favourable" to describe 
the'former, "negative and hostile" to describe .the,latter.
It, is clear that, in his opinion, all such terms are natural 
and empirical, (and it is significant to note in passing■ . , ' ■ - ' - . , , 1 ■ - I  ■ '• > I i ■ • ■ " , ‘ , : .!
that the way lie deécrlbéa the .general term of nro^attltude # 
as over lag" a llet of more spécifie attitude© - lends 
itself to a purely nominalistic interpretation of empirical 
concepts, and suggests that he accepts hl.s. empiricist
' oppoïiWts* treatment of these gênerai terms ).
We may tWs saÿ that the oompiesc oonoept of goodness is
formed by the addition to the non^mtarai concept of 
fittingnees. of a natural concept containing the empirical 
notes .indicated by the terms favourable and positive*^
We must I however* examine closely the Implications of this 
interpretation, bearing in mind our .analysis of the fit^
tingness**) where we argued that this notion had a ^con-^:' 1: 'y  ' ':'. \\  ^  ^ ' '. : y. \di&lonàd intelligibility: fittingness$ . we argUed, .was hot
inteliigible in isolation from the nature qf the terms be<^
tirfeen which.it holds, or can holdv . We are now told that it
can hold; not only between an object and ,a pro^attitude,
bW; betw object and .an ahtl^ttltude^ and, even be*
t^een hh object and, an.,attitude . of ignoring'* , We are also :
told. that .we'. {or':; \at ^ least Swing) Can form a clear concept
of fittihgness without including i.n it the cohoept of good.
P*##ably, we can also form, a clear concept: Of flttihgness
without including in it the concept of bad, or; again;' \ ' ' ' ' ' / / . ' ' ' ' ' ' ' without inoludihg in it the concept of Indifferent... dlear-^
lÿ;. then, ' hone of the empirical notes which mark off pro*
attitudes from anti*attitUdes and either of these frOm
attitudes of ignoring;, contribute to the intelligibility of
the ,concept of fittihghess^ Similarily; on the side of the: t ' ' ' - ' ; V" . - - ; ' . '' / : ' ' . ,
other term of the relationship.; which is indicated by the 
term *^ Object!*^  it Is clear that here too, those; empirical 
notés which mark off good objects from Wd'Objects and
■■■Ci,
/aaâ' either. pbjeots, caitobt'%pnt3sibtttè ,
to its ,in,telligitoHitjr;, gin.ee flttlng%ss applies la 'ail 
three eases, iî^ :esàGtly . th© same ways ■’. it is org ,anrl the 
same imlgae RGa^Aatuml relatipa •tjhieh .is^. gsesent in'the 
tlteee eases,, only the empirical .notes ; of ,the%q'b^ eet and 
the attitude'.differing., : - , . ' . ,■ . .'
It "is': i't 'thig ppiht tMf v)s G&-a appréciat®'.'both the 
airee.tio# .of %'#g.;s apgmmnt, hRi its 'x-ieaknags,. .¥©. ipy 
be iaciihea.' t.o. a.rgae tliat., ' sih'c.e',ail, . batwGen
good| ahd .ihdifferont oh|e'ots ,iies.:ln the empirical: ' 
data, and. since it is by thes.e .data, that vié rècognise . 
the, .object term ■ of, the relation; pf flttingness, it therem. 
fore' follows tMt ' the one constant-element ' present in . 
all 'three oases is the- relationship itself, the terms 
themselves differing in eaeh case»- But we see now'that 
this argument. Will hot hold, There must he something eon,- 
stant in the terms themselves, 'sino'e the intelligibility 
of the relation precupppéêa the ihtelliglbillty of the 
teri#o Mb oannot drop the terms **objeot*! and ,^ a^ttitüde" 
ont of our final analysis* life cannot treat "fittingneas*' 
as the ultimate term of **ethioal anaiyalèT* but what we 
miBt do la to give tbnthe terms "objeet^  ^and Attitude'* a 
meaning whiôh traheoehds the empirioal differenoes between 
good; bad; and Indifferent objeate}; and between pro, anti? 
and ignoring attitudes ; and which serves to preaerve the
..
by thé oôrreqt '^wirlng!^  6f bbjeôt and attitMè In 
eaôh oâaêV; WMt i@ éonàtant là each éaaë^  i^  the 
bare relation of fitting bût a ôertàîh r#atiôml 
%miltyg whlqh im m y  sigh^  ^ t#. phrâae "pWéotf'\ .
ïf; howeVë^ ^^  this bfltlolàm is abqeibtêdj^  It follows 
thût If we aire stllï to maintain that né eplêt.bmqlôglùàl
. ' ' .' ' > ' - 1 1 1 '   ^ > 1 • f  ^ I ',.difficulty attachée to the formation of the èomplex con* 
oept of goodheàpy then mûet bè able tô view tlie term 
"attitude^ */ là the double role of ; (1) contributing to* 
wards the intelllgibillty of flttlhgheeo; predefvlhg its 
ùhiqûeneeé In. its diverse màhlfeatatloha In the good» the 
bad; à #  the iiidif fêf eht ; and (2) being specif led by the 
empirical notée signified by '^ pro**; and "ignoring"#
Is this PCscible? It seems to us that on'general con* 
elderatloha which have been indicated in this Chapter it 
is impossible; given the limits of Iwing’s;'eplsteaology; 
for one and the same concept to fulfil thlc double role#
Me can; however; illustrate our difficulty more directly 
by considering the particular case of the concept of 
attitude and enquiring how Ëwihg himself views this notion# 
Bwlng freqUeiitly employs this term, often ixi con* 
junctlon with the term "mental"; but; Luifértùnatêly; he 
does hot seem to Consider It necessary to explain in detail
/d e tà il Whht he w a w  by I t . ,  Mè oah; 4 t sehmS'
clear; ' take it - thht- f or- him - It - is a natural - ' :
ifhioh^  wWh prefflked by the term "me#â%" belbnga 
the .WienCe' of Psychqlbgy»: - MqWoyer; : hé tçilé'xüe - ebs«^- - 
pliqitly that all the blémenW bf hie amîyéié.^ C^ ^^  ^
gqddhêés) are# with the èxeéptiba of the rëlatibh Itself 
(i*e# ; fittlngnéssl ) i This
being thé case we may.oonelude that this cohoept cqhtains 
the oommoh element which Is present in the three,types of 
attitude^ ^ 0; antip ahd ahd that the bbhoepts
of .these latter are- formed by adding additional empi^ i^bal^  
notes 111 each case# In this way the second of; the two  ^
rèles/ referred to above can be ;fulfllled; : %ien. .however,.. ' . ' ' -' . - - ' ; . ' ' , .r . ' .' . I , . / '  ' '
We ask this same concept_tb fulfil the first demand we 
come across a difficulty^ questiqiT of.the nature of 
soiehtiflG thlhlcing and , the femotion of the oohoeptual 
construction which it involves is extremely oOmplex; and
cannot deal with it here# )3ut It is important to note 
that in so far as %ing does describe natural qohcepts as 
^^ concepts Of a natural science" (2). the claim that "mental 
attitude" is a mthral Opnoopt brings us before a serious 
obstacle when we attempt to clarify the concept o f fit* 
tingness with the aid of the concept of mental attitude. 
The former has, as %# hâve been told* à fixed identi^ oal 
Çûntezfb in all its manifestations* and this content is, in 
theory at least; dlscernablè In the pure light of Intel*
/iàteilêôtLiial intùitiông thè latter* oh the eùàtrary, 
haà a éôhtçht whibh Is to somê arbitrarily
determined (thêre^ a^^  dlffeWnt "Whooïs" bf empirical 
'peyb&bïogy and different "imiÿkihg ÿUlés" fbr mrkihg 
èff mental phehomêz# from nbn^mentài pWho%em;\àhd 
'différent' wàya' of'dividing the' .àpWré 'of the former),
'Uzid' which "le opéh to alteration as'tiie'sbléhèo. wliloh 
bmbiôyailt/pWgreée#,;^ 'iWv* then* ban'tW''*soiohtlflq" 
'bbnbept.'pf' menWl htt^^ hélp uè to "ëée\ clearly"' In' ' '
''thè/obhçëpt'of flttW '" -- - y - - ^
let US suppose* however* that* In theory at least, 
it is possible to obtain a blearly fixed oontent for the 
term ."mental attitude^ *# Bearliig in mind that this con* 
bept is natural* and that this term Is ayhonymbus with 
emplfloal* we m y  ask hoW such a concept can render the 
concept of flttlngnebà Intelligible* BWlng himself has 
provided us with the answer Ih his insistence 6h the fact 
that no amount of empirical observation or generalisation ; 
from empirically ascèrWli^ble facts can "produce" in our 
minds thé idea of a nonlnatural entity* as is* for example, 
thé relation of flttingness. The origin of noh*natural 
ideas can in no way be found in sensible experience* thbugh^^^^^^^  ^:j 
these ideas db arise in situations which are also qualified .I. : . - . ' . ' ' /V . ' V- - ' ' ' : . . ^ ' ' - .by empirically verifiable charaoterlstios* We return* :!
therefore* to the sole admissible function of sensible 'Î
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/senslULe experience In the "production" of non-natuml 
ideasI namely, that of psychological aid. This, how­
ever, is not sufficient in order to meet the first 
demand put upon the concept of "mental attitude" in our 
analysis. It seems clear, therefore, that if the concept 
of mental attitude is a natural concept it cannot con­
tribute to the intelligibility of the concept of fit- 
tingness. It follows from this that, while we can ac­
cotait for the specification of "mental attitude" by the 
addition of further empirical notes as are, for example, 
covered by the term "pro", we have gone no way towards 
explaining how fittingness is, or can be, rendered intel­
ligible by the concept of mental attitude. And until we 
have explained this we have not explained the formation
Bf tftfl QOBpent of gttoftaeaai
Conclusion.
Ewing claims as a distinction of his non-naturalistio 
theory the fact that its demands on the converted natur­
alist are very slight, since it requires the latter to 
accept only one non-natural element, the relation of fit­
tingness (1). our examination of this relation has shown 
that, in fact, the converted naturalist (and Ewing himself) 
must be prepared to accept much more, or, to place the 
problem in a wider and less misleading setting, must be 
prepared to reject the naturalist-non-naturalist division
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/division in the sense in which this has been under­
stood by Ewing, and, in his own view, hy his naturalist 
opponents themselves. The epistemological theory which 
lies behind this distinction is totally inadequate to 
meet the demands put on it by Ewing's own analysis of 
the concept of goodness. In this concept It is impos­
sible for us to separate out one unique non-natural 
element, fittingness, we have argued that Ewing's anal­
ysis of such value-terms as tfgood" and "bad" is faulty 
in that he considers that he has isolated the bare re­
lation of fittingness, wiiereas this relation can only be 
rendered intelligible within a wider relational unity of ■ 
object-fitting-attitude; and in this complex neither 
"attitude" nor "object" can be treated as natural terms, 
in the sense in which Ewing employs this word, opposing 
the "natural" to the "non-natural". If by a natural con­
cept we take Ewing to mean a concept whose critical value 
is exiiausted in tlie sens e-data lAich occasion its applic­
ation in particular eases, tiien we may put our point in 
the following way*- In the relational unity "object- 
fitting-attitude" the concepts of object and attitude must 
be viewed as possessing a critical value which is not 
exhausted in the manner just described. The terms "object" 
and "attitude" must be provided with a in*ta empirical 
meaning. We shall suggest how this may be done in the
following chapter.
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Introdûotlôn# •
It was in folioi^ iqg. the general framework of Bwlng^a 
own thought that we were led to. disagree with his 
analysis ; of. the corioeptaal, elements involved In j ndg-^  
meats of-■'value*,, •and.,to ■ substitute the oompiex relate . 
lohal imlty of o^bjeqt-^ fltting^ attitucle" fhr the unique 
and simple oonoept of fittingness* In doing so* how- :
ever * we.have.set ourselves a problem not envisaged by 
Swing* sinqe* imlilçe him* we refuse to consider the con^ /'
eepts of object and attitude as naturalistic or empiric^ ^
al* in the/sense .in which Iwing employs these words* We 
have still, therefore* to provide an aoçôuht of these ,
terms which Will enable us to view the relational unity 
of "object-fitting-attitude" as an intelligible unity*
In order to do so we must review, the argument we
emplpyed in Section 3 ,of ■ the previous ■ chapter* ■ It was 
ba9ed^on #wihg*8 ô w  statement that the oohcept of fit- ;
tingness is wider : than the. concept of goodness* since 
there is a fitting response^  to bad objects, namely* an
anti-attitude.,' and also one to indifferent objects* namely * ;
ah attitude of ignoring# We argued that since,this-was ,. 
the oasè, and since we had shown that fittingness itself ’^v-l
could only be understood in connection .with the terms • / / i
between which it could hold*: there must therefore be some- . /j
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/something eommon to the three types of object and 
to:the three,types of attitude over and above the 
differenoea between them* and it was as signifying 
this.something found in all three types of object 
that, we employed the term "object", and* similarly 
the term !%ttltude" was used to signify whatever: it 
is that the three different attitudes have in common,
Section .1» Agreement.in Difference#
The question we must.';noW ask is how we are to envisage 
the relation between what is common and what is dif­
ferent in the three types of object and in the three 
types of attitude#
Let US consider the case of attitude# Are we to 
consider that there is one or a number of characteris­
tics found in exactly the same way In all three attit­
udes* and that the differences between them lie outside 
these notes* so that* for example, the concept of pro­
attitude is formed by addin;^  to the concept of attitude 
the notes covered by the phrase "favourable and positive"? 
Or, are we to consider that the differences between, for 
example* jEgg-àttltude and anti#attitude are actually con­
tained within the notion of attitude itself so tWt we 
oazmot say that these two types of attitude agz'ee in so 
far as they possess in a like manner some one or a 
number of characteristics and disagree in the further
' . : ' ' :. - 
/further Gl^moteristiOB which moh pqseesses?
The first interpretation seem to be
bidêër to the géheràl line' of Biwing'thought* for 
what wér Would then be doing would bo to substitute* 
for the simple concept of fittingness* a complex 
concept* which*;- like Biwing^ s- concept of fittingness, ■ 
is unlvooal; i#e* * we should be treating "fitting- 
attitude",as, which is found instantiated
in^exactly the same way in various applications* 
and iifhidh can be abstracted from these Instances. 
IbaVlng aside the further notes/which mark off the - 
different species" of fittlng^àttltude from each 
other# Aiid we may note now that we qssumed this 
interpretaticn .wheh we were, emmlnlng B'fihg*'a\ owh con#' 
ceptlon of *Wontal attitude" # But we must now ask the 
question; can we form à cpi%oept of attitude which is 
b^ elthei; a pro-^ attltude# noj; .an anti-attitude, nor an 
attitude of ignoring? It may be the case* to employ 
the phrase which Ewlng uses in connection ivith '!flt- 
tingness", that the concept "attitude" is wider,in 
extension than the concept of pro-attitude* or of anti 
attitude etc#; but the crucial question is whether we 
go bh this to conclude that it is therefore
ïWs must follow if m  treat 
the concept as unlvocal* end it is precisely this that
/that we now put in question* To Illustrate the
eame question from the complementary angle* we may 
ask whether we can form a concept of the differen­
tiating marks* as, for example, those covered by the 
phrase "positive and favourable" and those covered by 
"negative and hostile", in abstraction from the concept 
of attitude itself? It is true that if we are confront­
ed with two attitudes, eèg** one of desiring and one of 
aversion, we can say that we have two attitudes which 
differ in that one is dir^otM towards an oble^ ct* and 
the other is away from an object* But what is
meant by "directed towards" and by "directed away" in 
this connection cannot be understood in abstraction from 
the notion of attitude itself# What this reflection 
suggests* however, la that the notion of attitude itself 
can only be grasped in connection with the notion of 
objectI what differs in the two cases we are consider­
ing is................... .
object is realised# We can have desiring-attitudes and
aversion-^ attitudes, but the desiring attitude is attldude
as desiring# and the averslon-^ attitude is altitude ag
aversion* We cannot therefore say that there is one
common element found in exactly the same way in the two
oases, and whioh is speolfied by contrary notes* The
similarity between the attitudes of desiring and aversion 
(whioh justifies them both being viewed through the same
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/same oonoept of attitude) is realised la and through 
their dlfferemees»
A similar argument can he used to show that the 
term notion of object aa it appears within the complex 
of attltude-ohjeot cannot he ahstraqted and considered 
in Isolation from the speciflo notes which are supposed 
to mark off good objects frpm had ones aqd from indif­
ferent ones, Thus, It is as hQd that a,n object is the 
object of an attitude, it is as indifferent that an ob­
ject is the object of an attitude, it is as o^od that an 
object is the object of an attitude, and we cannot ab­
stract from the differing objects one common note found 
in exactly the same manner in all of them, and which is 
signified by the phrase "object of attitude"# We must* 
on the contrary* say that the similarity between the good* 
the bad, and the indifferent objects which is signified by 
"object of attitude" is realised in and through the dif­
ferences between them# This point, however, can be shown 
more directly by drawing attention to the fact that, since 
"attitude to an object" and "object of an attitude" are 
correlative terms, the analogical structure of the concept 
of attitude must be matched by the analogical structure of 
the concept of objects Consequently it is the complex 
notion of the relational unity signified"by "attitude- 
object" which must be treated as analogical, and thus as 
an idea which cannot be abstracted and considered in isol-
/isolation from its manifestation in differing cases*
However, since various and contrary manifestations 
of,attitude and object can each be found we have to 
faqe the question of how we are to "pair off** object 
and attitude In each case-in order to preserve the re­
lational unity whioh each case exhibits # How are we to 
determine the type^of object which "goes with" a pro- 
attitude, the type which "goes with" an antiTattitudo, 
etc*? It is useless to say that an%-attitude is linked 
ifith.a bad object* pro-attitude with a good object, 
since, according to Ewing, "object of anti-attitUde" is 
at least part of what is a^eant by saying of an object 
that it is *%ad", and similarly in the case of a good 
object# Furthermore, we can regard Bwing^s argument for 
the necessity of including in our definitions of %ood" 
and of "bad" a further (non-natural) element as illus- 
trating precisely the,fact that mere empirical observ- 
ation of the tojgethern,ess of a particular attitude and 
a particular object can never discover for us the presence 
of a stable and unchanging relational unity* Thus, one 
and the same object may, so he argues, in fact, be the
object of opposing attitudes4 With this we must agree* 
it is clear tlmt if we confine the critical value of the 
terms "object" and "attitude" to the empirical data through 
whioh a particular attitude and a particular object are 
revealed to us, we can never reach more than a de facto
s' 231* .
çoajimotion between àotual attitude and aotual
object#
We have; however, shown at length why we cannot 
açoept Bwingfe. method for tranef|ormi'ng the factual inr 
to necessary çonjUnotion# VJhat he argues for is the 
nz^segoe (discernible by the intuitive eye) in all value 
phenomena of one unique non-naturai relation, whioh is 
found in exactly the same manner 'in all its instances# 
According to our analysis in Chapter y much g(ore is rer 
quired of the "converted naturalist" than the mere récog­
nition and addition to his "naturalistic world" of a 
simple ndn..natural relation# This relation cannot in 
itself be viewed as sufficient to t#nsform the world of 
mattere of fact Into the world of values#
Hence, the impossibility of accounting for the dis­
tinctive nature of value judgments by the sole recourse 
to empirical data leads us to demand a meta-emnirlca1 
account of the terms "attitude" and "object". It does 
not follow that because, when they are given a purely 
^^ naturalistic" interpretation, they fail to provide us 
with one constant relational unity, these same terms, when 
given a meta-emplrical interpretation, will equally fail.
Section 2* Ontolo^loal Goodness and the Existence
The Thomist theory of ontological goodness provides an 
answer to thé problem we are considering. According to
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/to this theory there is iiflthln the structure of 
reality a fundamental relational unity of being-ln- 
potency and being-ln-aot* each finite being is in 
potenoy to further being and this potenoy expresses 
itself as a tendency or urge whose formal object is 
being-in-aot# It 1$, eonsequëntly, impossible
that there should be a finite being wbj.oh is not char­
acterised by this urge or tendency, and it is impos­
sible tWt there ehouild be any being %)hioh, in so far 
as it does exercise being-in-act is not In this
the "object" of this metaphysical tendency. The 
term whioh is employed to signify this tendency is the 
term "desire", and the term used to signify being as the 
object of this desire is the term "good" (1).
What we wish to suggest is that the relational unity 
of attitude-object finds its ultimate significance in the 
metaphysical relationship of being-in-potenoy - being-in- 
act. This relationship is metaphysical; that is to say, 
it characterises the bejh^ of things and is, consequently, 
not merely a relationship into which things can enter, but 
it is a relationship which no being can escape# Being-in- 
act is necesqaa^ ily the object of being-in-potency. Being- 
in-potency uecgsseirily desires belng-in-aot. Hence, In 
describing goodness as "being in so far as it is desirable" 
we must understand the term "desirable" in the sense of
"able to be desired according to the metaphysical principles
?
. / /- -y
/prlnqlpiès; governing, thç order of being as ,sUqh"* And 
thé:sole oondition whioii muât bè fulfilled in order that 
bqihg shp(ÿd bo: !*abl^  be de$lrèd" in this sense Is 
that; it shquid ^be.yih.iâêt*. Hëhdè thére 'is; no} need to. . 
ühdêrstïàhd :* d^eAiWblo! as "fitting} to bê: desired!* in the 
sensé ;ih\i&iqh Ewing employs this phrase, treatizlg fit- 
tinghess as a unique relation whioh is added to the terms 
sigMfièd i^ " d e s i r e ? : a n d ( I X .  HÎs: argument for 
th@ néoéssitÿ of; suoh;an addition oiily has strength if w® 
aboept a mturalistio. interpretation of ^ t^ terms "deëire** 
and: "object"* .But when wb give these terms their full.\ 
metaphysical;signifiqancc we see that of themselves they 
form.a neobèsary'.relational- imity: which,far., from, contra­
dicting empirical'eyidbnq'e* ban itself be,'shown to be re- 
qulr ed if : we are to give a coherent explanation of this 
évidence*. ". \ \  ^' ' '
. The doctrine tlmt every being is, in a certain 
respbot, ■ (namely, in so far as it or exercises the ; 
act of bèixig) ' good, and therefore able'to become an object 
of désire would be rejected by Ewing bn thé ground that 
some beings are clearly bad* Thus, in Ewing*s viewj the 
doctrine of ontological goodness is plainly contradicted 
by the facts of experlehoe* Ewing, indeed accepts with­
out analysis the existence of bad things* ':#ow it is true 
that the theory of ontological goodness implies that there 
is ,110, being which, considered simply as being, is bad*
/bad* But in. ordar to unaeyatand tho import af this 
theory We mttst bear in mind that no finite' being is 
atmply being as suoh» each finite baihg is a being 
Of,à eèrtain kind> or nature,! and it is through this 
nature that it exercises being«»in*6ct. it is also in 
and through this nature that ;lt dssir.eg more being) 
and», cleariy) the;"more being” which it.desires'must 
be "more\being" of a kind that it.can exercise in and 
throhgh its .nature» it does not foliow thorofore,that,
because'to far as'ea,ch/finite'being'exercises'the act 
of being'it'possesses'ontological goodness, no finite , 
.belhg’ can,',in its, totality of act of being together 
with nature, be.really bad* On the contrary, it aeema 
to us tliat this theory does eimbla, us to account for 
the .exiStenOe of bad things in,a manner which is more 
satisfactory than that which can be found in.Ewing's 
theory.
theory a bad thing la, byJieflaitlon# a 
"fitting objeot of ai% amtl-attltade?, Thla, however, Ig 
what 1$ meant by calling a thing bad; It does not pro- 
vide aa with any reason, for the badneae of the bad thing. 
The qama m y  be ;9aid In ôbnhéption with the définition of 
a good thing* Now$ Ewing states explloltly (1) that the 
"ground" of the goodness of a thing liés In the factual 
■qhiran.ter 1btig-lj, ' pf • whàt we ' pronounce good. - The ’ same, ' 
therefore, will be true of bad things; the ground or
23$. '
/or reason of the badness of things must be sought 
In the natural or empirical bharaoterlstlos of the 
thing judged bad. If, however, this la the ease It 
follows that the dlfferenee :between good things and 
bad things oonoerns solelv what is natural, or emplr- 
loal4. But the whole Import of Ewing theory 1$ 
centred In the view that from empirical facts It Is 
never possible to extz^ aot Value facts. If so, then 
We mt:^ t, Conclude that the difference between good 
things and bad things:
qf yalue. This same conclusion is forced on us If we 
compare the two. definitions of good.ness and badness: 
for, assuming that the term "fittingness" signifies 
one simple unique relation, the same Izi both definitions, 
We are left with only the natural terms "pra*#attltude" 
and "ahtl"#attitude" to mark the difference between what 
Is peant by "good" and what Is meant by "bad".
Finally, since Bwlng recognises a third possible 
"species" of attitude ivhloh can enter Into the relation 
of fittingness with an object, namely, the attitude of 
ignoring which is appropriate to indifferent objects, 
we may conclude that here too there is no difference in 
yalue between such an object and either a good or a bad 
object*
It is Interesting to note that, with the inclusion 
of Indifferent objects Into the sphere of the relation of
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/of EMlng seems to Wve established this
relation as all pervasive, einoe, presumably, any 
objeot must bè the "fitting objeot" of one or another 
of the three types of attitude# When we bear In mind 
that it is solely by this relation of flttlngness that 
the world of emplrloal faqts Is transformed.Into the 
world of values, we are tempted to make a comparison be^ # 
tween the place of this unique non-natural entity In 
Eiilng^ s system, and the place of ontological goodness . 
In the Thomlat theory of value* .Doth are all pervasive, 
and each fulfils the function of "establishing" the 
realm of %lue facts; that Is to say, within their own 
systems each stands as the ultimate principle of all 
value facts# But .here, the similarity ends; Ewing 
"fittingness" does not Itself provide the ground of 
difference between ^ ood. bad, and indifferent objects; 
this is to be found in the realx^  of empirical facts, so 
that, Ih fact, the world of values and gëâl 
values (l#e;, bad things) has two different and entirely 
separate grounds between lAich there is no common prin­
ciple of intelligibility# In the Thomist theory, on 
the other hand, the reality of value and the distinction 
between real dlsvalue and real value has one ultimate 
principle of intelligibility, and the distinction be­
tween good and bad objects is itself s distinction with- 
in thé realm of value#
. Aocording: to Thomlst: tbeprÿ, ail j udgmehts pf rvaiue y:/
(ivWther .pf gPPd pr bad pbjeqts) qre imdé In -the light ;
of t W  nptioiïipf being cmsldered às ^objoct pf désire"! ;; 
we oan sây thkt the j^ q^tion /of "being: so fâr as it Is \1
désirable" prpvides the formality, of .-all judgments of 
value* Whenever.,' therefore, we judge an bbjeot from the 
point of view of its value we are judging it from the
point of view of its ?being as desirable". But no finite
being is sheer being; as suoh; it is being ^  being of a / X
certain kind. The aet of being whioh it exerolses (and 
whioh enables it to ?fal]_ under!? the notion of ?being as ? 
desirable*?) is exéroisèd in and^  through ItB nature. Con- / i 
sequentiy, while it is still beinR in act Which grounds 
our judgment of value this .being is now .determined to a . 
certain kind of being, and when we ask whether the object % 
is good we are asking whether being, as it is exercised ://
is "desirable". But^ -^ /:; 
immediately we see that In order to render this question , //
intelligible we must turn to the other term of the relat­
ionship "being-in-pôtënoy - being-in-aot." For, as such, 
being-in-potency desires purely and simply being-in-a'ot.
If then we introduce, as we have just done, a determination -s 
- ' ' ' ' .. . . ' ' . ^ ' : XL:into the being-in-act whose desirability ip in question, we
must Introduce a corresponding determination into the being; :
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/bêlns^ln-poteaey which Is la question, so tMt this 
latter oaa be vléwél as escpreselag Itself in a need 
or desire of a oertaln kind, or as belonging to a 
certain nature. Consequently, while this latter desire 
iB, as àlmjÿa# desire for being In act, the determin­
ation of the desire (through the nature of the subject 
%#lOh ha^ the désire) oarrléâ with It the;determination 
of the belng-lh'CiGt which Is vlei^ ed as "desirable" to 
belng-li!'*aot of the sort whioh can be received by and 
exeroised In the desiring subject.# HenOe, when wé ask 
whether a particular objeot, oi' a partlqular k!lx%d of 
object is good there 1$ and must be a reférenoe to being- 
in-potéhoy as this Is expressed in and through a deter­
minate nature; that is to say, there must bé a reforenoe 
to a partioular l;in^  of desiring subjeot.
At this level w® can provide a meaning for the term 
"bad" whioh makes the dlstinotlon between "good" and "bad" 
a distinction within the realm of value itself. The level 
at whioh we are how viewing the relationship of being-ln- 
potency - being-lh-aot is the level of bein^ whioh are 
composed of pqt%e, and act of being* To ask whether an 
object is good or bad at this level is to ask whether the 
bélng which it exercises in and through its nature con­
tributes to or prevents the exercise of being in a subject 
as. this is realised in and through the nature of that 
subject# Both judgments (of "good" and "bad") are made
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/made within the formality of "being in so far as it 
is desirable"', biit "being" has now become ' apeoifled 
to beihg as this^qan be exercised through the nature
I  ' 'of the desirlhg #bjeot, From this point of view an
object is good it contributes towards the actual- 
ishtion of the potentialities of the subject under con-Isidération, it ig^ bad if It prevents or destroys such#a - possible aotimlj^ lsatioh. In. both oases (of "goodness" 
and "badness") t%e points of reference are the same:
(1) there is a reference.to a desiring subject,.and, (2) 
there is a reference-to the formal object of this desir­
ing subject, namely, the complete a<itmlisatlon of its 
beinf!* And wMt is being judged is the status of the 
object under consideration within.the dynamic order oonw* 
Stltuted by the subject^s tendency towards being#ln4act,
A "good" object is one which plays a part in this order, 
and a "bad" object is one which infringes this order» A 
"good" object Is one which, in the exercise of its[ being 
through Its nature, can contribute to the actualisation 
of the being of which the desiring subject is capable, a 
"bad" object is one which, in the exercise of its being, 
prevents or infi*inges on the exercise of being of which 
the desiring subject is capable» We see that in this 
dyhamlo order there is room for opposing attitudes on the 
part of the subject in relation to which we are judging 
objects: as contributing toimrds this order a "good"
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/'■'‘gopcl” objjeet is' Mcsggai’iS.F tüe ob^QSt of « “pro- 
attitWe” g a bad o'bjoat la ii$oesaai?ily the objeot of 
aa '•aati-'attitWe”» Siaoe eaeh awbjeet aeeesaas?!!^ )
• 4a. the meaaofQ la 'éii%eh it has .act aolàieveâ t.iae full 
aetmli-satioh of the boiag of yshlûïi it is  eaj^blo, 
deglms ”a w 0 $ eaeh gmbjeet» this
clpKiïïîle movement) mast aeaeasai'ily seok q M  m l o o m o  
■tMt t'Jhrleh eomtï'lbmtès tomyâs its aotoa'iisatioa) anü 
avoM aad ?op@l that whioh p3?e#eats os? iafrlogoG apoa 
Its aet-uaWaatioiil,■' (inâf m  m y  add, it is also pos»* 
sibl© at this lewol to fiad a plaoe for the attltHd© 
of ighorlhgp- ailles «e can envisage the possibility that 
tf» heiïig of a partiehla%' objaet as esereisei in a M  
through its aatiws oeither eohtrihates toi®rds aos? in-» 
fpioges the realisation or aetuailsation of tlio being 
of a osrtaia partlsula** !$iaâ of subjoat*
I t  follows, therefore, o n  this theory, that a 
■*good object" Qoa eqmlly be âesoribôd as aa objest %iMoh 
soatrlbatos to the ©stualisatioa of the being of whish a 
parbisiilar k S M  of shbjeot is capable, or as the objeet 
of s pyoswattitttcio, m û  a "bad oW@gt" as one which ia»» 
friages or preveats the aetnalisatlon of the being of 
whioh a pa»tloul®y hiad of sitbjwt la capaMe, or as the 
ùbjôQt of an anti^ttitaSe»
We ttitts  seea to  approaoii Bwiîîg’ s proposed d é f in it io n s  o f  
"good” aaft "bad” in terms ef " o#attitnde" and"anti»
respeùtlvely, but life bave ômltteâ 
la, ftxp lilm, t#i@ zaost ijapcortairb elcwa&nd; 1& tl%8 
dê'fïnltloziÿ the fua*ther èlemmt of ^^ fittlng-
neaa'\ Thé ohj ootloa i^ hloh -Bxflng - wcfwl& brihë '%'galhat 
qm? poaltloa can. eaaily be aèen, but w  are adW in. a 
position to defend ôüfselves# We Would entirely agree 
with Swing that to judge an object good and to judge 
that someone or Something is seeking it or desiring It 
is hot to make one and the same judgment# Consequent­
ly^  if the terms '^ object'* and '^pro-attltude" are inter­
preted naturalistldally our ahnlyala'le unacceptable. 
à series of^statements regarding the observable rel­
ation between the observable charaoteristios of a 
natural phenomenon and' the observable behaviour of some­
one or something) described purely in empirical terms 
describes a hatieàl event and we agree entirely %'^ith 
Swing that from such a *^matter of faot^ * no. "fact of 
value** can be deduced or eztraoted. But) in the previous 
chapter, we have shoim tliat Ewing*s ovm theory of **fit- 
tinghess" does itself require that a non-naturallstic 
Ihterpretatibh be put on the terms "attitude** and "ob­
ject") and, hence, on the terms "pro-attitude" and "anti­
attitude"# &nd in this present chapter ' we have attemptisd 
to attach a metaphysical signifioahce to these terms in 
the light of the doctrine of being-ln-potency - belzig*^ ln- 
act# Against Èwlng^s objection we argue that to ask
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/aslt whether an object Is "good" or "bad" Is Immed­
iately to place ourselves within the forznality of 
"being in so far as it is desirable", and to guide 
ourselves by the principle that each being desires 
the full ejEercise of the being of which it is capable. 
Our question then bears on the status which the ob­
ject under consideration occupies within the dynamic 
order of being-in^potency - being-in-act as this is 
specified in a particular finite being# To gay that 
the object la good lë to say that the object belongs, 
to this order and hence the object of a pro-atti- 
tUde on the part of the finite being which is the 
subject# To say that the object is bad is to say that 
the object upsets this order and hence the object 
of an anti**attitude, since "pro-attitude" and"anti- 
attitude" are themselves speoifloatlons of the meta­
physical drive or urge or tendency which has belng-in- 
act as its foraml object# We m y  say that it Is by 
reacting in contrary fashion to that %\fhioh enhances 
and to that which Infringes or prevents the realis­
ation of its own actuality that each finite being ex­
presses, the fundamental meta­
physical dynamic relation which ].inks belng-in-aet to 
being-ln-potency#
In this final chapter we have not attempted to offer more 
than a very brief sketch of what we consider to be the 
elements of a theory of goodness more satisfactory than 
that provided by Ewli^ g; and we have tried to do this 
while at the same time keeping as close as possible to
/to Ewing^a argimenta# It is, however, olëar 
from his mm:'Writings that Biving., and Indeed many 
others, would hhve aeriqhs obgëotiôns to raieo against 
our theory, yiewod ih certain of its apparent implio- 
ations* It seems important to anticipate the moat 
opvipue of these ob je étions and to indicate briefly in 
what measure our theory is capable of meeting it#
This ob je et ion oonoea^ hs the 'apparent ■^gelativity of 
goo(hiësh on our theory: if the goodness of an object
lies in lté power to perfect a particular/subject, then 
there will be as many *^ ord^ rs" of goodness ae there are 
desiring subjects @ or, supposing that we can subsume 
partieular beings midef definite spooies, there will, at 
any rate, be as maxiy ordei's of goodness ag there are 
speoleS'Of finite beings# Goodness, then, will be 
lative to the species uilder consideration: the different
species will act as so many centrés of réference ivlthin 
which an object can be viewed as good, but it will be 
ImpossibleAto view any object lîithoùt relating it to such 
a centre of réference* We must note in passing that this 
objection is distlnot from the more obvious and less con- 
vincing one that our theory places the ^q|%d of the gootl^  
ness of an object in the "needs" of a des#ing subject#
It is true that, on oui' theory, goodness appears to us as 
the desirable, but the ground of goodness is found in 
actuality - in the degree of being which an object oxer-
/exercises; :lt is tblp readorsTthe .object -
Gàpable/çf pe#oqtlng a "ae#y" subjoctA, The present 
.objection^ however,. #111 stande %Wn this la recog- 
hla#^ ,for it might stlli be the. càeo tMt we are left . : 
,#th a amber of dlaorete oentree of reference betwoea. 
which no çbmoqtlon Is %>o#lble, and t#é: would force 
us altnya to add to ow judgments of goodness a, qual­
ifying pWaee ée, for emmplo, "relative, to the needs ' 
of the èpeclee*^ It would never be possible for
Ù9 to attribute to an object a nq^ i-relatlVe goodwos*
This 'aeeme to be a very aerlous defect for .we do eoem.at 
times to appreliehd or reoogalee In an object & goodnoss 
whiob la ,0%^  relative la the s.ehse la whloh i^e Mve hero 
be:0à using Mils term# For e3i%^ mplo$ .the goodnèos of Imw*' 
ledge appears to us am "good in Itéelf" and apt mqrely as 
*^gbod jü&S members of the huma apeoleo"* . If$ however, no 
i^t my; be pb#oted,. we are W ^ d  by âa a#hroppoentrlc 
point of reference, pan never provide a ratloaal just- 
If lea t lea for this Impreeeloa of ao%%frelativity# Horo'^  
over, and this la the mpet eerloue aspect .of -the sltmt- 
Ipa, we shall be caught In an uwvoldàblo lllaelom, for 
we shall bè forced to judge all goodnees in the light of 
aotioas deriving from our aatlwopoceat%4c point of refer- 
ewo, and to, attribute aoarre^tlvlty tJliere we "see" ao%%- 
relativity, v^ lthout in either case being la a positloa to ; 
justify 0% point of view# This ia a particularly .
/particularly serious objection for us, for, in fact, 
what is being:imputod to us is precisely that funda­
mental defeot which we have attacked in Ewing*s epis- 
teAology, namely, the lack of critical justification 
for ‘ the notions • of ideas employed by thé .'human -mind in ■ 
judging the real,' the Motions being, in this case, those 
concerned with our judgments of goodness#
This last reflection, however, gives Us a certain 
indication of where we must look for the elements neces­
sary to defend our position against the objection* Let 
us begin by considering what, in fact, is being asked of 
Us within the framework of our own conceptions* In his 
commentafy on Chapter I, Book I, of thé HÏCOMACBlâH 
ETHICS Stv :Thomas makes it clear (1) that good is a 
"first notion" and that consequently it cannot, Strict­
ly speaking, be defined, since there are ho notions more 
primary into which it could be resolved* It can only be 
described by something which is derivative from it, as, 
for example, a cause may be described in terms of its 
effects* The characteristic of good, however, is to 
move appetite, and it is in this sense that Aristotle*s 
definition, "Goodness is what all desire" may be accept­
ed as a description of what we mean by the term "good- 
ness"* It follows from this account that the concept of 
goodness is a relational concept since we can only think 
Of goodness in relation to appetite* From our point of
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/of vlev)., therefore, there oan be ao question of eoh- 
eomethlag ag good j&thsugjLZ§Wl&^^ *
And the question at le sue is , therefore, the question 
of whether we oaa justify the distiaotioa betweea judg^ » 
meats of . value which assert %  is eood'fqr and. those 
whioh assert "Z is good"* If, la both caèos, the ooa- 
qept of good ooataias a reference to appetite,,how is 
it possible to omit the qualifying, phrase in 'the second 
ease? Our answer must be that this omission Can only be 
justified if our own appetite is itself an appetite whose 
actual object is nothing less than being-in-aot ag,-%çh* 
Thus for us the problem of justifying our belief that 
certain objects are "good in themselves" is not.a quest­
ion of finding and defining a type of goodness which has 
ho reference to appetite; it Is a question of finding an 
appetite whose "relativity" is not limited to a partic­
ular type of good) but which is open to the Eood as such.
the Thomist theory of the interpenetration of intel­
lect and will, rendering the will an intelligent power, 
lit from within by intelligence, ensures that the "good", 
which is the formal object of the will, is equally trans­
cendental with tile "true", the formal object of the Intel' 
loot; for, as the human intellect is measured by nothing 
less than being as such, so the human will is limited by
2 W  '
/bjr Qofelîtïis less tissu being ss sneh. M b Ûq no mere 
ttoîi^ aeatimi this tMseÿy here* aeknewjedging that, 
in an IsidepeMent presentation of the ïïhoraist shll# 
osophy of value, it would demnd priority of .place 
and detailed elabOîsation,; It. is, however, clear that 
it la from ifithln this theory tîsat the present object* 
ion of the' "relativity" of goodness, aodordiîig to, our 
theory stust. be mot, and for this purpose .ve draw at­
tention to the following eosisideratlons*.
i’he human being, is a finite ..being, and therefore .^ 
his desire- for "more being" is -eaipressed in and.through' 
the 'various powers'’.x-Moh ctoraoterise -Ms #ture,
%ile' mihtalnliig, 'as always* the Idontlfloatlon of. the 
"good" or "desirable" with being»in*aot we may thus on-* 
visage T#n^s relation to'his-good as expressing itself 
in a -.oertaih' -struotur# of potentiality  ^'aotUallty re­
lations, correspoadiag to the powers whlOh laan Is- capable 
of eseroising* 5ow, we suggest tiiat the dlstlnotion to 
vj'aie,h we have, referred-botweoa "3C is good" and "X is good 
for - y" can be preserved in our theory if m  recognise 
within the powers/which ma.n exercises a distinction be­
tween those - which are essentially the .expression of a 
finite or limited toeing, and those which do not nec.es- 
sarily .carry the mrk of finitude;* fhls distinction m y  
be illustrated toy comparing Smowledae end,health con-
/oonglderéd as perfeotloaS) the former of the Intel­
lect, and the latter of the body* I%i the human being 
eaoh of these perfeotlons Is pfesent as (?ood tb bq
rather than as a fully aotualised %)erfeotion; 
that is to say, it is shown forth or "foreshadowed", 
in the oorrespondlng "appetite" or "desire"* But If 
We Qompare the i:my in which these two perfections are 
foreshadoi'jed in their oorresponding appetites we see 
that there io an important difference in the two oases# 
The desire for knowledge is the desire for the actual­
isation of a poimr which ir^ itself ^ if we abstract from 
the conditions In which this power is exercised in us# 
does not require, as a necessary condition of its exer­
cise and consequently of its beinis; as a power, a refer­
ence to what is other than J±self^ # Thus its beini% is 
not necessarily limited by the being of what is other, 
than, itself , and consequently it does not contain with­
in itself the mark of finitude# As act, or perfection, 
therefore, the power of knowing may be considered as a 
perfection of belmz as such# On the other hand, if we 
consider the perfection signified by the term "iBalth" 
we see that what is referred to is a certain harmony of
vital functions which is necessarily dependent on the 
activity of some other power whose prinoiple is pther 
than the principle of the vital function concerned*
For example, my digestive organs function correctly,
/oprreçtly^ my body la, health Ohly. If!
they-^re proylded: with imterlal whlch. hA^ its origin 
là à beli^ ifhlch, Is Mother than*' myself... !l0n.oe, ,the 
perfection signified by the term^"health" (when under^ 
stood literally) pan only be attribûted/tp a, fl#te  ^
being: it is,a mode of being neoèssarilyobne^fhed.
%4)i/bh a# henpe relatly^ finite being*: . It Cannot,^  , 
therefore, be said, to^  ^ a. perfeotion of being :as , s)^h»
, \ The ; theory which;ifo, have eketohed here, is found lin : 
the Thomist dietlnotlph between pure and perfect^
ions:, and it plays an liyportant part in the final stages 
of the arguments emplpyèd, to deteriAlne the positlyp at- 
trlbutegof aod (l).:^  Wish to , suggest is that this
tlièory proyides grounds for the distlhetion betxveeh %  Is 
good" pnd "X Is good for ahdLthat it thus embies us
to esoape the priticlsm that, in defining good in relat­
ion to appetite, we are unable tp provide, in bur theory,
for that type of goodness with which such writers as
Mpof(0, Ewing, a M  Boss^ are most concerned, and which they 
all. Pall: "intrinsic",. -
We repeat, "good" is a relative term, for Its concept
neoessarlly cphtains a reference to appetite; but we
" ' .  ^ ' ' - ' ; - maintain that this "relativity" does not hPOQ^sarily cpnv
deinn all gopdhbss to the status of "good for Y", and that, 
in partlouiar,:ln his value judgments man is not neces­
sarily and unaypidabiy limited to an anthropocentrlo
# '
/anthrbppçoxitrlc centre of reference - or, to 
another way,, there is within man-^ s centre of referende 
thé possihiiity of ah' ahqplute polht of View* Xl) Thé 
scope' of imn?s\ possible value judgmeats Is hot deter- ' 
mined by those perfections whiôh/chàractêrise his finite 
hàthre# On the contrary, by virtue of,the' spiritukl ' ‘ 
pWers #ich hé possesses iwh Is able to frame value / 
judgments;Ih the light of perfections Which are perfect­
ions of Mias M  such:and- which, mu^.’therefore bé regard- 
ed as. goods tq be atoed at in and for themselveq without 
reference or restriction to a particular type of nature, 
shch as huiaan nature itself* Knowledge is good and heces' 
arily good, since it is a perfection of being as sitoh*
Goneludlng Bêmarks ;
have done no more here than indicate briefly thé line 
of defence which we - should adopt before what seems to ,us 
the most fundamental of the criticisms likely to be level­
led against our own position. Mention must, howevér, be 
made of one further point on which a mis under standing may 
arise. We have spoken of the spiritual perfections as 
"goods.to be aimed at in and for themselves", and the 
gerundive form of this phrase might suggest that we have 
here the foundation of the moral order» We should then 
have to face questions of the form, "Are, then, all partic­
ular acts of knowing morally good?" In a more general form
/form the question may be framed as to whether, in 
order to judge of the mor^j ;:oodhess of an âot, it is 
suffioient gimply to reoognise in it the exercise of 
a spiritual perfection* Our ansimr to this question 
is "Noj": and if we have defended ourselves against
the charge of reducing all goodness to the relative 
status "good for. man"^ we must face the apparently 
paradoxical position that^  according to our theory,
TJhat is "good in it$elf" may not be "good for man"*
We accept this position, provided it be, understood 
that in the piriraae "good for mn" are referring to 
man as he la in the state of having aomethin^ to do Ih 
order tO:realise'his completo and ultimate good#
We suggest that moral goodness Is essentially linked to 
the conception of man as homo viator and that we cannot 
identify what is good for man in this state with what 
would be good for man in the supposition that he had at­
tained his final or ultimate perfection# We admit that 
the saine argument whereby we defend our theory of goodness 
against the charge of anthropoeeatrlam establishes the 
thesis that man^s ultimate good or perfection must coin- 
oide with that which is "good in itself". But what we wish 
to insist on is that the moral order concerns precisely 
human acts considered in their relation to the at ta ining of 
man*8 final good,, and that, viewed in this perspective,
/perapeietivè. It doe# aot follow ttoat aay a #  every 
réalisatioa of a partiealar spiritual perfsotloa ig 
Kjorallv good, good* tWt is to say, as ooaduoive 
towards the attalmaeat of mn's final good. Feats 
of athletic skill which are "good for" the fully 
trained a#%l@te*. which, for him, are the expïéàsiOa 
of his "Ohjoyment" of athletic perfection, may with'* 
out.any coatradlcttoh bo correctly judged to be, dur*»
Ing trailing, detrimental to the attainment of that 
yefy perfe.ctlcn of which they themselves are the expres-»» 
Sion*
Moral goodness cohcerns human aotlCh under the con*» 
ditiohs of hu#h existence as "we know the latter, and 
w#t Is of first importance in the assessment' of - such 
goodness 'is the strerigth and dirGCtioa of the .will, since 
.it -la. by his will. tMt m n  moves towards the good ■'•'which 
he does hot possess» S^he functlon of the intellect in 
this .sphere is to aid the will end not to exercise its 
,own specific perfection without reference to the reper*» 
eussion of such exercise on the will’s tendency towards 
the "really good". Thus, it is important to aistinguish 
between m n in the state of moving towards his final 
perfection or'good,'and m n  in the state of possessing 
or "enjoyiîig" this ■ perfection, or good*
' We find an indicatlo.n of the correctness of making
: 2! 5r3, :.
/imking this distinction In coimeotion \^ itU tlie theory 
of goodness whlCh ve have here put forward in a remark 
of Tàpmas*s cpnCefnlng God's providential knoifledge#
The objection is/mde (1) that siàcég aecording to St# 
Augustine g "It is better to bolgndrant of some things 
thah to Imow themÿ for. example). ignoble things"^  ve must 
conclude that God has not Immediate providence oSrer Ig­
noble and I'jioked things# Replying* 8t* Thoms says* "It : 
is better for Us not to Imoiv evil and ignoble things* in 
so far as by them to-area Impeded In our knowledge of what 
is better and higher (for we cannot understand many things 
simultaneously) and in so far as the thought of evil some- 
times perverts the iKll towards evil*. This does not hold 
true of God * \#io côés everything simultaneously at one 
glance* and Wlipse will cannot turn In the direction of 
evil"* Here St # Thomas ' a > reply ,1s based on two marks 
which characterise thé exercise of the spiritual powers 
in man* namely* (1) the temporal mode of existence in which 
our intellectual activity is exercised* and* (2) the sus­
ceptibility of our will to be diverted from its inclin-
' ' ' . ' 'ation to the really good to the desire for and ehjoyment
in that which is incompatible with* or destructive of* this 
good# mere these conditions of spiritual activity are 
absent* as in the case of God* and* according to Thomist 
theory* in the case of man's final state of perfection* 
then all exercise of spiritual perfection is good#
2^»
Our purpose in this thesis has not been to provide 
an account of Thomist moral theory. This latter views 
moral philosophy as the science of man's actions con­
sidered in relation to his final end* and an adequate 
presentation of it presupposes the elaboration of the 
whole metaphysical structure of being* culminating in 
the proof of the existence of an Infinite Being* and 
returning from this to an analysis of the metaphysical 
status of man# The above brief remarks* therefore* on 
moral" goodness are ,in no way intended as an introduct­
ion to Thomist moral theory# Moreover* we are aware 
that the suggestions we have made regarding moral good­
ness give rise to further questions and require a great 
deal of detailed clarification* This should* however* 
in our opinion* form the subject of a separate study* 
for which this present work might serve as an introduct­
ion# It is true that the question* how "good" is to be 
defined* is presented by Moore and Ewing as the most 
important and fundamental question in Ethics* but our - 
examination of Ewing's attempt to answer this question* 
together with the considerations we have put forward con­
cerning "non-naturalism" in general have* we hope* shown 
that while the answer to this question may be of vital 
importance for ethical enquiry* the question itself and 
the elements required for its answer belong not to Ethics 
but to MgtaPhysics»
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